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 In 2013, the Supreme Court decided, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center 
v Nassar, that Title VII retaliation claims should be interpreted under the stricter but-for 
causality instructions. This requires claims of retaliation to show that the plaintiff’s 
discrimination complaint (or involvement in a discrimination claim) is the direct cause of the 
adverse action, as compared to a motivating factor that is required under the less strict motivating 
factor causal instructions. The current research examines the role of regulatory focus (promotion 
v. prevention), causal instructions, employment action (promotion v. dismissal), and number of 
claims considered on both juror (Study 1 and Study 2) and employer (Study 3) decision making. 
In line with previous research, jurors in Study 1 and 2 found for the plaintiff more often under 
mixed motive instructions but for the defendant more often under but-for instructions for 
retaliation claims. Study 3 did not find effects of causal instructions but did support previous 
research that people are more likely to take harsher actions for acts of omission (denying a 
promotion) than acts of commission (dismissing from a job). Implications for psychological 
theory, policy, law, and future research are discussed. 
  
iii 
Dedication 
To Ryan, for all of your support and willingness to join me in this journey.  
  
iv 
Acknowledgments 
I would first like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Richard Wiener for 
his support and encouragement of me throughout the past six years. You not only gave me more 
research experience than I ever thought I would have, but you helped me find opportunities that 
gave me the skills and confidence for my next step as a professor.  
Along with Rich, I would like to thank the rest of my committee, Dr. Sarah Gervais, Dr. 
Deb Hope, and Professor Richard Moberly. Thank you for your helpful feedback and advice 
during all stages of my dissertation. Sorry it was so long!  Additionally, thank you to Dr. Maggie 
Stevenson, my undergraduate advisor, for your constant support and serving as the first role 
model I had in academia.  
I would never have gotten through my studies without the support of good friends. Thank 
you to Kate Kimble and Abbey Riemer for always being there and making our time here more 
worthwhile and fun. Stacie Keller and Leah Georges, thank you for your guidance in helping me 
get started at UNL. I would have been lost without your direction.  
Thank you to my parents, Bert and Janice Sorenson, for all of your love and support. To 
my son, Oliver, you set the deadline for my dissertation and you are the sweetest little boy. 
Finally, and most importantly, thank you to my husband Ryan. You dropped everything to move 
with me to Nebraska because you believed in me and my dreams. Not only have you blessed my 
life by being my best friend, you have also kept me sane and encouraged me to be my best self. 
Thanks again for dropping everything once more to move our family to New York. I promise 
we’ll stay put for longer this time. 
  
v 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................1 
Legal Theory and Doctrine of Title VII Retaliation ...............................................................2 
Burden Shifting Models of Discrimination ..............................................................................4 
Title VII Retaliation .................................................................................................................7 
“Employees” protected under anti-retaliation provision ......................................................9 
Actions protected under anti-retaliation provision.  ..........................................................10 
The issue of burden-shifting.  ............................................................................................14 
Nassar and the Future of Retaliation .....................................................................................15 
Causal language.  ...............................................................................................................17 
Congressional intent.  .........................................................................................................18 
Future of retaliation post-Nassar.  .....................................................................................19 
Psychological Theories.............................................................................................................23 
Regulatory Focus ...................................................................................................................23 
Regulatory fit .....................................................................................................................26 
Regulatory focus and policy decisions ..............................................................................31 
Regulatory focus and fit in groups .....................................................................................35 
Prospect Theory .....................................................................................................................39 
Prospect theory and policy decisions .................................................................................44 
Prospect theory group decisions ........................................................................................46 
Other Psychological Theories ................................................................................................47 
Group decision making ......................................................................................................47 
Theory of planned behavior ...............................................................................................49 
General emotion theories ...................................................................................................52 
General decision making theories ......................................................................................55 
Understanding Causality in Retaliation .................................................................................57 
Chapter 2: Current Research .....................................................................................................59 
Hypothesis 1 ..............................................................................................................................59 
Hypothesis 1a .........................................................................................................................59 
Hypothesis 1b.........................................................................................................................60 
  
vi 
Hypothesis 1c .........................................................................................................................60 
Hypothesis 2 ..............................................................................................................................60 
Hypothesis 2a .........................................................................................................................60 
Hypothesis 3 ..............................................................................................................................61 
Hypothesis 3a .........................................................................................................................61 
Hypothesis 3b.........................................................................................................................61 
Hypothesis 4 ..............................................................................................................................61 
Chapter 3: Study 1- Regulatory Focus and Jury Decision Making in Retaliation Cases 
Involving Firing an Employee ....................................................................................................62 
Research Design and Procedure .............................................................................................62 
Participants ...............................................................................................................................63 
 
Chronic regulatory focus ........................................................................................................64 
Trial transcript ........................................................................................................................64 
Decision motivation measure .................................................................................................64 
Framing manipulation ............................................................................................................64 
Causal instructions .................................................................................................................65 
Verdict and case decisions .....................................................................................................66 
Manipulation check ................................................................................................................66 
Demographics ........................................................................................................................67 
Results .......................................................................................................................................67 
Phase 1: Preliminary Analyses of Verdict and Verdict Certainty ..........................................68 
Manipulation checks ..........................................................................................................68 
Motivational analyses ........................................................................................................70 
Strength of evidence analyses ............................................................................................71 
Regulatory focus analyses ..................................................................................................72 
Phase 2: Full Experimental Model Analyses .........................................................................73 
Predicting retaliation verdict  .............................................................................................73 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty ...............................................................................73 
Predicting discrimination verdict .......................................................................................75 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty ........................................................................76 
  
vii 
Phase 3: Experimental Model Analyses with +1 Instruction Condition ................................73 
Predicting retaliation verdict  .............................................................................................77 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty ...............................................................................77 
Predicting discrimination verdict .......................................................................................78 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty ........................................................................79 
Phase 4: Moderation Analyses ...............................................................................................80 
National origin motivation as a moderator  .......................................................................80 
Predicting retaliation verdict ......................................................................................81 
Predicting retaliation verdict with three-level instruction .........................................85 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty .......................................................................86 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty with three-level instruction ..........................87 
Predicting discrimination verdict ...............................................................................89 
Predicting discrimination verdict with three-level instruction ...................................90 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty ................................................................91 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty with three-level instruction ....................94 
Strength of evidence as a moderator  .................................................................................97 
Predicting retaliation verdict ......................................................................................97 
Predicting retaliation verdict with three-level instruction .......................................100 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty .....................................................................100 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty with three-level instruction ........................100 
Predicting discrimination verdict .............................................................................100 
Predicting discrimination verdict with three-level instruction .................................101 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty ..............................................................101 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty with three-level instruction ..................101 
Previous employment decisions as a moderator  .............................................................102 
Predicting retaliation verdict ....................................................................................102 
Predicting retaliation verdict with three-level instruction .......................................102 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty .....................................................................102 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty with three-level instruction ........................104 
Predicting discrimination verdict .............................................................................105 
Predicting discrimination verdict with three-level instruction .................................105 
  
viii 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty ..............................................................105 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty with three-level instruction ..................106 
Study 1 Discussion ..................................................................................................................106 
Chapter 4: Study 2- Regulatory Focus and Jury Decision Making in Retaliation Cases 
Involving Failure to Promote an Employee .............................................................................109 
Participants .............................................................................................................................111 
Results .....................................................................................................................................113 
Phase 1: Preliminary Analyses of Verdict and Verdict Certainty ........................................113 
Manipulation checks ........................................................................................................113 
Motivational analyses ......................................................................................................115 
Strength of evidence analyses ..........................................................................................117 
Regulatory focus analyses ................................................................................................119 
Phase 2: Full Experimental Model Analyses .......................................................................119 
Predicting retaliation verdict  ...........................................................................................119 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty .............................................................................120 
Predicting discrimination verdict .....................................................................................120 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty ......................................................................122 
Phase 3: Experimental Model Analyses with +1 Instruction Condition ..............................122 
Predicting retaliation verdict  ...........................................................................................122 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty .............................................................................123 
Predicting discrimination verdict .....................................................................................123 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty ......................................................................124 
Phase 4: Moderation Analyses .............................................................................................125 
Instruction accuracy as a moderator  ...............................................................................125 
Predicting retaliation verdict ....................................................................................125 
National origin and rehiring policy motivation as a moderator  ......................................125 
Predicting retaliation verdict with national origin ...................................................126 
Predicting retaliation verdict with rehiring policy ...................................................126 
Predicting retaliation verdict with three-level instruction and national origin ........129 
Predicting retaliation verdict with three-level instruction and rehiring policy ........130 
Predicting discrimination verdict with national origin ............................................130 
  
ix 
Predicting discrimination verdict with three-level instruction and national origin .131 
Strength of evidence as a moderator  ...............................................................................131 
Predicting retaliation verdict ....................................................................................132 
Predicting retaliation verdict with three-level instruction .......................................132 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty .....................................................................133 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty with three-level instruction ........................135 
Predicting discrimination verdict .............................................................................135 
Predicting discrimination verdict with three-level instruction .................................136 
Previous employment decisions as a moderator  .............................................................136 
Predicting retaliation verdict ....................................................................................136 
Predicting retaliation verdict with three-level instruction .......................................139 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty .....................................................................140 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty with three-level instruction ........................142 
Predicting discrimination verdict .............................................................................142 
Predicting discrimination verdict with three-level instruction .................................142 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty ..............................................................143 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty with three-level instruction ..................143 
Study 2 Discussion ..................................................................................................................143 
Chapter 5: Study 3- Regulatory Focus, Causality and Employment Decisions ...................147 
Measures and Materials ........................................................................................................147 
Chronic regulatory focus ......................................................................................................147 
Employment decision frame ................................................................................................147 
Resumes ...............................................................................................................................148 
Causal model manipulation ..................................................................................................148 
Decision condition and measure ..........................................................................................149 
Causality manipulation check ..............................................................................................149 
Demographics ......................................................................................................................149 
Research Design and Procedure ...........................................................................................150 
Participants .............................................................................................................................150 
Results .....................................................................................................................................151 
Dependent Variables ............................................................................................................151 
  
x 
Phase 1: Preliminary Analyses of Decision  and Rank of Candidates .................................152 
Manipulation checks ........................................................................................................152 
Motivational analyses ......................................................................................................153 
Trait regulatory focus analyses ........................................................................................154 
Phase 2: Full Experimental Model Analyses .......................................................................154 
Predicting decision  ..........................................................................................................154 
Predicting decision certainty ............................................................................................156 
Predicting resume rank ....................................................................................................157 
Phase 3: Moderation Analyses .............................................................................................157 
Predicting decision with applicant qualification ..............................................................157 
Predicting decision certainty with applicant qualification ...............................................158 
Predicting decision with previous employment decision .................................................161 
Predicting decision certainty with previous employment decision ..................................162 
Predicting resume rank with previous employment decision ..........................................163 
Study 3 Discussion ..................................................................................................................166 
Chapter 6: General Discussion .................................................................................................169 
Review of Hypotheses ............................................................................................................169 
Hypothesis 1 through 1c ..................................................................................................169 
Hypothesis 2 through 1a ..................................................................................................173 
Hypothesis 3 through 3b ..................................................................................................174 
Implications for Psychology ..................................................................................................177 
Implications for Law .............................................................................................................180 
Limitations and Future Research .........................................................................................181 
Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................183 
References ...................................................................................................................................184 
Appendix A: Chronic Regulatory Focus Measure ..................................................................210 
Appendix B: Case Vignette Study 1 .........................................................................................212 
Appendix C: Motivating Factors Study 1 ................................................................................215 
Appendix D: Judge’s Instructions Study 1 ..............................................................................216 
Appendix E: Jury Instructions Study 1 ...................................................................................217 
Appendix F: Verdict and Evidence Decisions Study 1 ...........................................................221 
  
xi 
Appendix G: Manipulation Checks Study 1 ............................................................................223 
Appendix H: Demographics ......................................................................................................226 
Appendix I: Case Vignette Study 2 ..........................................................................................228 
Appendix J: Jury Instructions Study 2 ....................................................................................232 
Appendix K: Manipulation Checks Study 2 ............................................................................238 
Appendix L: Motivating Factors Study 2 ................................................................................240 
Appendix M: Verdict and Evidence Decisions Study 2 ..........................................................241 
Appendix N: Resumes  ..............................................................................................................244 
Appendix O: Task Description and Regulatory Focus Manipulation ..................................247 
Appendix P: HR Policy and Causal Manipulation .................................................................249 
Appendix Q: Decision Measure ................................................................................................252 
Appendix R: Manipulation Checks ..........................................................................................254 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xii 
 
List of Multimedia Objects 
 
Table 3.1: Instruction Accuracy by Instruction Condition ............................................................69 
Table 3.2: Retaliation Verdict Decisions by Instruction Accuracy  ..............................................70 
Figure 3.1: Retaliation Verdict Certainty predicted by Regulatory Focus x Claim Type for But-
For Instructions ..............................................................................................................................75 
Figure 3.2: Discrimination Verdict Certainty predicted by Instruction  ........................................76 
Figure 3.3: Instruction x Regulatory Focus Interaction for Retaliation Verdict Certainty ............78 
Table 3.3: Discrimination Verdict Decisions by Instruction Condition ........................................79 
Figure 3.4 Discrimination Verdict Certainty by Three-Level Instruction .....................................80 
Table 3.4 Predicting Retaliation Verdicts as a Function of Instruction, Regulatory Focus, Claim 
Type, and Plaintiff National Origin ...............................................................................................82 
Figure 3.5: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of retaliation claim type on 
retaliation verdict ...........................................................................................................................84 
Figure 3.6: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of retaliation claim type on 
retaliation verdict for But-For Instructions ....................................................................................85 
Figure 3.7: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of regulatory focus on 
retaliation verdict certainty for but-for instructions and discrimination/retaliation claims ...........87 
Figure 3.8: National Origin as a moderator for regulatory focus on retaliation verdict certainty 
under but-for instructions ...............................................................................................................89 
Figure 3.9: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of instruction on 
discrimination verdict certainty .....................................................................................................91 
Figure 3.10: Discrimination complaint motivation as a moderator for the effect of instruction on 
discrimination verdict certainty for prevention focused participants ............................................93 
Figure 3.11: Discrimination complaint motivation as a moderator for the effect of instruction on 
discrimination verdict certainty for prevention focused participants ............................................94 
Figure 3.12: Discrimination Complaint as a Moderator for Instruction on Discrimination Verdict 
Certainty for Prevention Focused Jurors ........................................................................................96 
Figure 3.13: Discrimination Complaint as a Moderator for Instruction on Discrimination Verdict 
Certainty for Promotion Focused Jurors ........................................................................................97 
  
xiii 
Figure 3.14: Plaintiff Evidence as a Moderator for Instruction on Retaliation Verdict for 
Promotion Focused Jurors..............................................................................................................99 
Figure 3.15: Previous Employment Experience as a Moderator for Regulatory Focus on 
Retaliation Verdict Certainty .......................................................................................................104 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Measures ...............................................................110 
Table 4.2: Instruction by Instruction Accuracy ...........................................................................114 
Table 4.3: Retaliation Verdict by Instruction Accuracy ..............................................................115 
Figure 4.1: Motivating Factors and Retaliation Verdict ..............................................................116 
Table 4.4: Discrimination Verdict by Instruction ........................................................................121 
Table 4.5: Retaliation Verdict by Regulatory Focus Manipulation .............................................121 
Table 4.6: Discrimination Verdict by Three Level Instruction Condition ...................................124 
Figure 4.2: Rehiring Policy as a Moderator for Instruction on Retaliation Verdict ....................128 
Figure 4.3: Rehiring Policy as Moderator for Instruction on Retaliation Verdict for Retaliation 
Claims ..........................................................................................................................................129 
Figure 4.4: Plaintiff Evidence as a Moderator of Instruction on Retaliation Verdict Certainty for 
Participants in Retaliation Only and Prevention Conditions .......................................................135 
Figure 4.5: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for Regulatory Focus 
Predicting Retaliation Verdict for Discrimination and Retaliation Condition .............................139 
Figure 4.6: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for Regulatory Focus 
Predicting Retaliation Verdict Certainty for Discrimination and Retaliation Condition .............141 
Table 5.1: Instruction Accuracy by Instruction Condition ..........................................................153 
Table 5.2: Decision Condition by Decision .................................................................................155 
Figure 5.1: Decision Condition on Decision Certainty ................................................................157 
Figure 5.2: Applicant Qualification as a Moderator for Complaint Condition on Decision 
Certainty for Participants using But-For Instructions, Making a Promotion Decision, and 
Prevention focused. ......................................................................................................................161 
Figure 5.3: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for Instruction on 
Decision Certainty for Promotion Focused Condition .................................................................163 
Figure 5.4: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for Decision Condition 
on Applicant Rank for Control Participants .................................................................................165 
  
xiv 
Figure 5.5: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for Regulatory Focus on 
Applicant Rank for Promotion Decision Condition .....................................................................166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Retaliation, as defined in §2000e-3a of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, is any 
discriminatory act against an employee or applicant “because [the employee] has opposed 
any practice made an unlawful practice by this subchapter, or because [the employee] had 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding or hearing.” That is, if an employee participates in any claim or investigation 
concerning a discriminatory practice and the employer treats the employee adversely 
because of his or her involvement, then the company may be liable for retaliation. 
Individuals protected under the anti-retaliation provision include those who have filed a 
complaint (or been involved with the investigation of a complaint) based on race, color, 
national origin, religion, and sex.  The inclusion of an anti-retaliation provision is 
necessary for the enforcement of Title VII because legally protecting individuals who 
wish to file a complaint will encourage individuals to make the initial complaint. 
Specifically, if an employee is unprotected from adverse treatment that results from a 
complaint, she or he will likely be disinclined to file the initial complaint (Naquin, 2013).  
Developing an understanding of how jurors and employers perceive acts of retaliation is 
becoming increasingly important with recent court cases (University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 2014). Additionally, claims of retaliation filed 
under Title VII are on the rise. In 2014, 34.7% of the 88,778 total claims made to the 
EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) were Title VII retaliation actions. 
Though this is down 3% from 2013 (potentially as a result of Nassar), the proportion of 
retaliation claims within the larger EEOC pool has steadily increased in the last 14 years 
from 24.7% in 2000 to 36% in 2013).  
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Despite the rise in retaliation claims and the changing case law, very few 
empirical researchers have investigated the issue. In order to fully understand how to 
approach the study of retaliation, it is important to understand the legal underpinnings of 
retaliation in the workplace. The first section of this paper will explore the lengthy and 
complicated case history and legal doctrine of Title VII retaliation. Then I will introduce 
social psychological theories of motivation and decision making as possible explanations 
for the way in which people interpret and consider retaliation both from the perspective 
of a juror and an employer.   
Legal Theory and Doctrine of Title VII Retaliation 
 Plaintiffs bring discriminatory actions under Title VII under two broad definitions: 
disparate impact and disparate treatment. Disparate impact is any facially neutral 
employment practice that has a disproportionate adverse impact on a specific protected 
class (Seiner, 2006; Griggs v. Duke Power, 1971).  Griggs v. Duke Power (1971) was the 
first case to expand Title VII to encompass disparate impact. William Griggs filed a class 
action lawsuit on behalf of himself and several African American employees working at 
Duke Power Company alleging that the company’s inside transfer policy discriminated 
against African American employees because it required minimum scores on two 
aptitude tests in addition to a high school diploma. The Supreme Court, in an 8-0 
decision, determined that even though the test was facially neutral, the company intended 
to use it to keep less educated African American employees from advancing. Chief 
Justice Burger stated: “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem 
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for 
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” The Supreme Court 
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further extended the prohibition of disparate impact in their decision in Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust (1988) where Watson alleged disparate impact after she had applied 
four times for a promotion within the bank and was denied each time. The company did 
not have any clear requirements for determination of promotion so that the Supreme 
Court decided to scrutinize the company’s discretionary decision making under a 
disparate impact theory.  
Disparate treatment is an action taken against an individual because of the 
individual’s membership in a protected class (Seiner, 2006; Teamsters v. United States, 
1977; Slack v. Havens, 1975).  Unlike disparate impact, disparate treatment requires 
proof of discriminatory intent or motivation on the part of the employer (Teamsters v. 
United States, 1977).  Slack v. Havens (1973) illuminates the process that gives rise to an 
inference of intent. The black plaintiffs worked in the bonding and coating department of 
a plant alongside a white co-worker. At the end of their workday, the crew chief informed 
the plaintiffs that they would have to complete a deep and thorough cleaning of the 
department, a task that their job description did not outline. Organizational officials 
excused a white co-worker moving her to another department the day of the cleaning and 
brought in a different worker, who was black, to replace her for the cleaning. During the 
trial it came to light that one of the supervisors had commented to a plaintiff  “colored 
folks were hired to clean because they clean better” and “colored folks should stay in 
their place.”  The 9th Circuit Court found that the company, through the supervisor, 
intended to discriminate based on race by making their black employees perform more 
unpleasant and degrading tasks than their white employees. Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court distinguished between disparate impact and treatment in Teamsters when they 
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wrote that “Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in 
mind when it enacted Title VII” and went on to stress that proof of discriminatory motive 
is not required for disparate impact but is the cornerstone of disparate treatment. An 
employee must be able to show that the defendant had intended to discriminate against 
him or her because the plaintiff was a member of a protected class. The project focuses 
on cases of disparate treatment. 
Burden Shifting Models of Discrimination 
 Before discussing the case law of Title VII retaliation, an overview of the burden-
shifting model of discrimination claims is essential. One of the leading cases for Title VII 
disparate treatment also set forth the first model of burden shifting. In McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green  (1973), the plaintiff, an African American worker, suspected 
that McDonnell Douglas laid him off due to his longtime involvement with the Civil 
Rights Movement. In response to this perceived unfair treatment he, and other activists, 
planned a protest at the leading plant for the company.  Green filed a complaint with the 
EEOC claiming that McDonnell Douglas refused to rehire him due to his race and 
involvement with the Civil Rights Movement.  The District Court found in favor of the 
company, agreeing that Green’s involvement with the protests, which involved blocking 
traffic entering the plant, constituted an illegal activity and went well beyond his 
legitimate civil rights activities. The Court of Appeals, affirmed that illegal activities are 
not protected, but also remanded the case back to trial to investigate the racially 
discriminatory hiring practices. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals ruling 
and stated that the lower court should allow Green a fair opportunity to prove McDonnell 
Douglas’ discriminatory intent.  
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 In McDonnell Douglas the Supreme Court set the groundwork for the first 
burden-shifting model first requiring a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case that provides 
evidence that the plaintiff was qualified for the position but was not hired due to his or 
her protected class. The plaintiff must also show that, the company continued to look for 
other employees for the job. After proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their actions. If an 
employer can provide a legitimate reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to 
show this reason is pretext (i.e., not the real reason). Defendants commonly prove pretext 
by showing that the employer treated an employee, not in the protected class (a White 
employee in a case of discrimination against a Black employee), differently despite that 
employee having similar qualities and experience as the plaintiff. For example, in 
McDonnell Douglas, if the company had hired a White employee who participated in the 
same protest, then their argument that the plaintiff was not hired due to illegal activities 
would be pretext. 
 The courts followed the McDonnell Douglas scheme for all Title VII cases until 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) in which the defendants denied Hopkins, a female 
employee partnership in the company despite her being qualified for the position. The 
Supreme Court adopted a mixed motive model for determining liability. Here, the 
plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case through direct evidence that his or her 
protected class (e.g., sex) was a substantial factor in the decision. The burden then shifts 
to the employer who must establish that the same action would have occurred absent the 
protected class status of the employee. Thus the company must show that a legitimate 
reason, and not the plaintiff’s membership in the protected class, was the driving force of 
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its aversive action.  If the company can show that it would have made the same decision 
absent the protected class then it faces no liability.  However, if the protected class 
remains a substantial factor in the decision, even if there are other legitimate reasons for 
the decision, the employer may still be liable for damages.  
 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1991 codified the mixed 
motive model via additional language in §2000e-2m: “Except as otherwise provided in 
this title, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for 
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice” 
(emphasis added). Under the amended Title VII a plaintiff must show that their protected 
class motivated the decision. The employer may proffer a partial affirmative defense by 
showing they would have “taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible 
motivating factor” (§706g2B).  This affirmative defense limits the amount of damages 
that a court can award to the plaintiff to injunctive relief (i.e., the employer must desist 
discriminatory action) and court costs. The Supreme Court further defined the issue of 
causality in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) by extending the application of the 
mixed motive model to be applicable in all cases under Title VII. 
 Following the amendments to Title VII and the holdings in Price Waterhouse and 
St. Mary’s, many lower courts extended the mixed motive model to cases of age 
discrimination brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (e.g. 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc., 2000; Rose v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 
2001; Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 2004; E.E.O.C. v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co., Inc., 
2004). However, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services (2009), the Supreme Court 
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reexamined the language of the ADEA to determine if there existed evidence of 
Congressional intent to apply the mixed motive model to the ADEA. The discussion in 
the case hinged upon the language of §623a1 which states: “It shall be unlawful for an 
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment because of such an individual’s age” (emphasis added). The Supreme 
Court determined that the inclusion of the “because of’ clause indicates that age must be 
the determinative factor in the case, and not merely a motivating factor. The justices 
reasoned that because Congress did not amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII that 
it did not intend to extend the mixed motive model to age discrimination cases. Thus, 
lower courts must try cases under the ADEA using the but-for model of causality, which 
requires the plaintiff to carry the burden of showing the adverse treatment was due 
directly to the plaintiff’s age. That is, even if the employer used age in the decision there 
can be no liability, if a legitimate factor played an equal or greater role.  The decision in 
Gross, brought into play the issue of whether the courts should use the mixed motive or 
but-for model of causality for Title VII Retaliation, because the statutory language in 
Title VII is retaliation similar to the age discrimination language in the ADEA. The 
following section will examine the case law leading up to University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, which determined the correct causal model for 
Title VII retaliation.  
Title VII Retaliation 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects against discrimination due to terms, 
conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment based on sex, race, color, 
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religion, and national origin (§2000e-2). The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, 
§2000e-3a, prohibits adverse action against employees “because [the employee] has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful practice by this subchapter, or because [the 
employee] had made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding or hearing.”. The anti-retaliation provision includes two clauses 
prohibiting two types of actions: the opposition clause and the participation clause. The 
opposition clause bans retaliation because an employee “has opposed any practice” 
within the company. For example, in Womack v. Munson (1980), the Black plaintiff, 
Womack, worked in various positions for the county sheriff before being discharged. 
After his discharge he filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging abuses of black prisoners 
by the sheriff department. Two years after the complaint, the state prosecutor hired 
Womack as an investigator. During his time with the prosecutor he filed a lawsuit based 
upon the previous EEOC claim against the sheriff. After learning about the lawsuit, the 
prosecutor discharged Womack. Though the prosecutor contended to have discharged 
Womack for his own involvement in the potential abuse, the 8th Circuit Court ruled that 
the prosecutor had retaliated against Womack for his opposition to the treatment of black 
prisoners.  
The participation clause prohibits retaliation if an employee has “made a charge, 
testified, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this title.”  Activities covered by the participation clause include any type of 
participation, or refusal to participate in an investigation. For example, in Smith v. 
Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority (1977), the plaintiff, Smith, worked for the 
defendant for twenty years without incident. Then, in 1974 the defendant discharged 
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three black male employees (not including Smith) who later filed a charge with the Ohio 
Civil Rights Commission alleging racial discrimination under Title VII.  At a weekly 
staff meeting, the supervisor asked the staff, including plaintiff Smith, to sign an affidavit 
confirming the defendant’s reasons for discharging the employees. After Smith returned 
the affidavit unsigned the defendant demoted her because of her refusal. Even though 
Smith did not directly participate in the investigation, the court considered her refusal to 
participate on behalf of her employer to be an action that the participation clause protects.  
An important and timely issue in both opposition and participation cases is the manner in 
which the courts have determined which actions the anti-retaliation close covers.  
 “Employees” protected under anti-retaliation provision.  In §2000e-3a of 
Title VII, prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment.” Does Title VII reach to only current employees and 
applicants covered? In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. (1997) the Supreme Court considered 
whether or not Title VII protected a former employee.  After Shell Oil fired Robinson, he 
filed a complaint of discrimination. While the charge was pending, Robinson applied for 
another job and the prospective employer contacted Shell Oil for a reference. Robinson 
did not receive the job and claimed that Shell Oil had given him a negative reference due 
to his pending EEOC complaint. The Supreme Court, in a 9-0 decision, determined that 
former employees are protected under Title VII because failing to protect them would 
offer a “perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring . . . claims” 
against the company.  
Most recently, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP (2011) the courts 
considered whether Title VII protects third parties from retaliation.  Thompson and his 
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then-fiancé-now wife worked for North American Stainless. His wife filed a complaint 
with the EEOC alleging gender discrimination under Title VII and three weeks after the 
EEOC informed the company of the charge, North American Stainless fired Thompson. 
Thompson then filed a claim for retaliation, stating that the defendant fired him because 
of his wife’s complaint. The 6th Circuit upheld the lower court’s ruling in favor of North 
American Stainless, saying that third parties are not protected under Title VII. The 
Supreme Court overturned this holding and remanded the case back to the lower court. 
Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion, instructed the lower courts to interpret the 
anti-retaliation provision to cover a broad range of employees, including third parties.  
While some cases have limited the reach of Title VII (see the following discussion of 
Clark County School District v. Breeden, 2001and Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington 
Airports Authority, 1998), more generally federal jurisprudence has extended the reach of 
Title VII to encompass a greater diversity of actions and plaintiffs under the anti-
retaliation provisions. The following section outlines the current status of retaliation law 
under Title VII.  
Actions protected under anti-retaliation provision. In order for a retaliation 
complaint to go forward, the complainant must reasonably believe that an illegal activity 
occurred (Clark County School District v. Breeden, 2001), there must be a temporal 
causal path from the complaint to the adverse action (Clark County School District v. 
Breeden, 2001), the employee must act reasonably in their actions against the company 
(Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 1998), the action must be 
adverse enough to dissuade a reasonable employee from filing a complaint (Burlington 
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 2006), and the opposition to the illegal 
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activity is enough to warrant a retaliation complaint (Crawford v. Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 2009).  
The reasonable belief that an illegal activity occurred and the temporal causality 
serve gatekeeping functions in establishing a prima facie case.  In order to determine 
whether a claim of retaliation resulting from allegations of discrimination is a frivolous 
action, the 9th Circuit applied the reasonable belief test in Clark County School District v. 
Breeden, 2001 to determine whether a reasonable employee would find the action 
discriminatory. At a meeting, with the plaintiff present, her supervisor read aloud a 
sexually explicit remark that one applicant had made during the interview process. The 
supervisor stated that he didn’t understand what the comment meant and a male co-
worker replied “Well, I’ll tell you later” and both men laughed. The plaintiff complained 
to another supervisor about the comment and filed a claim with the EEOC. Twenty 
months after filing the claim, the plaintiff was transferred to a different department and 
states this was directly related to her complaint.  The Court found that the plaintiff’s 
claim did not fall under the opposition clause because no reasonable employee would 
have thought that one sexually charged comment was harassment. Further, the Court 
determined that the plaintiff did not show temporal causation between her claim and the 
alleged retaliation, because the retaliation came about when she transferred to a different 
department 20 months after the alleged discriminatory action.   
Even if a reasonable belief exists, certain actions remain outside the reach of the 
anti-retaliation provision. For example, in Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports 
Authority- MWAA (1998), the 4th Circuit had to determine whether the plaintiff’s actions 
fell under the participation or opposition clause. LaSauce, a co-worker of the plaintiff, 
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had filed an informal complaint with the EEO officer at MWAA for retaliation.  One of 
the managers worked to settle the complaint informally and drafted a written warning to 
the supervisor who had allegedly retaliated against LaSauce, but never formally sent the 
warning because the supervisor had recently accepted a new position at another airport. 
Laughlin, one of the secretaries at MWAA, found the warning on the manager’s desk. 
Believing that her manager was taking part in a cover-up, Laughlin made copies of the 
warning and sent it to LaSauce. MWAA terminated Laughlin for copying and releasing 
confidential documents, after which Laughlin filed a retaliation complaint with the 
EEOC, alleging retaliation under the participation clause. The District Court found in 
favor of MWAA and on appeal the 4th Circuit sought to determine if Laughlin had 
enough evidence for a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII.  The 4th Circuit 
stated that Laughlin’s actions did not fall under the participation clause, as there was no 
ongoing investigation and LaSauce never asked for assistance with the investigation. The 
Court then had to determine if Laughlin’s actions might fall under the opposition clause 
and developed a balancing test. The 4th Circuit reasoned that the purpose of Title VII was 
to protect employees who are reasonably engaging in opposition to discrimination and 
that the lower courts must balance that principle against an employer’s “objective 
selection and control of personnel.” In the case of Laughlin, taking confidential 
documents and sending it to an outside party was not a reasonable action and could be 
detrimental to a company’s security of sensitive documents. Thus, the 4th Circuit test 
provided a way to determine when an action is too unreasonable to be protected under 
Title VII.  
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Though both Clark County and Laughlin limit the types of actions covered under 
Title VII, the Supreme Court, in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White 
(2006), recently determined that Title VII does prohibit both employment related 
retaliations and actions that are not directly related to employment but might negatively 
impact an employee’s willingness to report discrimination.  White alleged that Burlington 
Northern retaliated against her because she filed a complaint of gender discrimination. 
The retaliation surfaced when Burlington Northern reassigned her to a position with less 
prestige and more arduous activities as well as when it later suspended her without pay 
for 37 days. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court addressed 1) the type of adverse action that 
falls under Title VII and 2) how harmful the action must be to fall within the scope of the 
anti-retaliation provision. Prior to this case, courts had interpreted an adverse action in 
different ways with some (e.g., the 7th Circuit)  holding that any action that was 
materially adverse to change the conditions or terms of employment, while other courts 
used a more restrictive approach and required that the adverse action had to affect an 
ultimate employment decision (such as hiring, granting leave, discharge, promoting, and 
compensation). In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court adopted the 7th Circuit’s 
interpretation that a “reasonable employee would have found the challenged action 
materially adverse.” The law now requires that the action in question would dissuade a 
reasonable employee from filing a complaint or participating in an investigation.  Thus, 
the anti-retaliation provision does not protect against “petty slights and minor 
annoyances” but actions that would be so negative as to stop an employee from 
complaining.  The courts must decide the issue from the perspective of an objective, 
reasonable person.  
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A final consideration on the types of actions that Title VII retaliation covers 
concerns whether or not the anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who 
participated in an employer’s internal investigation of a sexual harassment complaint 
(Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 2009).  Though 
this case seems to fall under the participation clause, the Supreme Court decided that the 
opposition clause protected a plaintiff making a sexual harassment claim. The human 
resources department within the company interviewed Crawford about the several sexual 
harassment complaints that coworkers had brought against a new employee.  During the 
interview, Crawford described several instances that she had either experienced or 
witnessed that one could reasonably interpret as sexual harassment. Following the 
investigation, the company dismissed Crawford and two other co-workers. The 6th Circuit 
found in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff, saying that Crawford had not played 
an active role in opposing the conduct involved. The Supreme Court reversed this 
holding, because such a rule would have undermined the effectiveness of the anti-
retaliation provision greatly reducing the law’s effectiveness in protecting employees 
who are oppose, regardless of how actively, an illegal action in the workplace.  
The issue of burden-shifting.  It is generally agreed upon that the typical 
retaliation case requires a plaintiff to prove three elements: 1. There was a complaint or 
investigation of protected conduct, 2. There was an adverse action, and 3. That the 
protected conducted caused the adverse action (Moberly, 2011). Though this seems 
straight forward, courts have struggled with the type of causation needed to prove 
retaliation. Since Price Waterhouse  (1989), courts have applied the mixed motive 
burden-shifting model even though there is some doubt as to whether the language of the 
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anti-retaliation provision provides for this model. For example, in  Woodson v. Scott 
Paper Co. (1997) the 3rd Circuit called for the use of the but-for model of causation for 
retaliation cases and questioned whether or not the plaintiff could prove the but-for causal 
link between his complaint and the adverse action. In another case, Hillig v. Rumsfeld 
(2004) the 10th Circuit determined that the McDonnell Douglas framework is sufficient 
for retaliation claims.  Recall that this would put the burden first on the plaintiff to 
produce the prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a 
legitimate reason for the action, and finally the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show 
that this reason is merely pretext.  To further complicate matters, the 5th Circuit decided 
that mixed motive instructions should apply in Title VII retaliation cases (Smith v. Xerox 
Co., 2010) by referring to the fact that in Gross (2009) the Supreme Court interpreted 
Title VII and the ADEA independently of each other and so even though the but-for 
language existed in the Title VII anti-retaliation provision, it was independent of the 
ADEA.  In 2013, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of which model of causality to 
use in Title VII retaliation cases in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. 
Nassar.  
Nassar and the Future of Retaliation  
 In 2013 the Supreme Court agreed to hear University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center v. Nassar to determine the appropriate model of causality to use in Title 
VII retaliation cases. Dr. Naiel Nassar was a physician, of Middle Eastern descent, 
working at the University Texas Southwestern Medical Center and at the Parkland 
Memorial Hospital. The University had arranged an agreement with Parkland Hospital so 
that the hospital offered physician positions to all medical faculty members in the 
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Department of Medicine. During his time at the Medical Center, Nassar believed Dr. 
Levine, the Chair of Infectious Disease Medicine, singled him out due to his Middle 
Eastern heritage for unfavorable treatment. He alleged that Levine questioned his billing 
practices, productivity and work ethic due to his national origin.  In 2005, Levine 
opposed hiring another Middle Eastern physician and commented to Dr. Keiser (Nassar’s 
primary supervisor) “Middle Easterners are lazy.” After the hospital hired the second 
Middle Eastern physician, Levine commented that the Hospital had “hired another one.” 
Nassar met with the University’s Chair of Internal Medicine, Dr. Fitz, numerous times to 
complain about the way Levine had treated him.  In the end, Nassar arranged to continue 
working at Parkland Hospital without continuing as a faculty member for the University 
allowing Nassar to remove himself from Levine’s supervision. The University and 
Hospital negotiated with Nassar to reach this compromise solution.  Shortly after 
reaching the agreement, Nassar wrote to Dr. Fitz (University Chair of Internal Medicine) 
resigning his position stating the reason was that Dr. Levine had harassed him. Nassar 
sent copies of this letter to other supervisors as well. Outraged by the letter, Fitz told 
Nassar’s supervisor that the action had publically humiliated Levine and that some action 
was needed to exonerate her. Fitz opposed the arrangement made for Nassar and the 
Hospital withdrew the offer. Nassar then filed a complaint of retaliation with the EEOC 
and finally district court.  
At trial, the district court instructed the jury to use mixed motive instructions for 
both the discrimination and retaliation claims, which led to the jury finding in favor of 
Nassar for both claims and awarded him $438,167.66 in back pay and over $3 million in 
compensatory damages.  Upon appeal the 5th Circuit vacated the discrimination 
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complaint for constructive discharge but affirmed the retaliation claim, saying that the 
University’s motivation to withdraw Nassar’s offer was, in part, Fitz’s desire to retaliate 
for Nassar’s complaints against Levine. When the Supreme Court ultimately took up the 
case, the justices found, in a 5-4 decision, that Title VII retaliation requires a but-for 
causality model. The Supreme Court finding hinged on two arguments: the finding in 
Gross for causal language and the Congressional intent involved in the amendments of 
Title VII.   
Causal Language. The Supreme Court began its discussion of the case by 
elaborating on the difference between a status-based discrimination claim and employer 
retaliation. The Court argued that under Title VII a status-based claim (discrimination 
based on race, color, national origin, religion, and sex) prohibited employers from using 
protected class membership as “… a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors motivated the practice” (§2000e-2m). Thus status-based 
discrimination falls under the mixed-motive model of causality, as the Court first decided 
in Price Waterhouse (1989). However, when examining the language of the anti-
retaliation provision Justice Kennedy quoted,  “It shall be unlawful…for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment…because he has 
opposed any practice…or because he has made a charge, testified assisted, or participated 
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII” (§2000e-3a). 
As in Gross v. FBL (2009) the language of the statute specifically uses the word 
“because.” Therefore, as in Gross, where the court held that ADEA required but-for 
causality, it held in Nasser that retaliation claim also required a but-for causality model.  
Thus, plaintiffs in retaliation claims must show that “the harm would not have occurred” 
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absent the opposition or participation in a discrimination claim.  Even though the 
Supreme Court said in Gross that the ADEA and Title VII should be considered 
independently, they held in Nasser that Gross was persuasive in the interpretation of the 
anti-retaliation provision.  
Congressional Intent. To interpret the Congressional intent of Title VII, the 
Supreme Court considered the structure and language of the statute. The Court argued 
that since Congress wrote the anti-retaliation provision as a separate section from status-
based discrimination that Congress intended the two to be considered as separate entities. 
Further, the amendments to Title VII in 1991 specifically added the provision for 
motivating factors for status-based discrimination but such a change was absent for the 
anti-retaliation provision. The majority concluded that, given this clear language, 
Congress had intended to limit retaliation claims to stricter liability than status-based 
claims, therefore, applying the mixed motive model to Title VII retaliation would be 
inconsistent with the intent of Congress.  
The Court also warned that lowering the standard of causation for retaliation 
claims would have serious repercussions. Specifically, since the number of Title VII 
retaliation claims with the EEOC had doubled in the past 15 years, lessening the causal 
standard could lead to more frivolous claims of retaliation. By applying the but-for 
model, courts could impose a structural barrier to limit the number of baseless claims 
filed with the EEOC.  Some may argue that this last argument is superfluous because the 
EEOC has already included many safeguards and protections against frivolous claims. 
For example, in Ledbetter v. Goodyear (2007), the lower level court dismissed the claim 
because the plaintiff filed outside of the timeline required by the EEOC (180 days).   
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Future of retaliation post-Nassar. Legal commentators argue that the 
effectiveness of the anti-retaliation provision is essential to the enforcement of Title VII 
anti-discrimination provisions (Naquin, 2013).   Specifically, if the law does not protect 
employees from retaliation then they will be unlikely to file the initial discrimination 
complaints or participate in discrimination complaint investigations for fear of reprisal 
from their employers.  In fact, research on victims of retaliation reveals that filing a 
complaint of retaliation can lead to ostracism in the workplace, open the employee up to 
more retaliation, and lead to higher levels of anxiety and sadness (Cortina & Magley, 
2007). Additionally, workers who fear retaliation report being less likely to complain 
about the initial discrimination than those who do not (Mitchell & Ambrose, 2012). 
Finally, anti-retaliation provisions benefit society as a whole as well as individual 
employees.  Arguably, employees possess unique knowledge about unlawful actions in 
the workplace so that when they report discriminatory actions  they help to assure that 
companies will comply with the law improving the level of justice available in society as 
a whole (Moberly, 2011).  Despite the reasons for ensuring an effective the anti-
retaliation provision, the decision in Nassar could limit the protections by narrowing the 
availability of relief in retaliation claims.  
For example, under the Nassar facts with a mixed motive model of causality the 
plaintiff might have been able to prove a legitimate case of retaliation. However, under 
the but-for standard, the University only had to  point to its own policy to argue  that the 
reason it terminated the contract was that it was following its own internal rules  and not 
Nassar’s letter accusing Levine of discrimination.  As a result, Nassar lost his claim (Lin, 
2014). Most important for understanding the impact of Nassar (2013) is the distinction 
 20 
that the Supreme Court drew between discrimination and retaliation claims, each with 
different causal requirements.  The differences between the causal models underlying 
each type of claim are subtle so that it might be difficult for a jury to clearly differentiate 
the two causal theories. Jurors may be confused by the two sets of instructions for the 
claims, especially when the court instructs them to treat the claims as separate entities 
that are unrelated (Lin, 2014), each with a different causality requirement.  Under such 
conditions, jurors may inadvertently adopt the higher but-for standard for all 
discrimination cases regardless of whether they are status or retaliation claims.  
Therefore, Nassar (2013) may result in a type of juror confusion, which may ultimately 
result in lowered protection in the workplace.  
On the other hand, it is possible that people are quite able to see clear differences 
between retaliation and status discrimination. Sherwyn, Heise, and Eigen (2014) argued 
that employees alleging retaliation actually fair better at trial than those alleging 
discrimination. The researchers showed undergraduate mock jurors videotaped 
reenactments of a retaliation case in which an employee alleged he was denied a 
promotion due to complaining about racial discrimination and sexual harassment. After 
watching the case, participants received mixed motive instructions (note: none used but-
for comparison instructions) and deliberated the case in groups six to reach their verdicts. 
Participants filled out individual verdict forms after deliberation. Fifty-nine percent of 
participants found in favor of the plaintiff.  Sherwyn and colleagues compared these 
results to a previous study that had undergraduate mock jurors watch and deliberate a 
national origin discrimination case. In that study, 40.1% of mock jurors found in favor of 
the plaintiff. Based upon these two studies Sherwyn et al. (2014) argued that jurors might 
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be more likely to find for the plaintiff under retaliation than discrimination. However, a 
comparison between studies without directly varying the type of causality instructions 
using an identical fact pattern falls very far short of the rigorous experimental evidence 
that would support this conclusion.  Specifically, Sherwyn and colleagues did not 
consider the difference between mixed motive and but-for causality instructions in their 
retaliation study and did not consider other confounding differences (e.g., differences 
between the fact patterns, participants, and the law under consideration) when coming to 
their conclusions.    
Nonetheless, this preliminary investigation raises the empirical issue of whether 
or not instructions for two related claims – discrimination and retaliation – each with a 
different causality requirement results in different trial processes and verdicts.  First, 
there might be different verdict outcomes for the same retaliation case depending on 
whether jurors use mixed motive or but-for instructions. In fact, previous research has 
revealed that but-for instructions in age discrimination claims are more likely to lead to 
pro-defendant verdicts, regardless of strength of evidence, while mixed motive 
instructions are more likely to lead to pro-plaintiff verdicts (Wiener & Farnum, 2013; 
Farnum & Wiener, under review). Extending this program of research to retaliation 
claims might find similar results. Furthermore, jurors who decide both discrimination and 
retaliation claims may have difficulty in parsing out and correctly interpreting the facts 
that could support different causal judgments under the two different sets of instructions. 
Psychological theories about judgment and decision making hold the promise to help us 
better understand the way in which jurors will react to retaliation claims in a case that 
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requires them to render a verdict for separate claims using different causality instructions.  
I take up the role of psychological models of decision making in the sections to follow.  
Perhaps, even more importantly, the decision in Nasser likely will have 
repercussions in the everyday life of the workplace by influencing the way in which 
employers treat employees. Employers may be more willing to retaliate against an 
employee if they know they can escape liability by finding another legitimate factor to 
dilute the retaliating action.  Imagine a situation in which an employer faces a 
discrimination charge from an employee who shows up late for work two days in a row. 
The employer may be more willing to risk legal action by retaliating against the 
employee (e.g., firing her) under a but-for model than under the mixed motive theory.   
Interestingly, psychological research suggests that observers may perceive 
differences in the level of legitimacy depending upon the type of retaliatory action. In a 
study on employee retaliation against a supervisor, participants read one of two 
situations: 1)A manager, who sexually harassed a friend of theirs, has asked them to find 
a missing file or 2)A manager, who unfairly passed the participant over for a promotion, 
asked for help in choosing a marketing plan.  Within each scenario participants were then 
given several options for what they did in the situation. For the missing file scenario these 
included denying knowing where the file is located, not telling where the file is located, 
and hiding the file. Participants then rated the acceptableness of the action from the 
scenario. Participants viewed acts of omission (e.g. not telling where the important file is 
located) as more acceptable than acts of commission (e.g. hiding an important file) 
(Charness & Levine, 2010). More generally, it is possible that employers may be more 
likely to retaliate against an employee via an act of omission, such as failing to promote 
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or engaging in third-party retaliation, than an act of commission, such as firing or 
demoting the complainant. Social psychological theories of motivation and decision 
making provide some guidance on understanding this issue as well as the overall reaction 
that jurors may have to different forms of causality instructions.   
Psychological Theories 
Regulatory Focus 
 Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT) proposes that people are motivated in one of two 
ways: promotion or prevention (Higgins, 1997; 1998; 2000; 2002). Promotion focused 
individuals tend to focus on their ideal self, or the person they would ideally like to be 
with the attributes that make up this ideal. In order to reach this ideal self, promotion 
focused people tend to seek achievement and advancement through taking risks to attain 
their goal.  People take risks in order to avoid errors of omission, or not acting when they 
should have acted. In comparison, prevention focused individuals tend to focus on their 
ought self, or the person they should be in society.  To achieve this self-goal, prevention 
focused people tend to seek safety and security by avoiding risks and therefore 
mismatches to desired outcomes to attain their goal. By avoiding risks, they seek to avoid 
acts of commission, or acting when they should not have acted (Higgins, 1997; 1998; 
2000; 2002).  These different pathways and goals have been well documented in the 
research literature (e.g. Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; 
Higgins, 2002; Higgins, Friedman, et al, 2001; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; 
Polman, 2012; Righetti, Finkenauer, & Rusbult, 2011; Santelli, Struthers, & Eaton, 2009; 
Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010; Woltin & Jonas, 2012; Zaal, Laar, 
Stahl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2012; Zhang, Higgins, & Chen, 2011). There is little doubt that 
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differences in regulatory focus style exists and a myriad of research documents how and 
when regulatory focus plays a role in motivation, decision making and the assignment of 
value to outcomes. Promotion and prevention (effects will be listed in this order) are 
predictive of several factors such as distant or proximal goals (Pennington & Roese, 
2003), abstract or concrete mental representations (Aaker & Lee, 2006), additive and 
subtractive counterfactual thinking (Roese, Hur, & Pennington, 1999), creativity versus 
self-control (Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002; Friedman & Förster, 2001), affective 
reactions of dejection or agitation (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000; Sassenberg & Hansen, 
2007; Shah, Brazy, & Higgins, 2004), reactions to change or stability (Liberman, Idson, 
Camacho, & Higgins, 1999), and emergence of approach or avoidance behaviors 
(Förster, Higgins, & Idson, 1999).   
 For example, Roese, Hur, & Pennington (1999) found that prevention focused 
individuals were more likely to generate subtractive counterfactuals (I should never have 
raised my hand) while promotion focused individuals were more likely to generate 
additive counterfactuals (I should have raised my hand). In a second study, they 
prompted participants to generate either additive or subtractive counterfactual thoughts 
and this, in turn, led to participants adopting either promotion or prevention focused 
responses.  Pennington and Roese (2003) also found that regulatory focus is related to 
temporal aspects of goals. Participants rated the importance of either promotion goals or 
prevention goals for an exam at two time points. Some forecasted 2 weeks before the 
exam and others responded only a few minutes before the exam. When the exam was 
more distant, participants had more promotion focused goals, but prevention focused 
goals remained constant across both temporal points. In another study (Study 4), 
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participants completed a measure of their chronic regulatory focus and were then asked to 
rate the perceived temporal distance of their future goals.  Specifically, participants who 
are chronically promotion focused believed their goals to be temporally farther away than 
did chronic prevention focused participants.  
 Promotion and prevention regulatory focus can result from either 
dispositional/chronic traits or situational inducements (Higgins, 1997; 1999; Shah, 
Higgins, & Friedman, 1998).  A person with a chronic promotion focus will be gain-
focused and more willing to take risks, while a chronic prevention focused person will be 
loss-focused and be more likely to avoid risks. Higgins (2000) also suggests that certain 
situations may also lead someone to act in either a promotion or prevention focused way. 
For example, if a teacher tells a student of a gain concern that includes positive outcomes, 
such as receiving extra credit for going to a talk, the situation will put the student into a 
promotion frame. He or she will work harder at finding a way to go to the talk. On the 
other hand, if a teacher tells a student of a loss concern that includes negative outcomes, 
such as loosing points on a test, the situation will put the student into a prevention frame.  
She or he will avoid going out to a movie to have more time to study for the exam.   
A typical measure of regulatory focus chronicity consists of measuring 
participants’ reaction times when they list attributes of their ideal self (promotion) or 
their ought self (prevention) (Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). If a participant lists the 
attributes of his or her ideal self faster than the attributes of the ideal self, that implies that 
that promotion focus attributes are more readily accessible so that the individual is more 
chronically promotion focused, whereas listing attributes of the ought self more quickly 
is indicative of a chronic prevention focus.  Individuals with chronic promotion focus 
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approach most tasks with eagerness while those with chronic prevention focus approach 
the same tasks with vigilance.  The former worry more about making errors of omission 
(missing an opportunity to succeed) and the latter, more about making errors of 
commission (mistakenly making a response that was wrong) (Higgins, 1997; 1999; Shah, 
Higgins, & Friedman, 1998).  
On the other hand, researchers can also manipulate promotion or prevention focus 
from the demands of the situations in which they place people. From an experimental 
research perspective, this allows researchers to manipulate type of regulatory focus 
(promotion vs. prevention) that participants experience through situational inducements.  
A common method of inducing regulatory focus is through an open-ended writing prompt 
that asks participants to write about or list attributes concerning either promotion or 
prevention goals (Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005; Roese, Hur, & 
Pennington, 1999). Galinsky and colleagues used this technique to induce regulatory 
focus in negotiation situations and found that those participants who wrote about 
promotion attributes were more likely to negotiate a higher dollar amount than those who 
wrote about prevention attributes.  
 Regulatory fit. Whether a person is prevention or promotion focused predicts a 
number of internal and external response and experience factors, but research also shows 
that the regulatory fit between a person’s motivational state and the situation determines 
perceptions of value and outcome expectations (Aaker & Lee, 2006; Avnet & Higgins, 
2003; Avnet & Higgins, 2006; Gallagher & Updegraff, 2011; Higgins, Idson, Freitas, 
Spiegel, & Molden, 2003). Regulatory fit occurs when the regulatory focus of the 
individual matches the regulatory focus of the situation. That is, when a promotion-
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focused individual is in a situation, which induces a psychological state that emphasizes 
gains, eagerness, and achieving objectives, they will experience regulatory fit. 
Alternatively, if a prevention-focused individual is in a situation, which induces a 
psychological state that emphasizes safety, avoiding losses, and vigilance, they will 
experience regulatory fit. People in a state of regulatory fit are more likely to exhibit 
stronger emotions and behaviors in line with their regulatory focus. Regulatory fit 
produces motivational properties such that people who are promotion focused and in a 
state of regulatory fit are more sensitive to the presence and absence of positive outcomes 
while those in a state of regulatory fit and prevention focused people are more sensitive 
to the presence and absence of negative outcomes. When chronic regulatory focus fits 
with the outcome available in a situation, people are more likely to choose the outcome 
that fits best. This occurs because regulatory fit “feels right”, intensifies peoples’ beliefs, 
and the extent to which they value outcomes (Lee & Aaker, 2004). Specifically, when 
people’s decision strategy, promotion or prevention focused, is reinforced instead of 
discouraged, their motivation to continue a task in a manner consistent with regulatory 
focus intensifies because they feel it will work best for them (Avnet & Higgins, 2006).  
Higgins and colleagues (2003) demonstrated the influence of regulatory fit on 
subsequent evaluations of an object.  They measured chronic regulatory focus by having 
participants list attributes that are descriptive of the ideal self and the ought self 
(participants listed these attributes separately). The researchers combined the 
participants’ selection of the traits that best describe them, as well as their reaction times 
in listing the traits to determine their regulatory focus.  That is, those who selected more 
ideal (ought) traits more quickly were chronically promotion (prevention) focused.  Next, 
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participants selected a gift of their choosing, either a Columbia University coffee mug or 
an inexpensive disposable pen (the mug was more desirable).  Half of the participants 
(those in the promotion condition) considered what they would gain by choosing the pen 
or the mug, while the other half considered what they would lose by not choosing the pen 
or the mug (prevention condition).  For participants who chose the mug (almost all 
participants) they viewed a new, expensive pen worth $3 and estimated the cost of the 
mug.  When regulatory fit was achieved (chronically promotion participants who 
considered gain – or – chronically prevention participants who considered loss), 
participants were more likely to overestimate the cost of the mug than when they were in 
a regulatory misfit condition (chronically promotion/loss situation -- or chronically 
prevention/gain situation).  Higgins and colleagues (2003) replicated this finding in a 
study using the same procedures but this time participants paid for the mug with their 
own money. Those in a regulatory fit state paid more for the mug than those in a 
regulatory misfit state. 
Avnet and Higgins (2006) tested the role of regulatory fit in participant decision 
making by showing participants two types of correction fluid, a newer type and an old 
fashioned type. The two fluids were shown simultaneously with a short description. The 
researchers placed half of the participants into a feeling-based strategy (promotion) such 
that those respondents rated how strongly they felt each emotion for each product, while 
the other half, those in the reason-based strategy (prevention) gave their overall 
evaluation for each product. All participants were then told to choose a product. After 
choosing which product they preferred, participants completed a measure of chronic 
regulatory focus.  Results revealed that participants who experienced regulatory fit (i.e., 
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their chronic focus matched the situational focus) felt more confident in their choice, 
were willing to pay more money, and rated their reactions as more important.  
Regulatory fit as compared to regulatory misfit can also lead to greater 
performances as illustrated on an anagram tasks (Shah, Higgins, and Friedman, 1998) and 
in exercise habits (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2011). Specifically, Gallagher and Updegraff 
had participants, all of whom indicated they do not regularly exercise, complete a chronic 
regulatory focus measure and then asked them to read one of four versions of an article 
advocating excercise: gain-framed/intrinsic outcomes (“Exercise now and feel better 
later!), gain-framed/extrinsic outcomes (“Exercise now and look better later!”), loss-
framed/intrinsic outcomes (“Lack of exercise will make you feel miserable!”), loss-
framed/extrinsic outcomes (“Lack of exercise will make you look miserable!”).  Over the 
next week, participants completed a daily log of their activities. Participants who 
experienced regulatory fit (promotion focus/intrinsic outcomes and prevention 
focus/extrinsic outcomes), as compared to misfit, were more likely to increase their 
exercise habits throughout the week (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2011).  
Regulatory focus and fit may also play a role regardless of whether the mental 
states are integral or incidental to the decision at hand. Integral regulatory focus 
manipulations are those that are part of the task at hand, while incidental manipulations 
of regulatory focus are independent of the task at hand and occur before the participant 
makes a decision (Cesario et al., 2008). The majority of regulatory focus studies use a 
measure or manipulation of incidental regulatory focus. For example, many researchers 
ask participants to either list their current hopes and aspirations (promotion focus) or list 
their current duties and obligations (prevention focus) to manipulate regulatory fit in an 
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incidental manner.  Cesario, Grant, and Higgins (2004) used this manipulation and then 
either induced regulatory fit or misfit, again incidentally, by having participants either 
write about how they could achieve their goals through either eager strategies 
(promotion) or vigilant strategies (prevention). Participants who experienced regulatory 
fit were more likely to rate a neutral article about an after school program more positively 
and were more likely to want to volunteer for the program, as compared to participants in 
a state of misfit.  
More recently, Cesario, Corker, and Jelinek (2013) also considered the “hedonic 
consequences of decisions” that is, the pleasures associated with accepting an argument 
and the pains of not accepting the argument as a potentially important factor in decision 
making.  People might be motivated by the knowledge of the pleasure of accepting the 
argument or avoiding the pain of not accepting the arguments.  Here, pleasure is not 
simply the presence or absence of positive and negative information, but instead, could 
result from either a positive outcome or the absence of a negative outcome—each 
motivating a similar decision. For example, in study 4, Cesario and colleagues (2013) 
used an incidental framing prime (prevention vs. promotion) and an integral outcome 
manipulation (obtaining gains or avoiding losses) to examine the potential importance of 
both types of manipulations as a source of motivation in decision making.  Specifically, 
participants first completed the incidental framing prime in which they completed a set of 
anagrams framed as either promotion (can earn 5 extra raffle tickets for getting 70% 
correct) or prevention (can lose 5 raffle tickets for getting 30% wrong). Following the 
incidental prime, participants received an integral manipulation in which they read a 
description about the importance of dental hygiene that was either promotion focused 
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(how buying mouthwash would advance their hygiene) or prevention focused (how 
buying the mouthwash would maintain their hygiene and prevent poor hygiene). 
Participants who were in a state of regulatory fit were willing to pay more money for 
mouthwash, namely, those in the positive integral outcome condition were willing to pay 
more if they were also in the promotion incidental condition, and those in the negative 
integral outcome condition were willing to pay more if they had been in the prevention 
incidental condition.  This implies that regulatory fit between hedonic outcomes and 
focus using incidental and integral manipulations produces strong effects of motivation in 
decision making.   
 Regulatory focus and policy decisions. Experimental lab studies have 
consistently shown consistent and strong effects of regulatory focus and regulatory fit on 
attitudes and perceptions of item value, but does regulatory focus shape decisions and 
behaviors outside the lab?  Boldero and Higgins (2011) examined the role of regulatory 
focus on support for economic reform. Participants completed a measure of chronic 
regulatory focus and then read one of three economic reports that described the current 
economy as poor, average, or good. After reading about the economy, participants were 
presented with a statement concerning a new economic policy legislators were looking to 
implement.  To measure the influence of regulatory fit, participants completed items 
assessing their support for the bill when considering their enthusiasm for maximizing the 
economic future (promotion strategy) or carefully considering how the bill could prevent 
an economic downturn (prevention strategy).  Participants who scored high on promotion 
focus were more likely to endorse the new bill when asked to consider it from a 
promotion strategy; whereas prevention focused participants demonstrated higher support 
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under the prevention strategy. This important finding shows that regulatory fit can play a 
role in persuasion about policy decisions. 
 Other research in the context of real world decisions demonstrated that regulatory 
focus can influence the actual behaviors of home owners living in flood plains with 
regard to whether they are willing to purchase flood insurance (Botzen, de Boer, & 
Terpstra, 2013). While, any form of risk framed communication concerning protecting 
their homes from flooding increased participants’ willingness to buy insurance, risk-
framed communications influenced those who were chronically prevention focused more 
as measured through the duration of the policy they purchased as compared to those who 
were chronically promotion focused. Similarly, Ellemers, Scheepers, & Popa (2010) 
examined the role of regulatory fit and support for affirmative action laws. They assessed 
participant regulatory focus at the beginning of the study and then asked participants to 
consider either what their in-group had to gain from affirmative action (promotion frame) 
or what their in-group had to lose from affirmative action (prevention frame). Participants 
who experienced promotion regulatory fit were significantly more likely to support 
affirmative action laws than those in a misfit.  Prevention focused participants were more 
likely to support affirmative action laws when they experienced regulatory fit than when 
they experienced a misfit.  Other studies have shown regulatory fit influenced support for 
a tax increase to help an after school programs (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003). 
Specifically, chronically promotion focused participants were more likely to support the 
tax increase when it was likely to advance children’s education and likelihood of success 
(promotion frame) than when the program was likely to prevent children from failing in 
school and undermining future success (prevention frame). Prevention focused 
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participants were more likely to support the tax increase when they read the prevention 
frame as opposed to the promotion frame (Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003).  
 These studies demonstrate that regulatory focus may be influential in decisions 
about law and policy and that the regulatory fit may lead to greater support for a law 
based upon participant’s “feeling right”. These factors may also play a role in juror 
decision-making. It is possible that jurors who are high in promotion focus may approach 
a case differently than those high in prevention focus.  Wiener and Farnum (2013) 
examined the role of regulatory focus on the use of but-for and mixed motive causality 
instructions on judgments of age discrimination. They measured chronic regulatory focus 
using the Composite Regulatory Focus Scale (study 1) and the Lockwood Scale (study 2) 
and found that strong promotion and prevention focus led to more verdicts in favor of the 
plaintiff, but only under the but-for causality instructions. Though both types of 
regulatory focus led to more pro-plaintiff verdicts, the pathways leading to this decision 
were different. Wiener and Farnum argued that promotion focused jurors are more likely 
to accept the plaintiff’s evidence and dismissing the defendant’s evidence, thereby risking 
that they are falsely finding for the plaintiff. Prevention focused jurors may focus more 
strongly on the defendant’s evidence so that they do not risk finding for the defendant 
when they should find for the plaintiff. It must be pointed out that, Wiener and Farnum 
(2013) did not manipulate regulatory focus so that additional research that manipulates 
either incidental or integral regulatory focus (or both) may aid in parsing out the 
influence of regulatory fit on use of instructions in discrimination cases.  The research 
proposed in this dissertation with regard to retaliation cases will help isolate the effect of 
regulatory fit on decision making in cases of discrimination.   
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 There are no studies that have examined the role of regulatory focus in retaliation 
cases and, in fact, no psychological studies that have examined retaliation decisions in 
discrimination law. However, Brebels, de Cremer, and Sedikides (2008) did conduct a 
series of five studies to determine when people who perceive a procedure as unfair are 
most likely to retaliate. Participants in the study completed a packet of information 
measuring their personality structures as part of a cover story. Procedural fairness was 
manipulated through the feedback participants received in which the “manager” wrote a 
note to the participants that said either he reviewed and graded all 5 measures from the 
information packet to place the participant in a group (procedurally fair) or that he had 
reviewed only 1 measure to place the participant in a group (unfair). After completing the 
packet, participants read that a “manager” would review their information and then they 
completed a regulatory focus “filler” task in which participants either described three 
accomplishments, hopes, or aspirations and strategies for attaining these goals (promotion 
focused) or described three responsibilities, duties, or obligations and strategies to attain 
these goals. At the end of the study Brebels et al. (2008) told participants that they would 
help decide how much to pay the manager for the study by either subtracting up to $3 
(study 1) or allocating a percentage of the total wage (study 2) to the manager. The 
researchers defined retaliation as participants taking money away from the manager. In 
the procedurally unfair condition promotion focus participants were significantly more 
likely to retaliate than were prevention-focused participants.   
Supporting the role of regulatory focus and fit, Gino & Margolis (2011) examined 
the role of regulatory focus in ethical decision making in a series of four studies.  Study 1 
and Study 2 used chronic regulatory focus to predict how often participants would 
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overestimate their number of correct answers on an anagram task. The paradigm allowed 
overestimation of correct answers only if participants cheated while grading their 
anagrams. Promotion focused participants were significantly more likely to overestimate 
their performance than prevention focused individuals. This overestimation then 
mediated (Study 2) whether or not participants donated money to a charity at the end of 
the study. Thus, promotion focused participants were more likely to donate to the charity, 
but only if they had cheated in the study. Study 3 and Study 4 examined how incidentally 
manipulated regulatory focus may influence ethical behaviors on the same anagram task. 
The results replicated the first two studies showing that participants induced to be 
promotion-focused were more likely to act unethically than prevention focused 
participants.  These studies applied to retaliation in the workplace, suggest that employers 
who are more promotion focused will be more willing to retaliate against an employee 
than employers who are prevention focused. 
  Regulatory focus and fit in groups. Almost all studies concerning regulatory 
focus examine the behavior of single individuals. However, group decision making is an 
extremely influential process with a strong impact in day-to-day life.  For example, juries 
are integral to the legal system and thus it is important to understand the way in which 
regulatory focus and regulatory fit might influence their deliberations and decisions.  
Along these lines group goals are one way in which regulatory focus and fit might 
determine the outcome of the jury decision process. In one study, researchers gave groups 
of four people a 60 minute training during which they manipulated regulatory focus by 
either framing the task as one involving safety and security (prevention) or growth and 
advancement (promotion).  Researchers also manipulated whether the goal was group-
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based or individual based by telling groups that either the top 3 performing groups 
(group-based goal) or the top 12 performing individuals (individual based goal) would 
receive a monetary reward. When working towards a group-based goal, as compared to 
an individual oriented goal, prevention focused groups, as compared to promotion 
focused groups, demonstrate higher worker engagement, lower levels of intolerance, 
more effective coordination, and higher performance (Beersma, Homan, van Kleef, & de 
Dreu, 2013). Type of goal did not influence promotion focused teams.  Sassenberg, 
Landkammer, and Jacoby (2014), found that when a prevention focus group performed 
an individually focused task they were more likely to discount information from other 
group members, but when they experienced regulatory fit and were given a group based 
goal, they did not discount other group members. Conversely, the promotion groups 
thrived when given individually focused goals. 
Burtscher and Meyer (2014) showed that the type of task interacts with the 
group’s regulatory focus to determine performance. Groups performed the “stranded in 
the desert” task in which they role played being the lone survivors of a plane crash in the 
desert and in order to survive they had to complete five decision-making tasks. Each task 
had six multiple choice options with one correct answer and two partly correct answers. 
Participants in a promotion focus were able to gain money by correctly solving the task 
while those in a prevention focus were able to avoid losing money by correctly solving 
the task. Finally, the researchers measured information processing by coding the sources 
of information the groups referred to during the task. Sources of information included 
strategy, items given in the scenario, the cover story, and the six multiple choice 
solutions. Promotion focused groups, as compared to prevention focused groups, 
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performed better on the reasoning task, but the style of group information processing 
moderated this effect. Specifically, promotion focused groups relied more on global and 
innovative information whereas the prevention focused groups used more of the finite 
information. Similarly, others have shown that promotion focused groups outperform 
prevention focused groups in a disjunctive task, one in which high performance by a 
single individual is enough to complete the task (Faddegon, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 
2009).  Finally, in line with regulatory focus for individuals, prevention focused groups 
focus more on losses and make less risky choices, while promotion focused groups focus 
more on the gains and make more risky choices (Florack & Hartman, 2007). 
 Making the situation even more complicated group dynamics and not just the type 
of task, influences the way in which promotion and prevention focused groups perform. 
For example, when an individual assumes power he or she is more likely to make 
promotion focused decisions when the group is low status, but when the group is high 
status the high powered individual is more likely to make prevention focused decisions 
(Scheepers, Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2011).  The collective regulatory focus of a group 
can shift individual regulatory focus states, so that individuals either became more 
promotion or prevention focused in a signal detection task to align with the collective 
regulatory focus of their group (Faddegon, Scheepers, & Ellemers, 2008).   
Furthermore, regulatory focus seems to play a role in attitudinal change in a group 
setting. Chung & Han (2013) examined the moderating role of regulatory focus in group 
deliberations with a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) x 2 (deliberation 
content consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent) x 2 (information type: hedonic v. 
utilitarian) between participants study.  The researchers manipulated participant 
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regulatory focus through an anagram task where participants either gained (promotion) or 
lost (prevention) points based on their correct or incorrect answers. Deliberation content 
included both information type and consistency with information. Information type was 
either a news story based on utilitarian topics (such as economic news articles) or hedonic 
topics (such as entertainment gossip), and then deliberation was consistent if the other 
group members commented in line with the news article or inconsistent if they diverted 
from the news article. Finally, the researchers gathered participant attitudes towards the 
topics before deliberation and after deliberation. They found that regulatory focus 
moderated the influence of information type on attitude change. Specifically, when 
working with hedonic information, participants were more likely to experience attitude 
change when they were promotion focused, but when working with utilitarian 
information they were more likely to show attitude change when they were prevention 
focused.  
 Given the research findings on regulatory focus and groups, it is possible that the 
regulatory focus of both the individuals within a group and the collective regulatory focus 
of the group may influence jury deliberations. The way in which the court and attorneys 
present information to jurors, the framing of the goal of jury deliberation, and perhaps the 
distribution of power within the group may lead to different verdicts based on regulatory 
focus predictions.   Further, jurors and juries with regulatory fit may be more likely to 
reach a unanimous verdict, show higher confidence in their verdicts, and higher 
satisfaction with the process than those jurors and juries that lack regulatory fit. It is also 
possible that regulatory fit between the jury and the framing of jury instructions may 
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increase comprehension and application of the instructions to the case facts, leading to 
verdicts that are more in line with the law than with personal bias.  
Prospect Theory 
 The notion of risk taking and decisions is also a central idea in prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992), which posits that when making a decision people derive utility for their decisions 
by considering the potential gains and losses based on the reference point from which 
they begin. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) expanded the initial version of prospect 
theory which explained only two outcome decisions to include multiple outcome domains 
in cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). All other aspects of 
prospect theory remained the same. This paper will focus on prospect theory with two 
outcomes because that fits most closely with retaliation cases where the primary 
judgment is liable vs. not liable.   
Within prospect theory there are four main tenets: reference dependence, loss 
aversion, diminishing sensitivity, and probability weighting (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Reference dependence 
refers to the notion that we base our decisions on a reference point rather than absolute 
values of gains and losses. While there has been much debate over whether there is a 
constant reference point, most researchers accept that the reference point is based on the 
expectations or beliefs from past outcomes (Köszegi & Rabin, 2006; 2007; 2009). Thus, 
the reference point could be different for each decision and each person making a 
decision.  Loss aversion refers to the phenomenon that people are more sensitive to 
losses, even small losses, than they are to gains of the same magnitude (Tversky & 
 40 
Kahneman, 1992; Barberis, 2013).  If a person faces either losing $5 or gaining $10, they 
will be more likely, under prospect theory, to focus on the loss of $5 and make their 
decision based on the possibility of this loss. Loss aversion is the basis for the tenet of 
diminishing sensitivity, which states that people are risk averse over moderate gains but 
risk seeking over moderate losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Barberis, 2013).  In the 
same decision as before, a person faced with losing $5 will be more likely to make a risky 
decision to avoid the loss, while the person faced with gaining $10 will avoid risk even 
though they have more to gain. In other words, people will go a long way in accepting 
risky choices to avoid a possible loss but will be much more conservative when facing 
even larger gains. Finally, prospect theory also posits that people do not weight outcomes 
objectively and are more likely to overweight extreme gains and losses, known as 
probability weighting (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Barberis, 2013).  As Barberis (2013) 
states, the  four tenets of prospect theory in combination determine when people are risk 
averse, risk neutral, and risk seeking. 
Recent research has sought to clarify and expand the influence of prospect theory. 
Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson (2008) considered the role of temporal value symmetry, which 
is whether or not gains and losses are more influential given their temporal distance from 
the present. They had participants, across 7 studies with 6 different scenarios, 
contemplate completing a task in either in the past or in the equidistant future. 
Participants then rated how much compensation (Study 1) they should receive, and found 
that, when contemplating the future, participants wanted significantly more compensation 
than if they completed the task in the past.  Participants’ affective response to the task 
mediated this effect, specifically they rated a future event as having more negative affect 
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and because of this negative affect they felt they should be compensated more. It is thus 
important to consider not just the gains and losses involved in a task, but also the 
temporal distance involved. Supporting this conclusion, Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and 
Erev (2004) demonstrated the importance of source of information in risky decisions.  
Half of the participants (decision-relevant group) completed a decision-relevant task in 
which they read six problems on the computer screen while the other half (experience 
group) were shown two buttons on the computer screen and were told that each button 
represented a choice, but were not given any other information. When participants based 
their decisions on decision-relevant information (typical in a prospect theory task) they 
were more likely to follow the pattern of probability weighting by overweighting the 
probability of a rare event. In contrast, participants who were forced to rely solely on 
their experience underweighted the probability of rare events.  Providing feedback to 
participants reduces the influence of experience on probability weighting in line with 
prospect theory (Jessup, Bishara, & Busemeyer, 2008). 
The richest research area of prospect theory, the study of framing effects has 
important implications for decision making in cases of retaliation (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1991). Framing involves describing gains and losses in terms of certainty/uncertainty or 
positive/negative outcomes. The certainty effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) occurs 
when participants prefer a certain gain over a probabilistic gain of equal or more value. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) use the example of presenting someone with either a sure 
gain of $30 or an 80% chance to win $45 and 20% chance of winning nothing. Even 
though you would have a very good chance of winning the $45 and the expected value of 
the second bet ($36) is greater than the expected value of the first bet ($30), more often 
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than not people prefer the certain gain so that they can avoid the risk of losing. The 
majority of research applying prospect theory to real world decisions relies on the 
positive/gain and negative/loss frame findings (e.g. Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, Pronin, & 
Rothman, 1999; Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012; Latimer et al., 2008; Rivers, Salovey, 
Pizzaro, Pizzaro, & Schneider, 2005; Rothman & Salovey, 1997).   
Research in the area of health behavior has found that gain/loss framing can help 
predict when people choose to take preventive action, though some of the findings is 
contradictory to prospect theory. Latimer and colleagues (2008) gave sedentary 
participants either gain framed messages (i.e., emphasizing the benefits of physical 
activity in reducing risks of diseases), unframed messages, or loss framed messages (i.e., 
emphasizing the risks of inactivity and the desirable outcomes that would be missed due 
to a lack of activity). Participants received the messages throughout their 9-week program 
and completed measures of physical activity, social cognition, and valuation of exercise 
at week 2 and 9. Participants who were in the gain-framed condition showed consistent 
increases in valuation of exercise, self-efficacy, and physical activity, as compared to 
both the mixed and loss-framed conditions over the course of the 9 weeks. This result has 
been found consistently with prevention of potentially less risky health concerns 
including smoking cessation (Steward, Schneider, Pizzaro, & Salovey, 2003), dental 
hygiene (Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999), and sunscreen use 
(Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, Pronin, & Rothman, 1999).  However, when the health 
concern carries more risk of more serious health outcomes, especially cancer, loss-framed 
messages as compared to gain framing influence participants to seek preventive measures 
including mammography (Schneider et al., 2001), HIV testing (Apanovitch McCarthy, & 
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Salovey, 2003), and pap testing (Rivers, Salovey, Pizzaro, Pizzaro, & Schneider, 2005).  
These findings confirm some tenets of prospect theory but also challenge other ones. 
Prevention based on gain-framed messages is in line with diminishing sensitivity in that 
people are more risk averse over moderate gains (such as using sunscreen). Though 
seeking prevention based on loss-framed measures for more serious medical conditions is 
not in line with diminishing sensitivity, it may confirm that these medical conditions are 
subject to probability weighting, and that emphasizing the loss involved with a rare 
occurrence is more persuasive than emphasizing the gain.  
Framing effects have also been found to influence decisions that occur under high 
need as well as the propensity of someone to switch their choice.  Mishra and Fiddick 
(2012) examined the role of gain/loss framing under differing levels of need by using 
classic Tversky and Kahneman scenarios (1982). Specifically, the researchers randomly 
assigned participants to one of four conditions: gain/low need, gain/high need, loss/low 
need, and low/high need.  Participants played the role of the current health minister of a 
country in which a fatal and contagious disease had infected 600 people. Serving as the 
health minister, the participant had to decide between two plans. In the gain/high need 
condition participants read gain-framed options (“If plan A is adopted, 200 people will be 
saved” and “If Plan B is adopted, there is a one third probability that none of them will 
die and a two thirds probability that all of the people will die”) as well as a high need 
statement in which they had to save at least 300 people (low need only required saving at 
least 100 people).  Participants chose riskier options under high need more than under 
low need, an effect that occurred across frame type. This suggests that the certainty effect 
and diminishing sensitivity are reversible under conditions of high need. Other 
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researchers have found that loss framing can influence the decision to switch choices 
(Yechiam, Zahavi, & Arditi, 2014). Specifically, loss framing can lead to restlessness in 
decision-making that results in participants switching choices more often than those who 
receive gain-frames. 
Prospect theory and policy decisions.  Little research has extended prospect 
theory to policy decision making and those studies that have shown mixed results. 
Boettcher (2004) asked participants to place themselves in the role of an advisor to a 
fictitious president (Study 1).  They read a scenario that described a terroristic hostage 
situation for which they were to advise the president on a course of action that was either 
gain-framed (number of people that could be rescued) or loss-framed (number of people 
that will die). Participants were more likely to be risk averse under the gain-framed 
condition and more risk seeking under the loss framed condition, a finding in line with 
prospect theory. Another study manipulated gain- and loss-framed information for 
participants determining whether or not they would support a new climate change policy 
(Wiest, Raymond, & Clawson, 2012). Although the frame did not change endorsement of 
the new policy, those in the loss-frame condition reported greater feelings of being 
threatened by climate change.  Finally, Belton, Thomson, and Dhami (2014) gave a 
hypothetical civil litigation case to lawyers and non-lawyer participants and asked them 
to put themselves in the position of the claimant in a dispute over how much they should 
receive for a totaled car due to an accident. The researchers framed damage outcomes as 
either a loss or a gain and asked participants to determine the appropriate settlement for 
the case. In the gain framed condition, participants were told their totaled car was worth 
$14,000 and the settlement was set at $19,000, thus they would gain from taking the 
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settlement. In the loss framed condition, participants were told their totaled car was worth 
$24,000 which meant taking the $19,000 settlement would be a loss of value. Regardless 
of profession (lawyer vs. non-lawyer) all participants showed effects of framing. 
Specifically, participants were more likely to settle their claim in the gain condition than 
the loss condition. Belton and colleagues also coded qualitative data of the decision 
making process and found that participants in the gain-frame condition were more likely 
to make risk-averse comments (“money in the bank is better than a chance or more or less 
money”) while those in the loss-frame condition were more likely to make risk-seeking 
comments (“I would feel that given that National Mutual had offered a settlement they 
were not confident in their position”). Lawyers made similar levels of risk-averse 
comments across conditions while non-lawyers made more risk-averse comments in the 
gain condition.  
Given the limited research concerning prospect theory and policy it is difficult to 
predict the influence framing may have on a juror. It is possible that a gain-framed 
instruction may lead to more risk-aversion, which would manifest as pro-plaintiff verdict 
under the assumption that jurors tend to be more sympathetic to a plaintiff in a 
discrimination or retaliation case. If the court provides loss-framed instructions this may 
elicit risk-seeking behaviors that could manifest in either more pro-plaintiff or defendant 
verdicts depending upon the jurors initial propensity. The role of prospect theory 
probably depends upon the strength of evidence in the case. Perhaps risk-averse jurors 
would be more likely to focus only on the strongest facts, while risk seeking would 
consider all case facts. Another possibility is that but-for and mixed motive instructions 
are inherently framed. That is, but-for instructions, due to the limited amount of 
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information considered and the burden resting on the plaintiff, may be loss-framed, 
whereas mixed motive is gain-framed with its greater allowance of additional decision 
factors. This could explain why jurors are, regardless of evidence strength, more likely to 
find for the plaintiff under mixed motive instructions but more likely to find for the 
defendant under but-for instructions (Wiener & Farnum, 2013).  
Prospect theory and group decisions.  There also exists a paucity of research on 
the way in which prospect theory tenets might influence group decision making. 
Boettcher (2004) found that for participants who participated in group deliberation 
concerning a hostage situation, the few framing effects for individual participants 
disappeared for the group.  It is possible that the type of group interaction may predict the 
influence of prospect theory tenets. When groups engaged in a face-to-fact interaction, 
framing effects occurred in line with prospect theory but not under a computer-mediated 
discussion. That is, when participants were discussing face-to-face they were more likely 
to exhibit risk-aversion for gain-framed decisions and risk seeking for loss-framed 
decisions (McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegel, 1987).  In other work, Whyte (1993) found that 
members of groups gave in to prospect theory pressures more easily. Participants role 
played a scenario in which they were in charge of a company that was dealing with a 
failing investment. They faced either a neutral or loss-framed option for dealing with the 
failing investment. Finally, participants either made the decision individually or in a 
group. Both individuals and groups were more likely to escalate their commitment to a 
failing investment with the loss-frame condition, but this escalation was quicker and 
more dramatic for the group.  
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The results of this research offer some suggestions for how prospect theory tenets 
might influence juries. Jurors acting as individuals are likely to give in to risk-aversion 
with gain and risk seeking with losses. This may depend on the method of deliberation 
(McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegel, 1987). If deliberation occurs in person, the effects may be 
more pronounced. But if a study uses an online deliberation, the usual risk aversion may 
not manifest.  It is also possible that the tenets of prospect theory are more influential in 
jury deliberation than in individual juror decisions (Whyte, 1993). However, other studies 
suggest that the effect of prospect theory could disappear with deliberation (Boettcher, 
2004). 
Other Psychological Theories. 
 Although they are not central to this process, other social psychological theories 
including group decision-making, the theory of planned behavior, general emotion 
theories, and general decision making theories might also influence decision making in 
allegations of illegal retaliation.  I consider each of these briefly as alternative 
approaches.  
 Group decision-making. Although the jury is an essential and invaluable aspect 
of the legal system, little research makes use of jury deliberations due to lack of 
resources. Jury deliberation studies are costly in terms of both time and money.  Yet, it is 
possible that individual juror judgments could be substantially different from judgments 
made during or after deliberation (Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; Kerr, Niedermeier, & 
Kaplan, 1999). Deliberation may help jurors approach the evidence of the case in a novel 
way and involve self-corrective measures for individual juror held bias or misinformation 
(Gastil, Burkhalter, & Black, 2007).  In fact, groups operate as their own information 
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processing systems (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; De Dreu, Nijstad, & van 
Knippenberg, 2008).  Although groups do have better collaborative recall of facts than 
individuals (Maki, Weigold, & Arellano, 2008), research also suggests that collaborative 
recall is greater when a group interacts less (Thorley & Dewhurst, 2009). This may seem 
counterintuitive, but individuals in groups with higher levels of interaction are more 
susceptible to adopting the incorrect responses and facts that fellow group members 
present (Salerno & Diamond, 2010). This is especially true under certain circumstances: 
unmemorable stimulus (Walther et al., 2002), smaller group size (Thorley & Dewhurst, 
2007), higher pressure to perform (Reyson, 2003), and the absence of dissenters (Walther 
et al., 2002).  There are ways to increase group productivity and interaction, such as 
developing a more cohesive group that shares a normative goal of productivity (Kerr & 
Tinsdale, 2004) and whose members are committed to perform to obtain the best result 
(Mullen & Cooper, 1994). This is in line with research on regulatory focus and groups. 
Specifically, when a group’s regulatory focus fits the regulatory focus of a task, which 
could be considered cohesion, they are better able to perform the task, as compared to 
when the task does not fit the regulatory focus (Sassenberg, Landkammer, and Jacoby, 
2014).  
There is little argument that jury deliberation involves stress, which may decrease 
group performance. More specifically, stress may increase the quantity but reduce the 
quality of the group’s product because it forces groups to focus only on the most vital 
tasks (Brown & Miller, 2000; Kelly & Karau, 1993).   Increasing time pressure in groups 
has an even greater effect on group focus (Brown & Miller, 2000; Volpe et al., 1996); 
however, if groups experience more stress than they can reasonably handle then their 
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overall performance decreases (Adelman et al., 2003).  Stressful conditions also increase 
a “need for closure” among individuals within the group, which may be a mechanism that 
actually increases group information exchange and information utilization (Kruglanski, 
Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2002).  
 Theory of planned behavior. The theory of planned behavior (TPB) seeks to 
explain the predictors of behavioral intentions (Ajzen & Madden, 1985; Ajzen, 1991).  
The theory posits that intentions result from attitudes, subjective norms, and the 
perception of behavioral control.  Central to TPB is the notion that a person’s intention to 
perform a behavior predicts whether or not they actually perform the behavior.  
Generally, the stronger the intention, the more likely it is that a person will actually 
perform the behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Simply having the intention to perform a behavior is 
not enough to always follow through; in fact, TPB suggests that attitudes, subjective 
norms, and perception of behavioral control limit intention to behave. A person may have 
the intention to steal a candy bar from the store, but given the shared subjective norm that 
this is illegal, the behavior is less likely to happen and ultimately reduces the intention to 
act. Similarly, if a person does not perceive that he or she can control the behavior then 
the person is less likely to perform the act. Perceived control can include beliefs about 
opportunities and resources; for example, having the intention to run a marathon 
tomorrow may not be realized if a person has never run before. Here, perceived 
behavioral control is quite low. A meta-analysis of 185 studies found that all three 
components of TPB predict behavioral intentions (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Successful 
examples of TPB factors predicting behavioral intentions with a variety of behaviors 
include, among others, source reduction activity for environmental managers (Cordano & 
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Frieze, 2000), pharmacists’ intention to provide medication therapy (Herbert, Urmie, 
Newland, & Farris, 2006), and online shopping behavior (Hsu, Yen, Chiu, & Chang, 
2006). More importantly for the current project, researchers have applied TPB to predict 
a variety of ethical and legally relevant intentions and behaviors.  
 Corporate managers often face situations in which they must either report or 
ignore a potentially fraudulent behavior. Carpenter and Reimers (2006), gave MBA 
students one of six scenarios that manipulated the positive or negative acceptance of 
attitudes concerning fraudulent charges, personal control over reporting, and subjective 
norms of accepting or rejecting ethical violations. When participants read about a 
workplace that had positive attitudes towards unethical behavior, high amounts of 
personal control, and positive subjective norms of participating in unethical activities, 
they were more likely to not report a potentially fraudulent action. However, when 
participants read about a workplace that viewed fraudulent activities negatively on all 
aspects they were more likely to indicate that they would report the behavior. These 
results supported previous studies in which researchers used TBP to explain whether or 
not accountants would participate in unethical behavior (Buchan, 2005), intentions of 
nurses to report inadequate patient care (Randall & Gibson, 1991), and intentions of 
illegally downloading music (Wang & McClung, 2010).  
 Researchers have also applied the theory of planned behavior to study how laws 
and regulations influence intentions to behave. For example, Macy, Middlestadt, Seo, 
Kolbe, and Jay, (2012) used TPB to show how and why smoke free air laws influence 
intentions to cease smoking by decreasing attitudes towards smoking and increasing the 
normative pressure to quit.  Additional TPB studies demonstrated that attitudes, 
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subjective norms and personal control predicted compliance with speed limit laws 
(Elliott, Armitage, & Baughan, 2003) and prohibitions against other driving violations 
(Parker, Manstead, Stradling, & Reason, 1992).  More specifically, if attitudes were more 
lenient towards breaking the law, subjective norms indicated that others break the law, 
and individuals scored higher on the perception of higher personal control people 
intended to break the law and to actually did so. One study looked at the role of TPB in 
whistleblowing behaviors within the Greek system at a university (Richardson, Wang, & 
Hall. 2007). Participants read one of three scenarios that described minor hazing (making 
a pledge get napkins for dinner), moderate hazing (throwing water balloons at pledges 
who were dressed up for an event) and severe hazing (forcing pledges to drink alcoholic 
beverages and complete a number of physical activities).  Richardson and colleagues 
(2007) found that attitudes, subjective norms, and behavioral control predicted intentions 
to report the hazing. The severity of the hazing served as a moderator determining the 
predictive strength of the attitudes, norms, and control on intentions.   
 The theory of planned behavior could explain employer intentions to retaliate and 
juror intentions toward verdicts favoring defendants or plaintiffs in retaliation cases. 
Jurors who have strong negative attitudes towards retaliation or discrimination and feel 
more personal control over rendering a verdict may be more likely to find for the 
plaintiff. Subjective norms could play a role in deliberation if there is a norm that is 
salient among a jury. It is also possible that the instructions themselves, but-for versus 
mixed motive, may serve as a subjective norm. Since but-for instructions require the 
plaintiff to bear the majority of the burden, this may provide a norm that the plaintiff is 
typically incorrect in their assertion, whereas mixed motive instructions may create a 
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norm that the employer wronged the plaintiff if an illegitimate factor came into play at all 
. Furthermore, employers who choose to retaliate may do so because they hold negative 
attitudes towards employees who complain, there is a strong subjective norm that 
suggests people do not tolerate complaining employees, and their own perception of 
personal control over the decision to retaliate is elevated. It is also possible that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar could influence subjective norms. Specifically, by 
stating that an employer is not liable if they took other, legal factors into consideration, it 
could create a norm that retaliation is acceptable if there is some legitimate reason that 
supports a reprisal. This change in subjective norm may influence intentions to retaliate. 
Thus, the theory of planned behavior might also be helpful in predicting when and why 
employers choose to retaliation or discriminate against employees.  
 General emotion theories.  It is difficult to consider decision-making without the 
influence of emotions. This is particularly true in cases of discrimination and/or 
retaliation, which are almost always emotionally charged. I will discuss several broad 
theories of emotion to briefly address some of the most important issues.  
 Mood-as-information suggests that people use the subjective experience of moods 
and emotions in their decision-making (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 2003).  
In the seminal study, participants reported higher life satisfaction on sunny days than on 
rainy days, but only when researchers did not draw their attention to the weather 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Subjective experiences with elements unknown to a person – 
such as the weather or emotions—can be strong predictors of decision-making. It may be 
possible that emotions within jurors, unbeknownst to them, influence their overall 
verdicts. Imagine a juror who feels anger over getting the wrong coffee order before the 
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trial, and this anger dissipates to annoyance that continues throughout the course of the 
trial and into deliberation. This juror may interpret this irritation as a sign that that the 
defendant is liable, not realizing that her or his emotions emerged from a different source 
having nothing to do with the case under consideration. This is particularly important as 
anger makes people more certain in their judgments, more punitive, and more likely to 
render a guilty verdict (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Salerno & Peter-
Hagene, 2013; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).  
 Conscious emotions also influence behavior and decision-making and are at the 
core of cognitive appraisal theory. Under this theory, emotions result from the 
interpretations and explanations that people assign to a given circumstance, especially 
absent physiological arousal (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991).  That is, in the 
absence of other information we look to our emotions as a source of information for how 
we should react in many situations.  Under appraisal theories emotions give rise to a 
range of cognitive dimensions including certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity, 
anticipated effort, and responsibility (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991).  Each 
individual emotion has its own footprint of cognitive appraisals. Consider the emotions 
that arise form negative events. For example, anger is associated with the belief that 
another person, instead of the self or a situation, is responsible for the negative event 
(Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Scherer,1999, 
2001;        Weiner,1986). When a perceiver attributes a negative event to external 
situations or to the self, it will likely lead to either sadness or shame.  The cognitive 
appraisal dimensions themselves determine future decisions and judgments.  
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Jurors likely appraise events that give rise to their current emotions.  For example, 
Kadous (2001) studied jurors’ decisions in a negligence case by varying the amount of 
distressing emotional content in the case description. Overall, the more distressed jurors 
felt the more likely they were to find the firm liable. This effect, however, dissipated 
when jurors rated their anxiety levels before reading the case (Kadous, 2001). This study 
found that when jurors are aware of the source of their anxiety, the emotions that they 
feel during the trial has less impact on their judgments and decisions.   Appraisals of the 
source of an emotion may also influence employer decisions. Kligyte, Connelly, Thiel, 
and Devenport (2013) found that anger inhibited ethical decision-making while fear 
facilitated it. If an employer is angry about receiving a complaint of discrimination, this 
anger may lead to retaliation, whereas if the complaint made them afraid of the 
consequences they might refrain from retaliating.  
 The plaintiff’s emotions may also influence juror decision-making. Research has 
consistently shown that people overestimate how they will emotionally respond to 
positive and negative situations and this overestimation influences decision-making. 
These errors in affective forecasting commonly known as the impact bias has important 
implications for how people make responsibility judgments (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, 
& Zhang, 2007; Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Baron, 1992; Igou, 
2008; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999; Wilson & Gilbert, 
2003; Zeelenberg 1999; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & 
van der Pligt, 2000).  People, in general, are able to predict the valence (positive or 
negative) of an event, but they are unable to accurately predict the duration and intensity 
of the same event (Gilbert et al., 1998; Gilbert, Lieberman, Morewedge, & Wilson, 2004; 
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Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).  When forecasting the emotions of others, people over rate the 
negative affect that someone else will experience in relation to a negative event because 
they underestimate others’ coping mechanisms (Igou, 2008). Most people have an 
understanding of their own coping behaviors and mechanisms but do not have accurate 
knowledge of the coping capabilities of others. So we know how we will adapt to our 
own experiences of negative events (although, Gilbert et al., -- 1998 suggests that we 
underestimate our own coping abilities) but misjudge the ability of others to do so. Igou 
(2008) referred to this process as the Asymmetric Immune Knowledge hypothesis.   
Affective forecasting and the asymmetric immune knowledge (AIK) hypothesis 
likely plays a significant role in legal decision-making. Recall that retaliation requires a 
reasonable belief that an action was discrimination.  In determining reasonable beliefs 
jurors may attempt to forecast the emotions and thoughts that a “reasonable” person 
experienced. Invoking the AIK theory, jurors are likely to see an action as more negative 
in affect than the plaintiff experienced. Research has found that affective forecasting the 
emotional experiences of a sexual misconduct complainant can lead to more judgments of 
sexual harassment (Wiener, Gervais, Allen, & Marquez, 2013; Kimble, Farnum, Wiener, 
Gervais, Allen, 2016).  
 General decision making theories. It is commonly assumed, especially under the 
law, that decision makers are rational actors. However, research on the psychology of 
decision making challenges this assumption (Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichenstein, 1977).  
Central to behavioral decision theory is the notion that people use non-rational 
information, such as social norms, to make decisions because decision making is complex 
and contradictory. (Hillman, 2000). Since the world is replete with complex and 
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contradictory information, people use strategies of bounded rationality, that is, they 
process information only until they are satisfied with a decision, even if that decision is 
not the optimal, rational choice (Simon, 1957). Behavioral decision theory shows that 
decision makers use both normative and descriptive information to reach judgments and 
decisions (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Slovic, Baruch, Eischoff, & Lichenstein, 1997). 
Normative information conforms to the beliefs and values of the individual and those 
around him or her.  Descriptive information refers to the beliefs and values associated 
with the decision in a way that makes it more accessible for incorporating that 
information into the decision making process.  This tradeoff and comparison of 
normative information with descriptive information has been found to predict decision 
making in business ethics (Loewenstein, 1996), consumer choices (Khan, Dhar, & 
Wertenbroch, 2004), and the management and regulation of risk (Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1984.). 
To make matters even more complex, people rely on heuristics, simple and 
efficient rules to make a variety of decisions in their daily life  (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973).  People use a variety of different types of heuristics in their decisions many of 
which turn out to be robust predictors of decision outcomes (Block & Harper, 1991; 
Campbell, Chao, Robertson, & Yokum, in press; Marti & Wissler, 2000; Epley & 
Gilovich, 2002; Epley, van Boven, Keysar, Gilovich, 2004; Robbenolt & Studebaker, 
1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Wansink, Kent, & Hoch, 1998). For example, 
anchoring and adjustment occurs when people focus on a piece of information (the 
anchor) that dictates a reference point for a decision (Block & Harper, 1991; Epley & 
Gilovich, 2002; Epley, Keysar, van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Wansink, Kent, & Hoch, 
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1998).  Research studies show that anchoring is influential in determining damages in 
civil claims such that jurors focus on any suggested amount or a cap and then adjust their 
decision based on this number (e.g. Campbell, Chao, Robertson, & Yokum, 2014; Marti 
& Wissler, 2000; Robbenolt & Studenbaker, 1999).  Another commonly used heuristic, 
the availability heuristic, occurs when people base their current decision on the ease with 
which they can remember concepts or past experiences related to the decision at hand 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In a trial, if the defendant was recently in the news as a 
paragon of charity, the availability of this memory could lead to more pro-defendant 
verdicts.  The availability heuristics influences moral perceptions (Wasieleski & Hayibor, 
2008) and verdicts in criminal cases (Kassin & Garfield, 1991; Lieberman, 2002) 
especially when there is an abundance of pretrial publicity (Greene, 1990; Greene & 
Wade, 1988; Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & Jimenez-Lorento, 1999). The representative 
heuristic is similar to the availability heuristic, but under this mental shortcut people 
focus on recalling the prototype, or representative, of a group or situation (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This heuristic is most salient in cases in 
which jurors view groups or individuals stereotypically (Darby & Jeffers, 1988; 
FörsterLee, FörsterLee, Horowitz, & King, 2006; Lieberman, 2006).   
Understanding Causality in Retaliation 
 The recent decision in Nassar (2013) brings the issue of causality into the 
forefront of retaliation law. Plaintiffs are filing an increasing number of claims of 
retaliation each year, making it imperative to understand how jurors interpret case facts 
under both mixed motive and but-for causality instructions. Further, the application of 
but-for causality may influence the decision making of employers who are contemplating 
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retaliation either deliberatively or unconsciously. While many social psychological 
theories of decision making can shed light on these issues, regulatory focus and its close 
cousin, prospect theory may be particularly useful in understanding how people evaluate 
risk in reaching retaliation judgments. Regulatory focus provides a framework for 
understanding the psychological pathways that jurors traverse and the effects of their 
motivational states when contemplating a retaliation case. To study this effect researchers 
can manipulate regulatory focus incidentally or integrally to determine when and why 
regulatory focus influences decisions. Prospect theory may explain the relationship 
between perceived risk and decision making by offering guidance to understand the way 
in which jury instructions frame losses and gains and thereby influence juror verdicts. 
Where gain framed jurors may act in risk averse ways loss framed jurors may seek out 
risky decisions.  Employers may also act in accordance to gains or losses when reacting 
to employee discrimination claims. Gain framed employers may be less likely to retaliate 
than loss framed employers.   
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Chapter 2: Current Research 
The current studies first seek to extend Wiener and Farnum’s (2013) findings on 
age discrimination to cases of retaliation. The studies manipulated participant regulatory 
fit and examined the pathways that participants use to reach their decisions by measuring 
how they weigh plaintiff and defendant evidence. Study 1 focused on a retaliation case 
following the firing of an employee while Study 2 used a case based upon failure to 
promote a deserving employee. The current research also seeks to understand the 
influence of regulatory fit and knowledge of retaliation law on decisions concerning 
promoting or firing employees. Study 3 included measures to examine the pathway that 
defendants use when determining if retaliation is an acceptable reaction to an employee 
complainant.  All three studies measured regulatory focus incidentally and manipulated 
task focus integrally to extend the understanding of how regulatory fit influences the 
comprehension and application of jury instructions as well as employment decisions 
when there are opportunities for retaliation. 
Overall Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1. In line with previous research (Wiener & Farnum 2013; Farnum & 
Wiener, 2016; Wiener & Farnum, 2016), participants using but-for instructions will be 
more likely to find for the defendant, while participants using mixed motive instructions 
will be more likely to find for the plaintiff.  
 Hypothesis 1a. When participants face two different sets of instructions, mixed 
motive for a discrimination claim and but-for for a retaliation claim, the but for 
instructions will bleed over and dilute participants use of the mixed motive instructions. 
Thus, in cases that include both statutory and retaliation claims jurors will be more likely 
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to find for the defendant in the discrimination case when they must use both types of 
instructions as opposed to when the law instructs them to apply only mixed motive 
instructions. However, it is possible (but less likely) that participants will compare the 
instructions, notice the differences in the decision criterion, and adhere even more closely 
to the mixed motive approach in the discrimination case and be more likely to find for the 
plaintiff than those who either used but-for instructions for both claims, or those who 
only decided a retaliation claim with but-for instructions.  
 Hypotheses 1b. When jurors are rendering a verdict for a retaliation case in which 
an employer denied the plaintiff a promotion, they will show less instruction effects than 
in a retaliation case in which the employer fired the plaintiff.  
 Hypotheses 1c. When making employment decisions (firing or promoting) in a 
system that relies upon but for causality instructions, participants playing the role of 
employers will be more likely to retaliate, while those operating in a system that uses 
mixed motive causality will be less likely to retaliate.   
Hypothesis 2. In line with previous research (Wiener & Farnum, 2013), 
participants high in either chronic promotion or prevention focus, as compared to 
participants low on either, will be more likely to find for the plaintiff.  
 Hypothesis 2a. Participants who are in a state of regulatory fit (i.e. chronic 
promotion/promotion manipulation) will be more likely to find for the plaintiff than those 
who are in a state of regulatory misfit. Promotion focused regulatory fit will lead to 
participants overvaluing the plaintiff’s evidence, while participants in a state of 
prevention focused regulatory fit will undervalue the defendant’s evidence (Wiener & 
Farnum, 2013).  
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 Hypothesis 3.  When making employment decisions (promoting or firing), 
participants high in promotion focus playing the role of employers will be more likely to 
retaliate against the plaintiff, whereas participants high in prevention focus will be less 
likely to retaliate against the plaintiff. Participants low in both will fall back on the 
causality instructions and show but for versus mixed motive effects on their verdicts.   
Hypothesis 3a. Retaliation will be more likely to occur when making a promotion 
decision as compared to termination judgment, because the promotion decision is an act 
of omission while the termination decision is an act of commission (Charness & Levine, 
2010). 
 Hypothesis 3b. Participants who are in a state of regulatory fit will weigh the 
resumes differently. Specifically, participants in a state of promotion regulatory fit will 
more value the good work qualities of the applicants who did not complain about 
discrimination more highly than the applicant who did complain about discrimination.  
Participants in a state of prevention regulatory fit will be more likely to undervalue the 
negative aspects of the applicant who complained about discrimination, as compared to 
the applicants who did not complain about discrimination.  
 Hypothesis 4. Regulatory focus, and especially regulatory fit, will be the most 
influential under but-for causality than mixed motive causality because it discourage 
respondents from considering all the case information so that they resort to their own 
feelings and motivations to make a decision.  
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Chapter 3: Study 1 
Study 1: Regulatory Focus and Jury Decision Making in Retaliation Cases involving 
firing an employee 
 Study 1 seeks to replicate and extend previous research on the influence of jury 
instructions (Wiener & Farnum, 2013; Farnum & Wiener, in press; Wiener & Farnum, in 
press) to cases of retaliation. Specifically, does the use of different instructions, mixed 
motive versus but-for, influence juror decision making in cases of retaliation and cases 
where jurors have to decide both discrimination and retaliation claims. Participants were 
given a case vignette and had to render a verdict for the case.  Additionally, Study 1 also 
examines the role of regulatory focus on juror decision making.  
Research Design and Procedure. Study 1 was a 2 (Regulatory frame: promotion 
v. prevention) x 2 (Claim type: Retaliation v. Discrimination/Retaliation) x 2 (Instruction: 
mixed motive v. but-for)  + 1 (Mixed Motive and But-for instructions for a 
Discrimination/Retaliation claim) between participants design with chronic prevention 
and promotion as continuous variables. Participants signed up for the study on 
Mechanical Turk, which directed them to the survey link.  Participants had to complete 
the survey in one sitting. Participants read the informed consent and indicated (yes or no) 
whether they consented to participate in the study. They completed the chronic regulatory 
focus measure before reading the trial transcript and then read the framing instructions, 
completed the decision motivation questionnaire, read the causality instructions, and then 
rendered their verdicts. Lastly, participants completed the manipulation check and 
demographic questionnaire. After completing the study, the program thanked participants 
and paid them $1 for their time. 
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Participants. Only participants who were 18 or older and a U.S. citizen were able 
to see the survey on Mechanical Turk. Participants were 210 community members 
recruited via Mechanical Turk.  Eleven participants were dropped from the dataset for 
falling outside two standard deviations of response time for the survey. The final 199 
participants were 50% (N = 100) women, had a mean age of 35.71, and 83.8% of them 
were employed. The ethnic breakdown of the participants was representative of the 
Mturk community with 79.3% European American, 6.6% African American, 4.5% Asian 
American, 4% Hispanic, 2% Latino/a, 1.5% Native American, and 1.5% other. 
Participants were well educated with 57.8% holding at least a college degree, 30.7% 
having completed some college, and 11.6% holding a high school diploma. Finally, 
42.2% of participants had occupied a work position in which they had made hiring or 
firing decisions.  
Chronic Regulatory Focus. Participants first completed Shah and Higgins (1997) 
incidental measure of regulatory chronicity by listing four attributes of their ideal self and 
four attributes of their ought self. They rated the extent to which they actually possess 
each attribute on a 1 to 5 scale (Ideal M = 2.77, SD  = .69 ; Ought M = 2.84, SD  = .63). 
The sum of the amount of time it took them to rate the ideal and ought attributes served 
as the measure of chronic prevention and promotion focus, respectively (Ideal M = 72.82, 
SD = 61.66; Ought M = 76.49 , SD  = 63.66)  (Appendix A).  
Trial Transcript. The trial summary was a modified version of the case facts in 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (Appendix B). In the first 
version of the summary (retaliation only), the plaintiff only brought a claim of retaliation 
but in the second version (discrimination and retaliation) the plaintiff brought two claims 
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– discrimination and retaliation.  In the transcript, the plaintiff alleges that the hospital 
fired him in retaliation to his national origin discrimination complaint that he had brought 
while he worked as a University affiliated doctor. The plaintiff’s complaint of national 
origin discrimination was based on treatment from his supervisor in which she scrutinized 
his work more than she scrutinized other employees and she made offensive ethnic 
comments to other co-workers regarding the defendant’s ethnicity, such as “Middle 
Easterners are lazy.” After he filed a complaint and sent a letter detailing the 
discrimination and resigned from the University, the hospital fired the plaintiff from his 
newly negotiated position as a non-University affiliated doctor. Pilot testing using 
Mechanical Turk found that respondents viewed the scenario as neutral with 50% (20) 
finding for the plaintiff and 50% (20) finding for the defendant.    
Decision Motivation Measure. Participants assessed the extent to which each of 
the following was a motivating factor in the University Medical Center’s actions that 
ultimately led to the decision to fire Dr. Ahmad on a 0 (not at all) to 11 (extremely) scale. 
The factors included 1. “Dr. Ahmad’s national origin.”(M = 4.25, SD = 3.04) 2. 
“Meadowood’s rehiring policy” (M = 5.03, SD = 3.26) 3. “Dr. Ahmad’s adversarial 
relationship with his supervisors” (M = 6.52, SD = 3. 28) 4. “Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination 
complaint” (M = 5.95, SD = 3.50) and 5. Dr. Ahmad’s letter to the University Medical 
Center’s faculty.” (M = 6.80, SD = 3.23) (Appendix C).  
Framing manipulation. Immediately after reading the trial transcript, participants 
read the judge’s explanation of the juror’s task akin to jury instructions in a real trial. 
There were two versions of these instructions: promotion framed and prevention framed.  
The promotion framed instructions informed the participants that it was their job to 
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achieve the satisfaction that comes from knowing they completed their job and achieved 
the best possible outcome.  The prevention framed instructions informed the participants 
that it was their job to avoid the dissatisfaction that comes from knowing they improperly 
completed their job and contributed to a miscarriage of justice (Appendix D).   
Causal Instructions. After reading the transcript, half of the participants received 
mixed motive instructions while the other half received but-for jury instructions. These 
were the instructions that Wiener and Farnum (2013) used modified to include language 
from Title VII that explained retaliation.  The mixed motive instructions informed 
participants that for a retaliation claim three elements must be met: 1. The plaintiff 
complained about national origin discrimination, 2. The defendant took a materially 
adverse action, and 3. That the discrimination complaint was a motivating factor for the 
defendant’s actions. “A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some part in the 
defendants decision.” For the but-for retaliation instructions, elements 1 and 2 were the 
same but element 3 required that the discrimination complaint be a determinative factor. 
“A determinative factor means the Defendant would not have taken the challenged 
employment decision but for the Plaintiff’s protected class.”  
 For the discrimination instructions, there were only two elements: 1. The 
defendant’s actions led to the plaintiff being fired and 2. The plaintiff’s national origin 
was the determinative/motivating factor.  Participants in the discrimination and retaliation 
condition either received but-for instructions for both charges, mixed motive for both 
charges, or mixed motive for the discrimination charge and but-for, for the retaliation 
charge (Appendix E). 
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Verdict and Case Decisions. Participants then completed a verdict ballot where 
they indicated whether they found in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. For 
retaliation verdicts 48.2% (N = 96) found for the defendant and 51.8% (N = 103) found 
for the plaintiff. For discrimination verdicts 55.8% (N = 67) found for the defendant and 
44.2% (N = 53) found for the plaintiff. Jurors also completed a verdict certainty scale on 
an 11-point scale ranging from -5 (completely certain the defendant is not liable) to 5 
(completely certain the defendant is liable) (retaliation verdict certainty M = .64, SD = 
2.86; discrimination verdict certainty M = .14, SD = 3.03).  Next jurors rated the strength 
of the plaintiff and defendant’s evidence on 1 (not at all convincing) to 9 (very 
convincing) separate Likert Scales for both retaliation verdicts (plaintiff evidence M = 
5.21, SD = 2.29; defendant evidence M = 4.66, SD = 2.25) and discrimination verdicts 
(plaintiff evidence M = 4.66, SD = 2.28; defendant evidence M = 5.28, SD = 2.10).  
Finally participants completed an item that measured their perception of the burden of 
proof in the case by marking how certain (0-100%) they had to be of the evidence in 
order to find the defendant liable (retaliation verdict burden of proof M = 70.41, SD  = 
2.25; discrimination verdict burden of proof M = 72.51, SD = 21.35)(Appendix F).  
Manipulation Check. To determine whether participants’ understood the 
instructions, they answered 2 true/false questions regarding the discrimination charge: 1. 
“University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s national origin was the 
determining factor in University Medical Center’s efforts to have Dr. Ahmad fired.” 2. 
“University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s 
national origin in University Medical Center’s efforts to have Dr. Ahmad fired.” 
Participants also answered 2 true/false questions regarding the retaliation charge: 1. 
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“University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination charge 
was the determining factor in University Medical Center’s efforts to have Dr. Ahmad 
fired.” 2. “University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. 
Ahmad’s discrimination charge in University Medical Center’s efforts to have Dr. Ahmad 
fired.” As an added manipulation check, participants indicated if they had heard of the 
case before, if they answered “yes,” (N = 2) they then rated their familiar with the facts of 
the case (neither was familiar with the facts of the case).  Since neither participant was 
familiar with the facts, they were kept in the data analyses (Appendix G).  
Demographics. Participants also completed a brief demographic survey on which 
they supplied their age, ethnicity, marital status, and other relevant self-report statistics. 
See Appendix H for the full survey. 
Results 
 The results of this study appear in four phases. Phase 1 displays preliminary 
analyses of the experimental task to determine which factors predict verdict and verdict 
certainty using only simple main effects. Phase 2 presents the full model analyses of the 
experimental task, absent the added condition of mixed motive instructions for 
discrimination and but-for instructions for retaliation, to test the influence of significant 
predictors. This analysis was a 2 (Regulatory frame: promotion v. prevention) x 2 (Claim 
type: retaliation v. discrimination/retaliation) x 2 (Instruction: mixed motive v. but-for) 
factorial design. Phase 3 presents the full model analyses including the added condition to 
test the influence of manipulations on the dependent variables.  Finally, phase 4 
examined in more detail the moderators that emerged as viable during phase 1 and 2 of 
the analyses.  
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 Phase 1: Preliminary Analyses of Verdict and Verdict Certainty 
 Manipulation checks.  A causal knowledge index was created in which 
participants who correctly identified the instruction type in the manipulation check were 
coded as 1 and those who incorrectly identified the instruction type were coded as 0. A 
binary logistic regression predicting accurate understanding of the instruction with the 
instruction manipulation (which included the condition in which participants had both 
instructions) revealed that for retaliation claims, instruction did predict accuracy, χ2(2) = 
7.10, p < .03, Nagelkerke R2 = .05. Categorical contrasts showed that participants who 
received both instructions were significantly less accurate in their knowledge of 
instructions compared to those who only received but-for, β = .975 (SE = .406), Wald  = 
5.76, p < .016, LLCI = 1.20, ULCI = 5.88, or only mixed motive instructions, β = .979 
(SE = .411), Wald  = 5.675, p < .017, LLCI = 1.19, ULCI = 5.96. Table 3.1 shows the 
breakdown for accuracy by instructional condition. A binary logistic regression 
predicting accurate understanding of instruction by the instruction manipulation for 
discrimination claims was not significant, χ2(2) = .113, p < .945, Nagelkerke R2 = .001.  
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Table 3.1: Instruction Accuracy by Instruction Condition 
  
Retaliation Claim Instruction Accuracy 
 
  
Inaccurate 
 
Accurate 
 
Total 
  
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
But-for Only 
 
 
19 
 
23.8 
 
61 
 
76.3 
 
80 
 
100 
Mixed Motive 
Only 
 
18 23.7 58 76.3 76 100 
Mixed Motive 
and But-for 
 
 
19 
 
45.2 
 
23 
 
54.8 
 
42 
 
100 
Total 56 28.3 142 71.7 198 100 
 
 A binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict by accuracy knowledge 
of the retaliation instruction approached significance, χ2(1) = 3.42, p < .06, Nagelkerke R2 
= .02, such that those who were accurate were marginally more likely to find for the 
plaintiff, β = .587 (SE = .320), Wald  = 3.372, p < .066, LLCI = .96, ULCI = 3.37. Table 
3.2 displays the retaliation verdict breakdown by accuracy. A binary logistic regression 
predicting discrimination verdict by instruction accuracy was not significant, χ2(1) = .074, 
p = .785, Nagelkerke R2 = .001. 
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Table 3.2: Retaliation Verdict Decisions by Instruction Accuracy 
  
Retaliation Claim Instruction Accuracy 
 
  
Plaintiff 
 
Defendant 
 
Total 
  
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
Inaccurate 
 
 
23 
 
41.1 
 
33 
 
58.9 
 
56 
 
100 
Accurate 
 
79 55.6 63 44.4 142 100 
Total 102 51.5 96 48.5 198 100 
  
 To assess the influence of instruction accuracy on retaliation verdict certainty, a 
one-way ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty revealed a non-significant effect 
of instruction accuracy, F(1, 196) = 2.927, p = .09, partial η2 = .022. A one-way ANOVA 
predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction accuracy also failed to reveal a 
significant effect of instruction accuracy on certainty, F(1, 116) = 1.865, p = .175, partial 
η2 = .016. 
Motivational Analyses. A preliminary forced entry binary logistic regression 
predicting retaliation verdict with the five motivating factors (plaintiff national origin, 
rehiring policy, relationship with supervisors, discrimination complaint, and the letter to 
the university) produced a significant overall model 2(5) = 24.67, p < .001, Nagelkerke 
R2 = .157, but only one of the motivating factors, plaintiff’s national origin, was 
significant, β = .244 (SE = .054), Wald  = 20.626, p < .001, LLCI = 1.15, ULCI = 1.42. A 
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forced binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict from the motivating 
factors also produced a significant model, χ2(5) = 23.706, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .242, 
again only plaintiff’s national origin was a significant predictor of verdict, β = .331 (SE = 
.077), Wald  = 18.215, p < .001, LLCI = 1.20, ULCI = 1.62. In both retaliation and 
discrimination verdicts, those who thought the defendant took into consideration the 
plaintiff’s national origin were more likely to find for the plaintiff.  This is interesting 
because under the law, the plaintiff’s national origin should not be a factor in determining 
a retaliation verdict. Instead, the participants should only have considered whether the 
hospital relied on the plaintiff’s discrimination complaint in its adverse employment 
decision. 
Next, to determine the influence of motivating factors on retaliation verdict 
certainty, a multiple regression predicted certainty with a significant model, R2 = .18, F 
(5, 196) = 8.48, p = .001.  The plaintiff’s national origin was the only significant 
predictor, β = .37 (SE = .06), t  = 1.16, p < .001, LLCI = .25 ULCI = .49. Finally, a 
multiple regression predicting discrimination verdict certainty by the five motivating 
factors produced a significant model, R2 = .12, F (5, 120) = 3.30, p = .001. Only national 
origin significantly predicted discrimination verdict certainty, β = .33 (SE = .09), t  = 
3.72, p < .001, LLCI = .15 ULCI = .51. 
Strength of Evidence Analyses. To understand how participants weighed the 
evidence of the plaintiff and defendant in deciding a verdict, I performed a preliminary 
forced entry binary logistic predicting retaliation verdict with strength of plaintiff and 
defendant evidence. The model was significant, χ2(2) = 127.556, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 
= .631, with both plaintiff, β = .783 (SE = .140), Wald  = 31.151, p < .001, LLCI = 1.66, 
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ULCI = 2.88, and defendant evidence, β = -.516 (SE = .121), Wald  = 18.304, p < .001, 
LLCI = .47, ULCI = .76, as significant predictors.  Importantly, participants who viewed 
the plaintiff’s evidence as strong were more likely to find for the plaintiff, while those 
who viewed the defendant’s evidence as strong were more likely to find for the 
defendant. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict by 
plaintiff and defendant evidence also produced a significant model, χ2(2) = 84.925, p < 
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .683. For discrimination verdicts only plaintiff evidence emerged 
as a significant predictor, β = 1.155 (SE = .228), Wald  = 26.632, p < .001, LLCI = 2.03, 
ULCI = 4.96, such that participants who believed the plaintiff’s evidence is stronger more 
likely to find for the plaintiff. The defendant’s evidence did not factor into this decision,  
 = -.25 (SE = ..19), Wald  =  1.75, p = .19, LLCI = .53, ULCI = 1.13.  
To examine the influence of strength of evidence on verdict certainty, separate 
multiple regressions predicting certainty by strength of evidence were conducted. For 
retaliation verdict certainty, the model was significant, R2 = .48, F (2, 198) = 89.19, p = 
.001 and both plaintiff evidence, β = .67 (SE = .09), t  = 7.84, p < .001, LLCI = .50 , 
ULCI = .84, and defendant evidence, β = -.26 (SE = .09), t  = -2.95, p = .004, LLCI = -
.43, ULCI = -.08,   were significant predictors.  For discrimination verdict certainty, the 
overall model was significant, R2 = .39, F (2, 120) = 37.77, p = .001. Plaintiff evidence 
was significant, β = .69 (SE = .13), t  = 5.46, p < .001, LLCI = .44 ULCI = .94, but 
defendant evidence was not significant, β = -.21 (SE = .14), t  = -1.51, p = .13, LLCI = -
.48,  ULCI = .06.  
Trait regulatory focus analyses. Trait regulatory focus was not analyzed in this 
study due to a failure in the regulatory focus measure to differentiate between promotion 
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and prevention focused individuals. Specifically, the reaction times did not correlate with 
the ratings of the traits (ideal rating  r = -05, p = .44, ought rating r = -.06, p = .36, even 
when transforming the data to be a normal distribution. More concerning, individuals 
who rated themselves high in ideal/promotion traits also significantly rated themselves 
high in ought/prevention traits (Pearson r = .51, p = .001). This suggests that the measure 
was not sensitive enough to parse out participants’ trait regulatory focus.  
 Phase 2: Full Experimental Model Analyses 
 In the analyses of the full model, participants from the different instruction 
condition (discrimination complaint with mixed motive instruction and retaliation 
complaint with but-for instruction) were left out. A separate analysis in phase 3 examined 
these participants’ responses.  
 Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and claim type. A 
forced binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict (0 = plaintiff, 1 = 
defendant) by instruction (0 = but-for, 1 = mixed motive), regulatory focus manipulation 
(0 = prevention, 1 = promotion), and claim type (0 = retaliation only, 1 = discrimination 
and retaliation) failed to produce a significant model, χ2(3) = 1.27, p = .736, Nagelkerke 
R2 = .011 and none of  manipulated variables predicted retaliation verdict, all ps > .429.  
To test for interactions between the variables, a second forced entry binary logistic 
regression included the three manipulated variables and their interactions to predict 
retaliation verdict. The model was not significant, χ2(7) = 4.454, p = .726, Nagelkerke R2 
= .038, with none of the variables or interactions reaching significance, all ps > .109. 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by Instruction, Regulatory Focus, and 
Claim Type. An ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, 
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regulatory focus manipulation, and claim type revealed no main effects (all Fs < 1.541, 
all ps > .216) and no significant two-way interactions (all Fs < 2.16, all ps > .144) but 
there was as significant three-way interaction, F(1, 148) = 5.617, p = .019, partial η2 = 
.037.  In order to more closely examine this three-way interaction, I split the data by 
instruction type and performed an ANOVA testing retaliation verdict certainty as a 
function of the regulatory focus manipulation and claim type. For but-for instructions 
there was a significant two-way interaction between regulatory focus and claim type, F(1, 
76) = 6.541, p = .013, partial η2 = .079 but that interaction was not significant  in the 
mixed motive instruction condition, F(1, 72) = .768 , p = .384, partial η2 = .011.  Figure 
3.1 displays the but-for instruction results. Participants who only made a retaliation claim 
showed no regulatory focus effect, F(1, 37) = 1.120, p = .297, partial η2 = .029; however, 
for those that had to make both a discrimination and retaliation claim, regulatory focus 
was significant, F(1, 39) = 6.759, p = .013, partial η2 = .148. Figure 1 shows that 
participants who used the prevention focused judge’s instructions were more certain that 
the defendant was liable while participants who received the promotion focused judge’s 
instructions were more certain that the defendant was not liable.  
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Figure 3.1: Retaliation Verdict Certainty predicted by Regulatory Focus x Claim 
Type for But-For Instructions 
 
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and claim 
type. A forced entry binary logistic regression with instruction and regulatory focus 
manipulation predicting discrimination verdict produced a non-significant model, χ2(2) = 
1.60, p = .449, Nagelkerke R2 = .028. Neither instruction (β = -.401, p = .401) or 
regulatory focus manipulation (β = -.463, p = .334) were significant predictors. Claim 
type is not included in this analysis because in order to evaluate a discrimination 
complaint participants also had to evaluate a retaliation complaint. A second forced entry 
binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and the added instruction X regulatory focus interaction also resulted 
in a non-significant model, χ2(3) = 1.698, p = .637, Nagelkerke R2 = .030, with none of 
the predictors significant, all ps > .370. 
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Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction and regulatory focus. 
A 2 (instruction type) by 2 (regulatory focus) ANOVA on discrimination verdict certainty 
demonstrated a main effect of instruction, F(1, 75) = 7.809, p = .007, partial η2 = .094, 
but no two-way interaction between regulatory focus and instruction, F(1, 75) = .001, p = 
.977, partial η2 = .000. The main effect of instruction (see Figure 2) shows that 
participants who received but-for instructions were significantly more certain (M = -.858, 
SD = .461) that the defendant was not liable, whereas participants who received mixed 
motive instructions were significantly more certain (M = 1.00, SD = .479) that the 
defendant was liable (See Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2: Discrimination Verdict Certainty predicted by Instruction  
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The following analyses examine the full model effects on the dependent variables, 
taking into consideration the third level of instruction: mixed motive for discrimination 
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because all participants who received the added level of instruction decided both claims. 
As such, all analyses in this phase only examine participants who made both a 
discrimination and retaliation claim. 
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction and regulatory focus. A forced entry 
binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict from instruction (coded with the 
mixed motive/but-for condition as the comparison) and from regulatory focus resulted in 
a non-significant model, χ2(3) = 2.93, p = .40, Nagelkerke R2 = .03. There was a no effect 
of instruction (Wald  = 2.35, p = .31) or regulatory focus (β = -.27, p = .46). A second 
forced-entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict with instruction, 
regulatory focus, claim type, and the added interaction of instruction x regulatory focus 
produced a non-significant model, χ2(5) = 5.96, p = .31, Nagelkerke R2 = .06. There were 
again no significant effects of instruction (Wald = 2.38, p  = .30), regulatory focus (β = -
.51, p = .42), or their interaction (β = 1.15, p = .21). 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by Instruction and Regulatory Focus. A 
3 (Instruction type: but for vs. mixed motive vs. combined) by 2 (Regulatory Focus)  
ANOVA on verdict certainty produced no significant main effects, all Fs < 1.33 and all 
ps > .25, but there was a significant two-way interaction between instruction and 
regulatory focus, F(2, 116) = 3.94, p = .02, partial η2 = .06. To better understand this 
interaction, I split the data into promotion and prevention focus and performed two 
ANOVAs. For participants in the prevention focused condition there was no effect of 
instruction, F(1, 57) = .72, p = .49, partial η2 = .02; however, participants in the 
promotion focused condition did show an instruction effect, F(1, 59) = 3.99, p = .02, 
partial η2 = .12 (See Figure 3.3). Participants who were in the promotion focused 
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condition and received only mixed motive instructions were significantly more certain in 
their verdict for the plaintiff than those in the but for only condition. Neither of these 
instruction conditions was significantly different combined condition.  
Figure 3.3: Instruction x Regulatory Focus Interaction for Retaliation Verdict 
Certainty 
 
Note: Different subscripts are significantly different 
 
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction and regulatory focus. A 
separate forced entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict with all 
three levels of instruction (coded with the mixed motive/but-for condition as the 
comparison) and regulatory focus again failed to produce a significant model, χ2(3) = 
6.85, p = .08, Nagelkerke R2 = .07. However, there was a main effect of instruction, Wald  
= 6.61, p = .04. The comparisons reveal that there is a significant difference in 
discrimination verdicts when comparing participants who used only but-for instructions 
to those who used mixed motive instructions for the discrimination claim, β = -.1.15 (SE 
a
a
a
b
a
ab
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Prevention, ns Promotion
Ve
rdi
ct 
ce
rta
int
y (
hig
he
r s
co
res
 fa
vo
r 
pla
int
iff
) But-For Only
Mixed Motive Only
Mixed Motive/But-For
 79 
= .46), Wald  = 6.29, p = .012, LLCI = .13, ULCI = .78 (See Table 3.3 for percentages). 
This suggests that participants who used only but-for instructions for both claims were 
more likely to find for the defendant on the discrimination charge as opposed to those 
who used separate instructions for the two claims. The difference between those who 
only used mixed motive instructions and those who used both instructions was not 
significant (β = -.77, p = .09).  
Table 3.3: Discrimination Verdict Decisions by Instruction Condition 
  
Plaintiff 
 
Defendant 
 
Total 
  
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
But-For only 
 
 
13 
 
31.7 
 
28 
 
68.3 
 
41 
 
100 
Mixed Motive 
Only 
 
15 40.5 22 59.5 37 100 
Mixed 
Motive/But-
For 
25 59.5 17 40.5 42 100 
Total	 67	 55.8	 53	 44.2	 120	 100	
 
A second forced-entry binary logistic regression predicted discrimination verdict 
with the 3-level instruction, regulatory focus, and the added interaction of instruction by 
regulatory focus produced a non-significant model, χ2(5) = 9.64, p = .09, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.10 and failed to show a significant interaction (β = -1.46, p = .12). 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction and regulatory focus. 
Rounding out Phase 3, a separate 3 (Instruction type) x 2 (Regulatory Focus) ANOVA on 
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discrimination verdict certainty yielded a significant main effect of instruction, F (2, 116) 
= 4.00, p = .02, partial η2 = .06 (See Figure 3.4). LSD pairwise comparisons revealed that 
participants who received only mixed motive instructions were significantly more certain 
of a verdict for the plaintiff as compared to participants who only received but for 
instructions (p = .007) and were marginally less certain in their verdict for the plaintiff as 
compared to participants who received both instructions (p = .06). Participants who 
received only mixed motive instructions did not differ in their verdict certainty as 
compared to participants who received both instructions. 
Figure 3.4: Discrimination Verdict Certainty by Three-Level Instruction 
 
Phase 4: Moderation Analyses 
 For the following analyses, unless otherwise noted instruction refers to only but-
for or mixed motive. The mixed motive/but-for condition will be specifically mentioned 
if it is being used in the analysis. 
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  Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and motivation. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting 
retaliation verdict from instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and the plaintiff’s 
national origin as a motivating factor resulted in a significant model, χ2(4) = 15.921, p = 
.003, Nagelkerke R2 = .129, but only the motivating factor was a significant predictor of 
retaliation verdict, β = -.226 (SE = .062), Wald  = 13.182, p = .001, while instruction (β = 
-.187, p = .581), claim type (β = .106, p = .754), and regulatory focus (β = .192, p = .571) 
were not significant.  The same forced entry binary adding all interactions produced a 
significant model, χ2(15) = 31.508, p = .008, Nagelkerke R2 = .244 (see Table 3.4 for all 
effects) with main effects of instruction, claim type, and national origin motivation. In 
line with the hypotheses, participants who received but-for instructions were more likely 
to find for the defendant, while those who received mixed motive instructions were more 
likely to find for the plaintiff.  Participants who had to decide only a retaliation claim 
were more likely to find for the defendant, while those who had to determine both a 
discrimination and retaliation claim were more likely to find for the plaintiff. Finally, 
those who thought the plaintiff’s national origin motivated the Medical Center’s actions 
were more likely to find for the plaintiff as compared to those who thought his national 
origin was not a motivating factor. There were also two two-way interactions, one 
between claim type and national origin, as well as an interaction between claim type and 
instruction.  
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Table 3.4 
Predicting Retaliation Verdicts as a Function of Instruction, Regulatory Focus, Claim 
Type, and Plaintiff National Origin 		Factor	
		Beta	
	Standard	Error	
		Wald	
		d.f.	
		Prob	
	Odds	Ratio		Instruction	 		3.049	 	1.563	 	3.806	 	1	 	.051	 	.047	Claim	 3.464	 1.570	 4.865	 1	 .027	 .031	Regulatory	Focus	 				1.104	 1.691	 .427	 1	 .514	 .331	National	Origin	motivation	 .631	 .253	 6.213	 1	 .013	 .532	Instruction	x	National	Origin	 -.521	 .307	 2.877	 1	 .09	 1.684	Claim	x	National	Origin	 -.703	 .315	 4.972	 1	 .026		 2.02		Regulatory	Focus	x	National	Origin		 -.123	 .346	 .127	 1	 .721	 1.131		Instruction	x	Regulatory	Focus	 -2.980	 2.144	 1.932	 1	 .165	 19.685	Instruction	x	Claim	 -4.809	 1.972	 5.949	 1	 .015	 122.555	Claim	x	Instruction	x	Regulatory	Focus	 4.606	 2.713	 2.882	 1	 .09	 .010	Claim		x	Instruction	x	National	Origin	 .836	 .403	 4.312	 1	 .038	 .433	Claim	x	Regulatory	Focus	x	National	Origin	 .089	 .450	 .039	 1	 .843	 .915	Instruction	x	Regulatory	Focus	x	National	Origin	 .385	 .430	 .802	 1	 .370	 .680	Instruction	x	Claim	x	Regulatory	Focus	x	National	Origin	 -.394	 .571	 .477	 1	 .490	 1.483	Constant	 -3.006	 1.345	 4.997	 1	 .025	 20.202	
 
To examine the interaction between claim type and national origin, the data was 
split between claims and a forced entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation 
verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and national origin produced a significant model 
for retaliation only, χ2(7) = 23.748, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .354, but produced a non-
significant model for the discrimination and retaliation condition, χ2(7) = 7.353, p = .393, 
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Nagelkerke R2 = .119.  Participants who only had to render a verdict for retaliation 
considered the use of the plaintiff’s national origin, β = .631 (SE = .253), Wald  = 6.213, 
p = .013.. Those participants who had to render a verdict for both a discrimination and 
retaliation claim did not show a difference in verdict when considering the plaintiff’s 
national origin, = .072 (SE = .188), Wald  = .147, p = .701.   
A moderation analysis, using Hayes’ (2013) process moderation, more closely 
examined the moderation of national origin on the effect of claim type on retaliation 
verdict. Using the Johnson-Neyman technique, participants who strongly believe national 
origin was considered showed marginally significant moderation, z = 1-72, p =.08., LLCI 
-1.90, ULCI = .12 (rating = 6.92). Participants who were extremely high on their belief 
that national origin played a role (ratings starting at 8.25) did show significant differences 
(all ps < .05).  Figure 3.5 shows the moderation pattern in that participants who received 
the retaliation only decision, are more influenced by the use of national origin as 
compared to those who made both a discrimination and retaliation claim. Specifically, 
those who were only asked to render a retaliation verdict were most likely to find for the 
plaintiff if they strongly believed the defendant took into consideration the plaintiff’s 
national origin and were least likely to find for the plaintiff if they believed the defendant 
did not take into consideration the plaintiff’s national origin.  
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Figure 3.5: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of retaliation 
claim type on retaliation verdict.  
 
 Hayes (2013) process moderation was also conducted to examine the moderation 
of national origin on the interaction of claim type by instruction on retaliation verdict. For 
participants using but-for instructions, national origin moderated the effect of claim type 
on verdict at both low (z = 2.11, p = .03, LLCI = .12, UCLI = 3.16) and high (z = -2.26, p 
= .02, LLCI = -3.31, UCLI = -.24) levels of belief that national origin played a role in the 
defendant’s decision. The pattern of results for this moderation is similar to the overall 
moderation of national origin on the effect of claim type on retaliation verdict. 
Specifically, participants in the retaliation only condition were more influenced by their 
belief that the defendant considered national origin than those in the discrimination and 
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retaliation condition (see Figure 3.6). National origin did not moderate the effects of 
claim type under mixed motive instructions, β = -.004 (SE = .168), Wald  = .001, p = 
.981. 
Figure 3.6: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of retaliation 
claim type on retaliation verdict for But-For Instructions. 
 
Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and motivation. Next, I conducted a forced entry binary logistic 
regression predicting retaliation verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, 
and the plaintiff’s national origin as a motivating factor. The model was significant, 
χ2(11) =23.12 p = .02, Nagelkerke R2 = .18; however, there were no significant main 
effects or interactions (all ps > .08) and no need to conduct further moderation analyses.  
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Predicting retaliation verdict confidence by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and motivation. To test the potential moderating role of national origin on 
retaliation verdict certainty, an ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict confidence by 
instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and national origin as a moderator was 
conducted. The only main effect in the model was for national origin, F (1, 147) = 
33.647, p = .001, partial η2 = .186. There were no two-way interactions, but a three-way 
interaction between instruction, claim type, and regulatory focus was significant, F (1, 
147) = 9.110, p = .003, partial η2 = .059. Splitting the file by instruction type, revealed a 
two-way interaction between claim and regulatory focus under but-for instructions, F(1, 
75) = 9.978, p = .002, partial η2 = .117, but not under mixed motive instructions, F(1, 71) 
= 1.527, p = .221, partial η2 = .021. Hayes (2013) process moderation for but-for 
instructions found that when participants decided only a retaliation claim, national origin 
did not moderate the effect of regulatory focus on retaliation verdict certainty,  β = -.255 
(SE = .274), t = -.930, p = .359, LLCI = -.812, ULCI = .302.  
For participants using but-for instructions and deciding both a discrimination and 
retaliation claim, national origin did moderate the effect of regulatory focus on retaliation 
verdict certainty. The Johnson-Neyman Technique of significance did find that for 
participants who had low, t (1, 37) = -2.86, p = .01, LLCI = -5.54, ULCI = -.95) and 
moderate beliefs, t (1, 37)= -2.73, p = .01, LLCI = -3.79, ULCI = -.56) that the defendant 
considered national origin, there was significant moderation (see Figure 7). Specifically, 
participants in the promotion condition who believed strongly that national origin 
influenced the employer’s decision, were more certain in a plaintiff’s verdict than those 
who believed that national origin played less of a role (i.e., low or medium national origin 
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beliefs). However prevention participants who were trying to avoid errors of commission 
did not show effects for national origin discrimination beliefs.   
Figure 3.7: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of regulatory 
focus on retaliation verdict certainty for but-for instructions and 
discrimination/retaliation claims. 
 
An ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory 
focus, claim type, and rehiring policy motivation as a covariate produced no significant 
main effects or interactions, all Fs < 3.32 and all ps > .08. 
Predicting retaliation verdict confidence by three-level instruction, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and motivation. A one-way ANOVA predicting verdict certainty be 
the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and national origin motivation as a covariate 
resulted in a significant main effect of national origin, F (1, 153) = 29.46, p = .001, 
partial η2 = .16, and regulatory focus, F (1, 153) = 4.37, p = .04, partial η2 = .03, and a 
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significant interaction between instruction and regulatory focus, F (2, 153) = 3.57, p = 
.03, partial η2 = .04. I split the file first by regulatory focus and conducted moderation 
analyses of national origin on the effect of instruction on retaliation verdict certainty.  No 
moderation was found for either prevention or promotion focused participants, all ps > 
.14. However, when splitting the file by instruction type Hayes’ (2013) process 
moderation showed that for participants using but-for instructions, national origin 
moderated the effect of regulatory focus at both low, t (1, 76)= -2.86, p = .01, LLCI = -
5.54, ULCI = -.95, and moderate, t (1, 76)= = -2.72, p = .01, LLCI = -3.78, ULCI = -.-
.56, levels of national origin motivation (See Figure 3.8). National origin did not 
influence participants who were in the prevention focused condition, but participants in 
the promotion condition were more certain in their verdict for the defendant if they 
believed the defendant did not consider the plaintiff’s national origin. Analyses produced 
no moderation effects of national origin on the relationship between regulatory focus and 
retaliation verdict certainty for participants using only mixed motive instructions, all ps > 
.46, and for participants using the combined instructions, all ps > .21. 
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Figure 3.8: National Origin as a moderator for regulatory focus on retaliation 
verdict certainty under but-for instructions.  
 
An ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty by three-level instruction, 
regulatory focus, claim type, and rehiring policy motivation as a covariate produced no 
significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 3.01 and all ps > .09. 
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, 
and motivation. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination 
verdict from instruction, regulatory focus, and the plaintiff’s national origin as a 
motivating factor was produced a significant model, χ2(3) =19.019 p = .001, Nagelkerke 
R2 = .297, but only national origin emerged as a significant predictor of discrimination 
verdict, β = -.411 (SE = .111), Wald  = 13.567, p = .001, while instruction (β = -1.159, p 
= .408) and regulatory focus (β = 1.498, p = .228) were not significant.  The same forced 
entry binary adding all interactions produced a significant model, χ2(6) = 22.342, p = 
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.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .342, but no main effects or interactions were significant, all ps > 
.099.  
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and motivation. A forced-entry binary logistic regression predicting 
discrimination verdict with the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and national 
origin produced a significant model, χ2(11) = 36.69, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .35. There 
was only a significant main effect of instruction (Wald = 7.50, p = .02), with a marginally 
significant difference when comparing the but-for only condition to the two instruction 
condition, β = -2.51 (SE = .1.35), Wald  = 3.45, p = .06, and a significant difference 
between the mixed motive only condition and the two instruction condition, β = -2.18 
(SE = 1.27), Wald  = 2.92, p = .02. Specifically, participants were marginally more like to 
find for the defendant if they only used but-for instructions, and were significantly more 
likely to find for the defendant if they only used mixed motive instructions as compared 
to using mixed motive for discrimination and but-for for retaliation. There were no other 
main effects or interactions, all ps >.09.  
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and motivation. To test the potential moderating role of national origin on 
discrimination verdict certainty, an ANOVA predicting discrimination verdict confidence 
by instruction, regulatory focus, and national origin as a moderator was conducted. Only 
main effects of national origin, F (1, 74) = 13.232, p = .001, partial η2 = .152, and 
instruction, F (1, 74) = 6.959, p = .010, partial η2 = .086, emerged. Hayes’ (2013) process 
moderation, using the Johnson-Neyman technique, revealed that national origin 
moderated the effect of instruction on discrimination verdict certainty at both moderate, t 
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(1, 75)= 2.670, p =.010, LLCI = .416, ULCI = 2.864, and high, t (1, 75) = 2.414, p =.018, 
LLCI = .378, ULCI = 3.946 levels (see Figure 3.9). Specifically, participants either 
moderate or high in their belief that national origin motivated the defendant’s action were 
more likely to be certain in their verdict for the plaintiff under mixed motive as compared 
to but-for instructions. Under low belief that national origin was a motivating factor, 
there was no difference in certainty of verdict based on instruction.  
Figure 3.9: National origin motivation as a moderator for the effect of instruction on 
discrimination verdict certainty.  
 
Next, to test the potential moderating role of discrimination complaint on 
discrimination verdict certainty, an ANOVA predicting discrimination verdict confidence 
by instruction, regulatory focus, and discrimination complaint as a moderator was 
conducted. There was a main effect of discrimination complaint, F (1, 79) = 12.61, p = 
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.001, partial η2 = .15, a significant two-way interaction between instruction and 
regulatory focus, F (1, 79) = 5.84, p = .02, partial η2 = .08, and a significant three-way 
interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, and discrimination complaint, F (1, 79) 
= 7.13, p = .01, partial η2 = .09. The data file was split on regulatory focus and separate 
process analyses, following Hayes’ (2013) procedure, were conducted. For prevention 
focused participants, moderate, t (1, 35) = 2.02, p = .05, LLCI = -.91, ULCI = 3.56, and 
high, t (1, 35) = 2.80, p = .01, LLCI = .99, ULCI = 6.19 levels of discrimination 
complaint motivation (See Figure 3.10). Prevention focused participants who were either 
moderate or high in their belief that the discrimination complaint motivated the defendant 
were more likely to be certain the defendant is liable under mixed motive instructions 
than but-for instructions. Similarly, for promotion focused participants, those low, t (1, 
36) = 2.93, p = .01, LLCI = 1.06, ULCI = 5.82, and moderate, t (1, 36) = 2.33, p = .03, 
LLCI = .25, ULCI = 3.54, in discrimination complaint motivation were more certain the 
defendant was liable under mixed motive than but-for instructions (See Figure 3.11).  
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Figure 3.10: Discrimination complaint motivation as a moderator for the effect of 
instruction on discrimination verdict certainty for prevention focused participants.  
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Figure 3.11: Discrimination complaint motivation as a moderator for the effect of 
instruction on discrimination verdict certainty for prevention focused participants.  
 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and motivation. An ANOVA predicting discrimination verdict 
certainty by the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and national origin motivation 
as a covariate was produced only a main effect of national origin, F (1, 110) = 13.22, p = 
.001, partial η2 = .11. Specifically, those who thought national origin motivated the 
decision were more likely to be certain in a verdict for the plaintiff.  All other main 
effects and interactions were not significant, all Fs < .84 and all ps > .44.  
An ANOVA predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory 
focus, claim type, and discrimination complaint motivation as a covariate produced a 
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significant main effect of instruction, F (1, 110) = 6.41, p = .002, partial η2 = .10.  The 
main effect of instruction found that participants using but-for instructions were more 
certain the defendant was liable than participants in the two-instruction condition (p = 
.01). Mixed motive only instructions were not significantly different from the other two 
(ps > .08). There were two significant two-way interactions, the first between instruction 
and regulatory focus, F (1, 110) = 3.46, p = .03, partial η2 = .06, and also between 
instruction and the discrimination complaint, F (1, 110) = 7.38, p = .001, partial η2 = .12. 
Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between instruction, regulatory 
focus, and the discrimination complaint, F (1, 110) = 3.56, p = .03, partial η2 = .06. 
To better understand the three-way interaction between instruction, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and discrimination complaint motivation, the data was split based on 
regulatory focus manipulation. Using Hayes’ (2013) process moderation, separate 
moderation analyses were conducted for prevention and promotion conditions. For 
participants in the prevention focused condition, both low, t (1, 56) = 2.70, p  = .01, LLCI 
= .48, UCLI = 3.27, and moderate levels, t (1, 56) = 1.96, p  = .05, LLCI = -.02, UCLI = 
1.89, of discrimination complaint motivation moderated the relationship between 
instruction and discrimination verdict certainty (see Figure 3.12).  Specifically, for 
participants who were either low or moderate in their belief the discrimination complaint 
motivated the defendant, they were more certain the defendant was not liable under but-
for instructions and most certain the defendant was liable if they used the mixed motive 
instructions for the discrimination complaint and but-for instructions for the retaliation 
complaint. Interestingly, those who were high in the belief the discrimination complaint 
played a role showed no differences based on instruction. This mirrors participant 
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misunderstanding for retaliation claims, as the discrimination complaint should not 
matter for the discrimination claim. 
Figure 3.12: Discrimination Complaint as a Moderator for Instruction on 
Discrimination Verdict Certainty for Prevention Focused Jurors.  
 
 Moderation analyses for promotion focused participants also showed significant 
moderation for participants who had low levels of belief the discrimination complaint 
influenced the defendant’s actions, , t (1, 58) = 2.46, p  = .02, LLCI = .29, UCLI = 2.86, 
and the Johnson-Neyman results showed significant moderation at the highest levels of 
belief the discrimination complaint mattered, t (1, 58) = -2.00, p = .05, LLCI = -3.02, 
ULCI = .00. For participants low in discrimination complaint motivation, they were more 
certain the defendant was not liable under but-for instructions and most certain the 
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defendant was liable under the two-instruction condition. For participants high in 
discrimination complaint motivation, they were more certain the defendant was liable 
under but-for instructions and least certain under the two-instruction condition (See 
Figure 3.13).  
Figure 3.13: Discrimination Complaint as a Moderator for Instruction on 
Discrimination Verdict Certainty for Promotion Focused Jurors.  
 
Strength of Evidence as Moderator.  
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression 
predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, and regulatory focus with 
plaintiff and defendant evidence as moderators produced a significant model, χ2(24) 
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=134.74 p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .771. The only main effect was for plaintiff evidence, 
β = 1.342 (SE = .671), Wald  = 3.997, p = .046. There was a two-way interaction between 
instruction and regulatory focus, β = -19.928 (SE = 10.046), Wald  = 3.935, p = .047. 
Finally, there were two three-way interactions: the first between instruction, regulatory 
focus, and plaintiff evidence,  β = 2.163 (SE = .1.126), Wald  = 3.688, p = .055; and the 
second between instruction, regulatory focus, and defendant evidence, β = 2.142 (SE = 
.106), Wald  = 4.034, p = .045.  
First I examined the three-way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, 
and plaintiff evidence on verdict. When looking at participants in the prevention 
condition, Hayes’ (2013) process moderation, using the Johnson-Neyman technique, 
revealed that plaintiff evidence did not moderate the effect of instruction on retaliation 
verdict at any level of the moderator (all ps > .45). However, for participants in the 
promotion focused conditions, high plaintiff evidence moderate the relationship between 
instruction and retaliation verdict, z = 2.08, p  = .04, LLCI = .20, UCLI = 6.41.  
Specifically, participants were significantly more likely to find for the plaintiff under 
mixed-motive instruction, as opposed to but-for instructions, if they also believed the 
plaintiff’s evidence was strong (See Figure 3.14). Moderation was not significant at the 
low (p = .43) or moderate (p = .12) levels of plaintiff evidence.  
 
 
 
 
 99 
Figure 3.14: Plaintiff Evidence as a Moderator for Instruction on Retaliation 
Verdict for Promotion Focused Jurors.  
 
Next, Hayes’ (2013) process moderation analyses were conducted to examine the 
three-way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, and defendant evidence. 
Process analyses for neither promotion focused or prevention focused participants 
revealed significant moderation (ps > .06 and ps > .35, respectively). Though promotion 
focused individuals had a marginal moderation at p = .06, no values were significant 
under the Johnson-Neyman technique and the confidence intervals crossed zero, 
suggesting that moderation does not actually exist. Next, I split the data was then by 
instruction type to examine potential moderation of the relationship between regulatory 
focus and retaliation verdict, but no moderation was found for either but-for (all ps > .09) 
or mixed motive instructions (all ps > .12).  
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Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression 
predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and strength of 
evidence produced a significant model, χ2(11) = 102.91, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .63. 
There was only a main effect of plaintiff evidence, β = .80 (SE = .33), Wald  = 5.88, p = 
.01, all other main effects and interactions were not significant, all ps > .21.  
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and strength of evidence. Since only plaintiff evidence predicted 
retaliation verdict certainty in Phase 1, defendant evidence will not be considered a 
moderator in the following analyses.  A one-way ANOVA with instruction, regulatory 
focus, claim type, and plaintiff evidence as a covariate was conducted. There was only a 
main effects of plaintiff evidence, F (1, 141) = 120.18, p = .001, partial η2 = .46, with 
stronger plaintiff evidence predicting a pro-plaintiff verdict. There were not significant 
interactions, all ps > .14 and thus no moderation analyses were conducted.  
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A one-way ANOVA predicting retaliation 
verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and plaintiff evidence 
showed only a main effect for plaintiff evidence, F (1, 148) = 114.10, p = .001, partial η2 
= .43, in that participants who thought the plaintiff’s evidence was stronger were more 
likely to be certain in a verdict for the plaintiff. There were no other main effects or 
interactions, all Fs < 1.4 and all ps > .24.  
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, 
and plaintiff evidence.  In Phase 1, only plaintiff evidence predicted discrimination 
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verdict certainty, and so the following analyses only include plaintiff evidence as a 
moderator. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict 
based on instruction, regulatory focus, and plaintiff evidence produced a significant 
model, χ2(7) = 57.07, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .71. However there was only a 
significant main effect of plaintiff evidence,  β = 1.06 (SE = .47), Wald  = 5.20, p = .02 
such that stronger plaintiff evidence predicted greater likelihood of a plaintiff verdict. No 
other main effects or interactions were significant, all ps >.46.  
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and plaintiff evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting 
discrimination verdict based on three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and plaintiff 
evidence as the moderator produced a significant model, χ2(11) = 102.06, p = .001, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .77. Again, there was only a main effect of plaintiff evidence, β = .68 
(SE = .33), Wald  = 4.13, p = .04, but no other main effects or interactions, all ps > .27.  
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and plaintiff evidence. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to predict 
discrimination verdict certainty with instruction, regulatory focus, and strength of 
evidence as covariates. There was only a main effect for plaintiff evidence, F (1, 71) = 
36.96, p = .001, partial η2 = .34, in which those who viewed the plaintiff’s evidence as 
stronger were more certain in their verdict for the plaintiff. No other main effects or 
interactions were significant (all Fs < 1.89, all ps > .17). No moderation analyses were 
conducted based on these results.  
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and plaintiff evidence. A one-way ANOVA predicting 
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discrimination verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and strength 
of evidence showed only a main effect for plaintiff evidence, F (1, 103) = 18.39, p = 
.001, partial η2 = .15, in that those who believed the plaintiff’s evidence was strong were 
more certain in their verdict for the plaintiff. There were no other main effects or 
interactions, all Fs < .32 and all ps > .18.  
Previous employment decisions as a moderator.  
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. I conducted a forced entry binary 
logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict from instruction, claim type, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment 
decisions. The overall model was not significant, , χ2(15) =7.14 p = .95, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.06 and there were no main effects or interactions. No further analyses were necessary.  
Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. I conducted a forced entry binary 
logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict from the three-level instruction, 
regulatory focus manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous 
employment decisions. The overall model was not significant, , χ2(7) =5.13, p = .64, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .04.  No main effects or interactions were significant, all ps > .34.  
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and employment decision. A one-way ANOVA examined the role of 
instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions (as a 
covariate) on retaliation verdict certainty. There was a main effect of regulatory focus, F 
(1, 140) = 4.65, p = .03, partial η2 = .03, in which participants in the prevention focused 
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condition were significantly more certain of their verdict for the plaintiff as compared to 
promotion focused individuals. There were two significant two-way interactions, the first 
between regulatory focus and previous employment decisions, F (1, 140) = 4.96, p = .03, 
partial η2 = .03, and the second between instruction and claim type, F (1, 140) = 4.65, p = 
.03, partial η2 = .03. There was also a marginally significant three-way interaction 
between instruction, claim type, and previous employment decisions, F (1, 140) = 3.57, p 
= .06, partial η2 = .02.  
First, moderation analyses were done on the two-way interaction between regulatory 
focus and previous employment decisions. Using Hayes’ (2013) process moderation, the 
interaction of regulatory focus and previous employment experience was significant, t (1, 
152)= -2.25, p = .03, LLCI = -3.97, UCLI = -.26, suggesting significant moderation. 
Figure 15 shows that this moderation is strongest for participants in the prevention 
focused condition, as compared to the promotion focused condition.  For participants in 
the prevention focused condition, if they had no previous experience making employment 
decisions (such as firing or hiring) they were more certain in finding for the plaintiff, 
while those who had previous experience were slightly certain in finding for the 
defendant. All participants in the promotion focused condition were certain in finding for 
the plaintiff, but those with previous experience were more certain in their verdict than 
those with no previous experience. This could suggest that when put into prevention 
focus, those who know what goes into these decisions may not want to risk overlooking a 
legitimate factor that might have led to the alleged retaliation.  
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Figure 3.15: Previous Employment Experience as a Moderator for Regulatory 
Focus on Retaliation Verdict Certainty 
 
 Next, moderation analyses assessed the potential moderation of previous 
employment experience on the effect of instruction by claim type on retaliation verdict 
certainty. Separate process moderation was done on both participants were decided only a 
retaliation claim and those who decided a discrimination and a retaliation claim focused 
participants separately, but no significant moderation was found (ps > .10 and ps > .25, 
respectively). The data was then split by instruction type to examine potential moderation 
of the relationship between claim type and retaliation verdict certainty, but no moderation 
was found for either but-for (all ps > .49) or mixed motive instructions (all ps > .13). 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A one-way ANOVA with 
three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions, as a 
covariate, on retaliation verdict certainty failed to produce main effects of instruction, 
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regulatory focus, or previous employment decisions (all Fs < .72 and all ps > .40). Nor 
were there any significant interactions between any of the variables, all Fs < .2.65 and all 
ps > .07. Moderation analyses were not necessary. 
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, 
and previous employment decisions. Next, I conducted a forced entry binary logistic 
regression predicting discrimination verdict from instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment decisions. 
The overall model was not significant, χ2(7) = 4.67 p = .70, Nagelkerke R2 = .08 and 
there were no main effects or interactions. I conducted no further analyses on the 
potential moderating effects of previous employment decisions.  
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction. regulatory focus 
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic 
regression predicting discrimination verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment 
decisions produced a non-significant overall model, χ2(7) = 11.77 p = .11, Nagelkerke R2 
= .12 and there were no main effects or interactions, all ps > .14. No further analyses 
moderation analyses with these variables were necessary.  
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and employment decision. A one-way ANOVA on discrimination verdict 
certainty with instruction, regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions as a 
serving as independent variables resulted in only a significant main effect of instruction, 
F (1, 71) = 4.20, p = 04, partial η2 = .06. In line with previous effect, participants who 
used but-for instructions were more certain in their verdicts for the defendant, while 
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participants who used mixed motive instructions were more certain in their verdicts for 
the plaintiff. No other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps > .16). 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A one-way ANOVA 
predicting discrimination verdict certainty with three-level instruction, regulatory focus, 
and previous employment decisions as a covariate resulted in no significant main effects 
or interactions, all Fs < 2.56 and all ps > .08. No moderation analyses were conducted.  
Study 1 Discussion 
The results of study sought to examine several hypotheses that were mostly 
supported. Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants using but-for instructions would be 
more likely to find for the defendant, as compared to the plaintiff.  Although logistic 
regressions of the full dichotomized verdict resulted in no effects for retaliation verdict or 
discrimination in the full model analyses, verdict certainty analyses of variance showed 
that participants using but-for instructions were more likely to be certain in their verdict 
for the defendant while those using mixed motive were more certain in their verdict for 
the plaintiff. Moderation analyses further found that under but-for instructions, but not 
mixed motive, belief that the plaintiffs national origin motivated the defendant 
significantly predicted retaliation verdicts for participants when they made only a 
retaliation decision as compared to those who made both a discrimination and retaliation 
decision.  National origin also moderated the relationship between regulatory focus and 
claim type, but only under but-for instructions. This is in line with previous research 
(Wiener & Farnum, 2013; Farnum & Wiener, 2015) who have found that extralegal 
psychological factors are more influential under but-for instructions. 
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Hypothesis 1a predicted that when participants used mixed motive instructions for 
a discrimination claim and but-for instructions for a retaliation claim, that the but-for 
instructions would potentially bleed over and lead to more pro-defendant verdicts. 
Although there was no evidence for this phenomenon, participants who used two 
different instruction types were less certain in their retaliation verdict as compared to 
participants who only used one type of instruction. Participants were less certain of 
finding for the plaintiff, such that the pattern of certainty for plaintiff verdict was more in 
line with mixed motive instructions than but-for charges. This suggests that perhaps 
mixed motive instructions from the discrimination claim may bleed over into the 
retaliation claim. Additionally, participants who determined a discrimination claim were 
more likely to find for the plaintiff in the two-instruction condition than those in the pure 
the but-for only condition. This suggests that but-for instructions do not bleed over into 
discrimination claims.  
 Unfortunately, I was unable to test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, concerning 
chronic regulatory focus and regulatory fit because the chronic regulatory focus measure 
that was unreliable and unable to differentiate participants in either promotion or 
prevention focused conditions.  Hypothesis 4 predicted that regulatory focus, as 
manipulated in the study, would be the most influential under but-for instructions. This 
hypothesis was partially supported. Specifically, for retaliation verdict certainty 
regulatory focus predicted verdict certainty under but-for instructions but not under 
mixed motive. On the other hand, when looking at all three levels of instruction for 
retaliation verdict certainty, prevention focused individuals did not show any difference 
in their use of instructions, but participants in the promotion focused condition were more 
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certain in their verdict in favor of the defendant under but-for instructions as compared to 
mixed motive instructions. There was no difference, however, between those who used 
both instructions and those who only used one type of instruction.  
 An interesting and pervasive finding from the first study is that whether or not the 
defendant considered the plaintiff’s national origin in reaching the employment decision 
drove the participants verdicts. . This information should from the basis of the 
discrimination judgment, but not the retaliation claim. Regardless, national origin 
motivation influenced participant verdict and verdict certainty for retaliation claims. 
Additionally, participants used the discrimination complaint as a moderating factor in 
their discrimination verdict certainty decisions. The discrimination complaint should not 
legally be influencing discrimination verdicts decisions. There was also some evidence 
that if participants had previous experience making hiring or firing decisions that this 
could influence how they determined their verdicts. Specifically, participants who were 
in the prevention focused condition were more certain in their verdict for the defendant if 
they had previous experience, whereas promotion focused participants were more certain 
in their verdict for the plaintiff if they had previous experience. Perhaps, the assessment 
of risk occurs differently depending on regulatory focus. Those with prevention focus, 
having made these decisions before, understand that there are many factors that go into 
firing someone. As such, they may be less willing to risk finding retaliation when it may 
not exist.  
 Study 2 next assesses the role of regulatory focus, instruction, and claim type in a 
case where the plaintiff did not receive a promotion, instead of being fired.  
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Chapter 4: Study 2 
Study 2: Regulatory Focus and Jury Decision Making in Retaliation Cases involving 
failure to promote an employee 
The second study utilized the same design and analyses as the first but the trial 
transcript described a case in which the employee did not receive a promotion.  Thus, the 
design of study 2 was a 2 (Regulatory frame: promotion v. prevention) x 2 (Claim type: 
Retaliation v. Discrimination/Retaliation) x 2 (Instruction: mixed motive v. but-for)  + 1 
(Mixed Motive and But-for instructions for a Discrimination/Retaliation claim) between 
participants design with chronic prevention and promotion as continuous variables. The 
discrimination judgment and the retaliation judgment was the same as in study 1 except 
that the charges were 1) that the hospital failed to promote the plaintiff because of his 
national origin and 2) the hospital failed to promote the plaintiff because of his 
discrimination complaint. The fact pattern was a modification of University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, similar to study 1 except that the plaintiff 
complained that he deserved a promotion that the hospital denied him (See Appendix I).   
The chronic regulatory focus measure was the same as in study 1 as was the regulatory 
focus framing manipulation. Appendices J, K, L, and M are the jury instructions, 
manipulation checks, motivation factors measures, and verdict decisions for study 2 (See 
Table 4.1 for means and standard deviations of all measures).  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Measures 
 N M SD 
Motivating Factors    
National Origin 198 4.97 3.12 
Rehiring Policy  197 5.09 3.10 
Adversarial 
Relationship 
198 6.32 2.98 
Discrimination 
Complaint 
198 5.83 3.33 
Letter to University 198 6.74 3.00 
Retaliation Verdict 198   
Plaintiff Verdict 107 (54%)   
Defendant Verdict 91 (46%)   
Retaliation Verdict 
Certainty 
198 .90 2.91 
Retaliation Plaintiff 
Evidence 
198 5.57 2.27 
Retaliation 
Defendant Evidence 
197 4.57 2.49 
Retaliation Burden of 
Proof 
197 71.49 25.03 
Discrimination 
Verdict 
120   
Plaintiff Verdict 61 (51.7%)   
Defendant Verdict 57 (48.3%)   
Discrimination 
Verdict Certainty 
119 .13 3.32 
Discrimination 
Plaintiff Evidence 
120 4.82 2.49 
Discrimination 
Defendant Evidence 
120 5.41 2.31 
Discrimination 
Burden of Proof 
120 69.60 .70 
 
 Though failure to promote and firing an employee are both adverse actions under 
Title VII, I hypothesized that retaliation that occurs as a failure to promote will be viewed 
as less legitimate than retaliation as discharge. That is, participants may not show as 
strong regulatory fit effects and instruction effects because they do not believe the 
employer retaliated when not promoting the complainant.  This is consistent with other 
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research examining employee retaliatory acts of omission (e.g. failing to look for an 
important missing file), which participants perceived as more acceptable than acts of 
commission (e.g. hiding an important file) (Charness & Levine, 2010).  Specifically, 
Charness and Levine presented participants with one of five scenarios that described a 
negative action by a manager (e.g., a manager who has sexually harassed your friend 
needs help finding a missing file) and then described the employee’s actions. These 
actions were be one of five responses that varied in either being an act of commission 
(employee hides the file) or omission (the employee does not tell the manager where the 
file is) and then whether the influence of the action was far-reaching (it took weeks to 
find or replace the file) or resolved quickly (it took hours to find or replace the file). 
Participants then rated the acceptability of the employee’s behavior.  Charness and 
Levine (2010) found that participants viewed an act of omission as more acceptable than 
an act of commission, but the influence of the action (far reaching or resolved quickly) 
was not rated as significantly different. I anticipate similar results when comparing study 
1 and study 2.  
Participants. Participants were 212 community members recruited via 
Mechanical Turk that were at least 18 years of age or older and were U.S. citizens..  
Eleven participants were dropped from the dataset for falling outside the standard 
deviation of response time for the survey and 3 participants were dropped for incomplete 
data. The final 198 participants who were kept for analyses were 54% women, had a 
mean age of 34.38, and 80.3% of them were employed at least part-time. The ethnic 
breakdown of the participants was representative of the Mturk community with 79.7% 
European American, 8.6% African American, 4.6% Asian American, 3.6% Hispanic, 
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1.5% Native American, 1% Latino/a, and 1% Middle Eastern. Participants were fairly 
educated with 56.1% holding at least a college degree, 30.8% having completed some 
college, and 12.6% holding a high school diploma. Lastly, 46.5% of participants 
indicated that they had been in a position to make hiring or firing decisions in their jobs.  
Results 
 As with Study 1, the results of Study 2 appear in four phases. Phase 1 displays 
preliminary analysis of the experimental task to determine which factors predict verdict 
and verdict certainty using only simple main effects. Phase 2 presents the full model 
analyses, absent the +1 condition of mixed motive instructions for discrimination and 
but-for instructions for retaliation, of the experimental task to test the influence of 
significant predictors while taking into consideration the 2 (Regulatory frame: promotion 
v. prevention) x 2 (Claim type: Retaliation v. Discrimination/Retaliation) x 2 (Instruction: 
mixed motive v. but-for) factorial design. Phase 3 presents the full model analyses 
including the third level of instruction to test the influence of manipulations on the 
dependent variables using the 2 (Regulatory frame: promotion v. prevention) x 3 
(Instruction: mixed motive v. but-for v. mixed motive/but-for) factorial design.  Finally, 
phase 4 will examine the proposed moderators that emerge as viable during phase 1of the 
analyses.  
 Phase 1: Preliminary Analyses of Verdict and Verdict Certainty 
 Manipulation checks.  As in study 1, I created a causal knowledge index in which 
participants who correctly identified the instruction type in the manipulation check were 
coded as 1 and those who incorrectly identified the instruction type were coded as 0. A 
binary logistic regression predicting accurate understanding of the instruction by the 
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instruction manipulation (which included the condition in which participants had both 
instructions) revealed that for retaliation claims, instruction did predict accuracy χ2(2) = 
6.81, p < .03, Nagelkerke R2 = .05. Categorical contrasts revealed that participants who 
received but-for instructions were significantly more accurate in their knowledge of 
instructions as compared to those who received mixed motive instructions, β = -.97 (SE = 
.38), Wald  = 6.44, p < .01. LLCI = .18, ULCI = .80, but were not different from those 
who received both but-for and mixed motive instructions, β = -.59 , p < .20, LLCI = .22, 
ULCI = 1.38. Participants who received either only mixed motive instructions or both 
instructions were not significantly different on retaliation instruction accuracy, β = -38 , p 
< .36, LLCI = .30, ULCI = 1.56. Table 4.2 shows the breakdown for accuracy by 
instructional condition for retaliation claims. A binary logistic regression predicting 
accurate understanding of instruction by the instruction manipulation for discrimination 
claims was not significant, χ2(2) = 3.07, p < .22, Nagelkerke R2 = .04.  
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Table 4.2: Instruction by Instruction Accuracy 
  
Retaliation Claim Instruction Accuracy 
 
  
Inaccurate 
 
Accurate 
 
Total 
  
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
But-For 
 
 
13 
 
16.9 
 
64 
 
83.1 
 
77 
 
100 
Mixed Motive 
 
28 35 52 65 80 100 
Mixed 
Motive/But-
For 
11 26.8 30 73.2 41 100 
Total	 52	 26.3	 145	 73.7	 198	 100	
  
 A binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict by accuracy knowledge 
of the retaliation instruction was significant, χ2(1) = 6.90, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .05, 
and indicated that those who were accurate about the instructions were more likely to find 
for the plaintiff, β = .86 (SE = .33), Wald  = 6.72, p < .01, LLCI = 1.23, ULCI = 4.51. 
Table 4.3 displays the retaliation verdict breakdown by accuracy. A binary logistic 
regression predicting discrimination verdict by instruction accuracy was not significant, 
χ2(1) = .00, p < .99, Nagelkerke R2 = .00. 
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Table 4.3: Retaliation verdict by instruction accuracy 
  
Retaliation Verdict by Instruction Accuracy 
 
  
Defendant 
 
Plaintiff 
 
Total 
  
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
Inaccurate 
 
 
32 
 
61.5 
 
20 
 
38.5 
 
52 
 
100 
Accurate 
 
59 40.4 87 59.6 146 100 
Total	 91	 46	 107	 54	 198	 100	
 
 To assess the influence of instruction accuracy on retaliation verdict certainty, a 
one-way ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty revealed a non-significant effect 
of instruction accuracy, F(1, 196) = 04, p = .84, partial η2 = .00. A one-way ANOVA 
predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction accuracy also revealed no 
significant effect of instruction accuracy on certainty, F(1, 116) = .83, p = .36, partial η2 
= .007. 
Motivational Analyses. A preliminary forced binary logistic regression predicting 
retaliation verdict by the five motivating factors (plaintiff national origin, rehiring policy, 
relationship with supervisors, discrimination complaint, and the letter to the university) 
tested whether these factors from the case predicted retaliation verdict. The overall model 
was significant, χ2(5) = 32.84, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .20. Two of the motivating 
factors were significant predictors, plaintiff’s national origin, β = .23 (SE = .06), Wald  = 
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17.26, p < .001, LLCI = 1.13, ULCI = 1.41, and the rehiring policy, β = -.17 (SE = .05), 
Wald  = 9.94, p < .002, LLCI = .76, ULCI = 94. Specifically, participants who believed 
national origin played a role in the defendant’s actions were more likely to find for the 
plaintiff, while participants who believed the rehiring policy influenced the defendant’s 
actions were more likely to find for the defendant. As with Study 1, national origin is not 
a legally relevant motivating factor for a retaliation claim (See Figure 4.1). The rehiring 
policy is also problematic, as the rehiring policy is a legitimate reason for the defendant’s 
actions. None of the other motivating factors were significant, all ps > .51. 
Figure 4.1: Motivating Factors and Retaliation Verdict 
 
A forced binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict by the 
motivating factors also produced a significant model, χ2(5) = 24.43, p < .001, Nagelkerke 
R2 = .25, but only plaintiff’s national origin was a significant predictor of verdict, β = .28 
(SE = .07), Wald  = 13.67, p < .001, LLCI = 1.42, ULCI = 1.53. Participants who thought 
the defendant took into consideration the plaintiff’s national origin were more likely to 
find for the plaintiff, as compared to the defendant.  This is legally appropriate  for the 
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discrimination complaint and is in the right direction. All other motivating factors were 
not significant, all ps  > .29.  
Next, to determine the influence of motivating factors on retaliation verdict 
certainty, a multiple regression predicting certainty by the motivating factors produced a 
significant model, R2 = .12 , F (5, 196) = 5.27, p = .001.  The plaintiff’s national origin, β 
= .15 (SE = .07), t  = 2.33, p = .02, LLCI = .02 ULCI = .29, and the rehiring policy, β = -
.18 (SE = .06), t  = -2.81, p = .01, LLCI = -.31 ULCI = 0.05 were the only significant 
predictors. Specifically, participants who believed the plaintiff’s national origin was a 
strong motivating factor were more likely to find the defendant liable, while  those who 
thought the rehiring policy was a motivating factor were more likely to find the defendant 
not liable. A multiple regression predicting discrimination verdict certainty by the 
motivating factors produced a significant model, R2 = .18 , F (5, 118) = 5.10, p = .001, 
and found that the plaintiff’s national origin, β = .31 (SE = .10), t  = 3.23, p = .01, LLCI 
= .12 ULCI = .51, and the plaintiff’s discrimination complaint were significant 
predictors, β = .22 (SE = .10), t  = 2.22, p = .03, LLCI = .02 ULCI = .41.  
Strength of Evidence Analyses. To understand how participants weighed the 
evidence of the plaintiff and defendant in deciding a verdict, I conducted a forced entry 
binary logistic predicting retaliation verdict with strength of plaintiff and defendant 
evidence and found the model  was significant, χ2(2) = 150.64, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.71, with both plaintiff evidence, β = 1.11 (SE = .16), Wald  = 47.52, p < .001, LLCI = 
2.21, ULCI = 4.16, and defendant evidence, β = -.44  (SE = .13), Wald  = 11.64, p = .001, 
LLCI = .50, ULCI = .83, as significant predictors.  Participants who viewed the plaintiff’s 
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evidence as strong were more likely to find for the plaintiff, while those who viewed the 
defendant’s evidence as strong were more likely to find for the defendant.  
Next, a forced entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict by 
plaintiff and defendant evidence also produced a significant model, χ2(2) = 105.82, p < 
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .79. For discrimination verdicts both plaintiff evidence, β = 1.41 
(SE = .29), Wald  = 24.40, p < .001, LLCI = 3.35, ULCI =7.21, and defendant evidence, β 
= -.46 (SE = .22), Wald  = 4.32, p = .04, LLCI = .41, ULCI =97, emerged as a significant 
predictors. Again, participants who believed the plaintiff’s evidence was strong were 
more likely to find for the plaintiff, while those that viewed the defendant’s evidence as 
strong were more likely to find for the defendant. 
To examine the influence of strength of evidence on verdict certainty, separate 
multiple regressions predicting retaliation verdict certainty and discrimination verdict 
certainty by plaintiff and defendant evidence were conducted. For retaliation verdict 
certainty, the model was significant, R2 = .38 , F (2, 196) = 59.28, p < .001, but only 
plaintiff evidence was a significant predictor, β = .75 (SE = .08), t  = 9.13, p = .001, LLCI 
= .59 ULCI = .92, while defendant evidence was not significant, β = -.05, p = .41. For 
discrimination verdict certainty the model was significant, R2 = .44 , F (2, 118) = 46.18, p 
< .001, and plaintiff evidence was significant, β = .80 (SE = .11), t  = 7.07, p = .001, 
LLCI = .58 ULCI = 1.02, but defendant evidence was not significant, β =-.15, p = .23. 
For both retaliation and discrimination verdict certainty, participants who viewed the 
plaintiff’s evidence as strong were more likely to be certain in their verdict for the 
plaintiff as opposed to the defendant. 
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Trait regulatory focus analyses. Again, I was unable to analyze chronic 
regulatory focus due to a failure in the regulatory focus measure to differentiate between 
promotion and prevention focused individuals. Specifically, the reaction times did not 
correlate with the ratings of the traits, even when transforming the data to be a normal 
distribution. More concerning, individuals who rated themselves high in ideal/promotion 
traits also significantly rated themselves high in ought/prevention traits (Pearson r = .63, 
p < .001). This suggests that the measure was not sensitive enough to parse out 
participants’ trait regulatory focus.  
 Phase 2: Full Experimental Model Analyses 
 In the analyses of the full model, participants from the different instruction 
condition (discrimination complaint with mixed motive instruction and retaliation 
complaint with but-for instruction) are not included. These participants will be analyzed 
in separate analyses in phase 3.  
 Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and claim type. A 
forced binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict (0 = plaintiff, 1 = 
defendant) by instruction (0 = but-for, 1 = mixed motive), regulatory focus manipulation 
(0 = prevention, 1 = promotion), and claim type (0 = retaliation only, 1 = discrimination 
and retaliation) produced a non-significant model, χ2(3) = 3.92, p = .27, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.03. None of the manipulated variables predicted retaliation verdict, all ps > .13.  Testing 
for interactions between the variables, a second forced entry binary logistic regression  
with the three manipulated variables and their interactions predicting retaliation verdict 
failed to produce a significant model,  χ2(7) = 6.81, p = .45, Nagelkerke R2 = .06, with 
none of the variables or interactions predicting retaliation verdict, all ps > .15. 
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 Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by Instruction, Regulatory Focus, and 
Claim Type. A one-way ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, 
regulatory focus manipulation, and claim type revealed a main effect of instruction, F(1, 
149) = 4.68, p = .03, partial η2 = .03, with participants in the mixed motive condition 
more certain of their verdict for the plaintiff (M = 1.54, SD = .32) than participants in the 
but-for condition (M = .56, SD = .32). No other main effects or interactions were 
significant (all Fs < 1.45, all ps > .23),  
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and claim 
type. A forced entry binary logistic regression with instruction and regulatory focus 
manipulation predicting discrimination verdict produced a significant model, χ2(2) = 
8.98, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .14 with instruction as a significant predictor, β = 1.13 (SE 
= .49), Wald  = 5.41, p = .02, LLCI = 1.19, ULCI =8.02. Specifically, participants using 
the mixed motive instructions were more likely to find for the plaintiff than participants 
using the but-for instructions (See Table 4.4). There was also a marginally significant 
effect of regulatory focus, β = -.92 (SE = .49), Wald  = 3.67, p = .056, LLCI = .15, ULCI 
=1.02, with prevention focused jurors more likely to find for the plaintiff and promotion 
focused jurors more likely to find for the defendant (See Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.4: Discrimination Verdict by Instruction 
  
Discrimination Verdict by Instruction  
 
  
Defendant 
 
Plaintiff 
 
Total 
  
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
But-For 
 
 
24 
 
63.2 
 
14 
 
36.8 
 
38 
 
100 
Mixed Motive 
 
15 37.5 25 62.5 40 100 
Total	 39	 50	 39	 50	 78	 100	
 
Table 4.5: Retaliation verdict by regulatory focus manipulation 
  
Discrimination Verdict by Instruction  
 
  
Defendant 
 
Plaintiff 
 
Total 
  
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
Prevention 
 
 
15 
 
39.5 
 
23 
 
60.5 
 
38 
 
100 
Promotion 
 
24 60 16 40 40 100 
Total	 39	 50	 39	 50	 78	 100	
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A second forced entry binary logistic regress predicting discrimination verdict by 
instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and instruction X regulatory focus 
manipulation produced a significant model, χ2(3) = 8.98, p = .03, Nagelkerke R2 = .14, 
with no significant main effects or interactions, all ps > .10. 
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction and regulatory focus. 
A one-way ANOVA predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction and 
regulatory focus manipulation found a marginal main effect of instruction,  F(1, 74) = 
3.55, p = .06, partial η2 = .05, but no two-way interaction between regulatory focus and 
instruction, F(1, 74) = .47, p = .50, partial η2 = .01. The main effect of instruction shows 
that participants who received but-for instructions were significantly more certain (M = -
.53, SD = .55) that the defendant was not liable, whereas participants who received mixed 
motive instructions were significantly more certain (M = .92, SD = .54) that the defendant 
was liable. 
Phase 3: Experimental Model Analyses with +1 Instruction Condition 
The following analyses examine the full model effects on the dependent variables, 
taking into consideration the third level of instruction: mixed motive for discrimination 
claims and but-for for retaliation claims. In these analyses, claim type will not be used, as 
all participants who received the third level of instruction decided both claims. As such, 
all analyses in this phase only examine participants who made both a discrimination and 
retaliation claim. 
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, regulatory focus, and claim type. A 
forced entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict with instruction 
(coded with the mixed motive/but-for condition as the comparison) and regulatory focus 
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resulted in a non-significant model, χ2(3) = 1.18, p = .76, Nagelkerke R2 = .01 without  
main effects of instruction or regulatory focus, all ps > .47. 
A second forced-entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict with 
instruction, regulatory focus, and the interaction of instruction x regulatory focus 
produced a non-significant model, χ2(5) = 4.15, p = .53, Nagelkerke R2 = .04. There were 
no significant main effects and the interaction was not significant either, all ps > .14.  
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by Instruction and Regulatory Focus. A 
one-way ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction and regulatory 
focus failed to find any main effects nor an interaction between instruction and regulatory 
focus , all Fs < .73 and all ps > .48,  
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction and regulatory focus. A forced 
entry binary logistic regression predicting discrimination verdict with all three levels of 
instruction (coded with but-for only as the comparison) and regulatory focus resulted in a 
non- significant model, χ2(3) = 6.48, p = .09, Nagelkerke R2 = .07. However, there was a 
marginally significant main effect of instruction, Wald  = 5.40, p = .067. Analyses 
revealed that there is a significant difference in discrimination verdicts when participants 
used only but-for instructions compared to those who used only mixed motive 
instructions, β = 1.07 (SE = .47), Wald  = 5.14, p = .02, LLCI = 1.15, ULCI = 7.34  (See 
Table 4.6 for percentages). Participants who used only but-for instructions for both 
claims were more likely to find for the defendant on the discrimination charge as opposed 
to those who used only mixed motive instructions. The differences between those who 
used both instructions as compared to those who used only but-for  (β = .31, p = .49) and 
those who used only mixed motive instructions (β = -.76, p = .10) were not significant.  
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Table 4.6: Discrimination Verdict by Three Level Instruction Condition 
  
Defendant 
 
Plaintiff 
 
Total 
  
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
But-For only 
 
 
24 
 
63.2 
 
14 
 
36.8 
 
38 
 
100 
Mixed Motive 
Only 
 
15 37.5 25 62.5 40 100 
Mixed 
Motive/But-
For 
18 45 22 55 40 100 
Total	 57	 48.3	 61	 51.7	 118	 100	
 
A second forced-entry binary logistic regression predicted discrimination verdict 
with the instruction, regulatory focus, and the interaction of instruction by regulatory 
focus produced a non-significant model, χ2(5) = 10.10, p = .07, Nagelkerke R2 = .11. 
There were no significant main effects or interactions, all ps >.10.  
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction and regulatory focus. 
I conducted a separate ANOVA  to predict discrimination verdict certainty by the 
instruction and regulatory focus. There were no significant main effects and the 
interaction between instruction and regulatory focus was also not significant, all Fs < 
1.92 and all ps > .15. 
  
 125 
Phase 4: Moderation Analyses 
 For the following analyses, unless otherwise noted instruction refers to only but-
for or mixed motive instructions. The mixed motive/but-for condition will be specifically 
mentioned if it is being used in the analysis. 
 Instruction Accuracy as a Moderator 
 Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and 
instruction accuracy. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation 
verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and instruction accuracy produced a 
significant model, χ2(4) = 16.64, p = .002, Nagelkerke R2 = .13. There was a significant 
main effect of instruction, β = .80 (SE = .36), Wald = 5.09, p = .02. LLCI = 1.11, ULCI = 
4.50, in which participants who used mixed motive instructions, as compared to but-for 
instructions, were more likely to find for the plaintiff. There was also a main effect of 
accuracy, β = 1.44 (SE = .42), Wald = 11.62, p = .001, LLCI = 1.84, ULCI = 9.65, where 
participants who were more accurate in their knowledge of the instructions were more 
likely to find in favor of the plaintiff. . No other mains effects were significant, all ps > 
.33. A second binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim 
type, regulatory focus, accuracy, and adding all interactions produced a significant 
model, χ2(14) = 25.57, p = .03, Nagelkerke R2 = .20, but there were no significant main 
effects or interactions, all ps > .11. Since accuracy did not interact with any of the 
manipulated variables, moderation analyses were not necessary.  
National Origin and Rehiring Policy Motivation as a Moderator. Based on 
analyses from Phase 1, only national origin and the rehiring policy will be considered 
potential moderators. Specifically, potential moderators for predicting retaliation verdict 
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are national origin and rehiring policy, while only national origin is a potential moderator 
for discrimination verdicts. Since neither motivation factor predicted verdict certainty, 
moderation analyses do not include those factors. 
  Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and national origin motivation. A forced entry binary logistic regression 
predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and national 
origin produced a significant model, χ2(4) = 18.17, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .15. Only 
national origin motivation emerged as a significant predictor, β =.22 (SE = .06), Wald  = 
12.94, p = .001, LLCI = .1.10, ULCI = 1.39, all other effects had p values of .07 or 
greater. A second forced entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation with the 
same model plus all interactions resulted in a significant model, χ2(15) = 25.61, p = .04, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .20, but there  were no significant main effects or interactions, all ps > 
.09. 
 Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and 
rehiring policy motivation. Next, a forced entry binary logistic regression predicting 
retaliation verdict from instruction, regulatory focus, claim type and the rehiring policy as 
a motivating factor also generated a significant model, χ2(4) =13.95 p = .01, Nagelkerke 
R2 = .11, with a main effect of the rehiring policy, β =-.18 (SE = .06), Wald  = 9.31, p = 
.002, LLCI = .74, ULCI = .94. No other effects were significant, all ps > .11.  
A second forced entry binary logistic regression predicted retaliation verdict by 
instruction, regulatory focus, claim type, rehiring policy as a employer motivation, and 
added all the interactions. The model was significant, χ2(15) =29.32 p = .01, Nagelkerke 
R2 = .23, and there were a significant effects for instruction, β = 4.70 (SE = 2.05), Wald  
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= 5.23, p = .02, LLCI = 1.95, ULCI = 6156.99, a  two-way interaction between 
instruction and rehiring policy, β = -.87, (SE = .35), Wald  = 6.06, p = .01, LLCI = .21, 
ULCI = .84, and a marginally significant three-way interaction between instruction, claim 
type, and rehiring policy, β =.88 (SE = .45), Wald  = 3.82, p = .05, LLCI = 1.00, ULCI = 
5.86. With regard to the main effect of instruction, participants who used mixed motive 
instruction were significantly more likely to find for the plaintiff, while participants using 
but-for instruction were more likely to find for the defendant.  
 To examine the interaction between instruction and rehiring policy, I used Hayes’ 
(2013) process moderation  to find instruction effects under low levels of belief in the 
rehiring policy on retaliation verdict, z = 2.35, p = .02, LLCI = .21, ULCI = 2.27. 
Moderate (z = 1.71, p = .09, LLCI = -.09, ULCI = 1.27) but no instruction effects at high 
levels (z = -.12, p = .91, LLCI = -.98, ULCI = .87) of belief in the use of the rehiring (See 
Figure 4.2). Specifically, mixed motive participants, as compared to but-for participants, 
were most likely to find in favor of the plaintiff when they believed the defendant did not 
take into consideration the rehiring policy.  On the other hand, belief in the employer’s 
use of hiring policy had no impact under but-for instructions. Thus, respondents using 
mixed motive causality instructions held the company accountable when the respondents’ 
believed the company made employment decisions that did not take their own hiring 
policy into consideration.  
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Figure 4.2: Rehiring Policy as a Moderator for Instruction on Retaliation Verdict. 
 
 To examine the three-way interaction between claim type, instruction, and 
rehiring policy, I performed separate Hayes (2013) process moderation analyses under 
each claim type. For participants who only had to determine a retaliation claim, low 
levels of rehiring policy motivation moderated the relationship between instruction and 
retaliation verdict, z = 2.29, p = .02, LLCI = .27, ULCI = 3.50. Again, as seen in Figure 
4.3, beliefs that the company failed to use its rehiring policy led to increases a plaintiff 
verdict when respondents used mixed motive instructions compared to when they used 
but-for instructions. Analyses with  participants deciding both a discrimination and 
retaliation claim did not find significant moderation effects for rehiring policy on the 
relationship between instruction and retaliation verdict, all ps > .36.  
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Figure 4.3: Rehiring Policy as Moderator for Instruction on Retaliation Verdict for 
Retaliation Claims 
 
Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and national origin motivation. A forced entry binary logistic regression 
predicting retaliation verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and the 
plaintiff’s national origin as a motivating factor resulted in a significant model,  χ2(4) 
=23.97 p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .24, but with only national origin motivation as a 
significant effect,  β = .32 (SE = .07), Wald  = 18.50, p < .001, LLCI = 1.19, ULCI = 
1.59. A second forced entry binary logistic regression predicting retaliation verdict  with 
the same model plus all interactions also produced a significant model, χ2(11) = 32.77 p = 
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .32. There were, however no significant main effects or 
interactions (all ps > .08). Moderation analyses were unnecessary.  
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Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and rehiring policy motivation. Next, a forced entry binary logistic 
regression predicting retaliation verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, 
and the rehiring policy as a motivating factor was not significant overall, χ2(4) =8.12 p = 
.09, Nagelkerke R2 = .09. Only instruction was marginally significant, Wald  = 5.67 , p < 
.06, with but-for instructions leading to more pro-defendant verdicts than mixed motive 
instructions, β = 1.09 (SE = .47), Wald  = 5.29, p < .02, LLCI = 1.18, ULCI = 7.57. There 
was no difference when comparing participants who used both instructions to those who 
only used but-for (β = .81, p = .08) and those who only relied on mixed motive 
instructions (β = .28, p = .55). Regulatory focus (β = -.40, p = .30) and the rehiring policy 
(β = .-.08, p = .20) were not significant. A second forced entry binary logistic regression 
adding all the interactions to the first model produced a non-significant model, χ2(11) 
=23.53, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .24. No main effects or interactions were significant, all 
ps > .11. I conducted no moderation analyses.  
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and 
national origin motivation. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting 
discrimination verdict from instruction, regulatory focus, and the plaintiff’s national 
origin as a motivating factor produced an overall significant model,  χ2(3) =17.97 p < 
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .27, with both national origin, β = .27 (SE = .10), Wald  = 7.73, p 
= .01, and instruction, β = 1.35 (SE = .53), Wald  = 13.567, p = .001 emerging  as 
predictors of discrimination verdict, β = -.411 (SE = .111), Wald  = 6.44, p = .01, while 
regulatory focus (β = -.77, p = .14) was not significant.  As already described in Phase 1 
and Phase 2, participants who believed national origin played a role were more likely to 
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find for the plaintiff than the defendant, and participants using mixed motive instructions, 
as opposed to but-for instructions, were more likely to find for the plaintiff. A second 
forced entry binary logistic regression adding all the interactions to the first model also 
produced a significant model, χ2(7) = 19.44, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .29, but no main 
effects or interactions emerged, all ps > .14.  
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and national origin motivation. A forced-entry binary logistic regression 
predicting discrimination verdict with the three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and 
rehiring policy significant overall, χ2(4) = 25.60, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .26, with 
effects for national origin, β = .32 (SE = .08), Wald  = 17.77, p <.001, LLCI = 1.19, 
ULCI = 1.61, and instruction, Wald  = 7.15, p = .03. When comparing instruction types, 
participants who received but-for instructions were marginally more likely to find for the 
defendant as compared to participants who used mixed motive causality for 
discrimination claims and but-for for retaliation claims, β = -1.02 (SE = .53), Wald  = 
3.72, p = .05, LLCI = .13, ULCI = 1.02. There was no difference in verdict between 
participants who only used mixed motive instructions and participants who used both 
instructions (β = .36, p = .48). Regulatory focus was not significant (β = -.21, p = .62). A 
second forced entry binary logistic regression adding the  interactions to the first model 
was significant, χ2(11) = 31.60, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .31,  but only national origin 
was emerged as an effect, β = .47 (SE = .21), Wald  = 5.23, p = .02, LLCI = 1.07, ULCI = 
2.41. All other main effects and interactions were not significant, all ps > .40. 
Strength of Evidence as a Moderator.  
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Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression 
predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, and regulatory focus with 
plaintiff and defendant evidence as moderators produced a significant model, χ2(5) 
=140.09 p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .79. There were main effects of regulatory focus, β = 
1.41 (SE = .66), Wald  = 4.51, p = .03, LLCI = 1.11, ULCI = 15.05, and plaintiff 
evidence, β = 1.66 (SE = .32), Wald  = 27.61, p < .001, LLCI = 2.83,ULCI = 9.77. 
Specifically, participants who were promotion focused were more likely to find for the 
plaintiff, as compared to prevention focus, and participants who believed the plaintiff’s 
evidence was stronger were more likely to find for the plaintiff as opposed to the 
defendant. All other effects were not significant, all ps > .08.  A second forced entry 
binary logistic regression adding all interactions to the first model was significant, χ2(23) 
=159.69 p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .85, but with no main effects or interactions, all ps > 
.09. No moderation analyses were conducted.  
Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression 
predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and strength of 
evidence was significant overall, χ2(5) = 81.19, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .66. There 
were main effects of plaintiff evidence, β = 1.00 (SE = .19), Wald = 26.87, p < .001, 
LLCI = 1.86, ULCI = 3.96, and defendant evidence, β = -.43 (SE = .15), Wald = 8.42, p = 
.004, LLCI = .49, ULCI = .87. Instruction and regulatory focus were not significant, ps > 
.24. A second forced entry binary logistic adding all interactions to the main effects was 
also significant overall, χ2(17) = 100.10, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .76. There was still 
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only main effects of plaintiff evidence β = .86 (SE = .45), Wald  = 3.70, p = .05, LLCI = 
.98, ULCI = 5.73, and defendant evidence, β = -.86 (SE = .39), Wald  = 4.79, p = .03, 
LLCI = .00, ULCI = .20. Instruction, regulatory focus, and all interactions were not 
significant, all ps > .09.  
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and strength of plaintiff evidence. Since only plaintiff evidence predicted 
retaliation verdict certainty in Phase 1, I did not include defendant evidence as a potential 
moderator in the following analyses.  An ANOVA with instruction, regulatory focus, 
claim type, and plaintiff evidence as a covariate resulted in  a main effect of regulatory 
focus, F (1, 141) = 5.06, p = .03, partial η2 = .03, in which promotion focused participants 
were more certain of their verdict for the plaintiff than prevention focused individuals. 
There was also a main effect of plaintiff evidence, F (1, 141) = 94.77, p = .001, partial η2 
= .40.  There were no significant two-way interactions or three way interactions, all Fs < 
3.38 and all ps > .08. The four way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, 
claim type, and plaintiff evidence was significant, F (1, 141) = 4.16, p = .04, partial η2 = 
.03.  
To better understand the four way interaction, I split the data first split by claim type 
and performed separate ANOVAs, predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, 
regulatory focus, and plaintiff evidence separately for retaliation only and discrimination 
and retaliation conditions. For participants only making a retaliation decision, there was a 
significant three-way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, and plaintiff 
evidence, F (1, 70) = 5.80, p = .02, partial η2 = .08. This interaction was not present for 
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participants who decided both discrimination and retaliation claims, F(1, 70)  = .35 and p 
= .55.  
Using only participants who decided a retaliation claim, I next split the data according 
to the regulatory focus condition. There was only a significant interaction between 
instruction and plaintiff evidence for prevention focused participants, F (1, 36) = 5.16, p 
= .03, partial η2 = .12, and not for promotion focused participants, F (1, 36) = 1.19 and p 
= .28. Figure 15 shows that respondents do not weigh plaintiff evidence as much under 
but-for instructions as under mixed motive instructions. Hayes (2013) process moderation 
for participants in the retaliation only condition who were also in the prevention focused 
condition showed significant instruction effects for those who believed the plaintiff 
evidence was strong, t (1, 36) = 2.39, p = .02, LLCI = .36, ULCI = 4.41, but not under 
low, t (1, 36) = -.83, p = .41, and moderate, t (1, 36) = 1.12, p = .27, belief levels. For 
participants who believed the plaintiff’s evidence was strong, they were more likely to 
find for the plaintiff under mixed motive instructions as compared to but-for instructions 
(See Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4: Plaintiff Evidence as a Moderator of Instruction on Retaliation Verdict 
Certainty for Participants in Retaliation Only and Prevention Conditions. 
 
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and strength of evidence. An ANOVA predicting retaliation verdict 
certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and plaintiff evidence showed only 
a main effect for plaintiff evidence, F (1, 113) = 70.79, p < .001, partial η2 = .38. 
Instruction and regulatory focus were not significant, Fs < .82 and ps > .44. A second 
ANOVA adding all interactions again resulted in only one  significant effect,  for plaintiff 
evidence, F (1, 108) = 70.85, p < .001, partial η2 = .40. All all other main effects and 
interactions were not significant, all Fs < 2.97 and all ps > .09. 
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discrimination verdict from instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and strength of 
evidence produced a significant model, , χ2(4) = 76.07, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .85 
with main effects for  plaintiff evidence, β = 1.60 (SE = .43), Wald  = 14.02, p < .001, 
LLCI = 2.14, ULCI = 11.44, and a marginally significant effect of defendant evidence, β 
= -.61 (SE = .32), Wald  = 3.64, p = .06, LLCI = .29, ULCI = 1.02. No other effects were 
significant, all ps > .10. A second forced entry binary logistic regression adding  all 
interactions to the main effect model was also significant overall,  χ2(11) = 86.57, p = 
.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .89, but without  significant main effects or interactions, all ps > 
.07. No further analyses were needed.  
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction. regulatory focus 
manipulation, and strength of evidence. A forced entry binary logistic regression 
predicting discrimination verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and strength of evidence was significant overall, χ2(5) = 108.61 p = .001, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .80. There were main effects of plaintiff evidence, β = 1.44 (SE = .29), 
Wald  = 24.25, p < .001, LLCI = 2.37, ULCI = 7.44, and defendant evidence, β = -.46 
(SE = .23), Wald  = 4.08, p = .04, LLCI = .40, ULCI = 1.00. Instruction and regulatory 
focus were not significant, ps > .23.  A second binary logistic adding  all interactions to 
the first model produced a significant model, χ2(17) = 127.17, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.88, but there were no main effects or interactions, all ps > .80.  
Previous employment decisions as a moderator.  
Predicting retaliation verdict by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic 
regression predicting retaliation verdict from instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
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manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment decisions 
failed to produce a significant  overall model, χ2(4) =4.76, p = .31, Nagelkerke R2 = .04 
and there were no main effects, all ps > .12. The same model adding all interactions again 
failed to produce a significant model, χ2(15) =17.62, p = .28, Nagelkerke R2 = .14. There 
was, however, a significant main effect of claim type, β = -4.89 (SE = 2.32), Wald  = 
4.45, p = 03, LLCI = .00, ULCI = .71, in which participants only deciding a retaliation 
claim were more likely to find for the plaintiff as compared to participants deciding both 
a discrimination and retaliation claim. There was also a significant two-way interaction 
between claim type and regulatory focus, β = 8.14 (SE = 3.27), Wald  = 6.19, p = .01, 
LLCI = 5.63, ULCI = 2092942.13, a significant two-way interaction between claim type 
and previous employment decision, β = 2.79 (SE = 1.42), Wald  = 3.86, p = .049, LLCI = 
1.01, ULCI = 264.59, and a significant three-way interaction between claim type, 
regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions, β = -4.79 (SE = 1.98), Wald  = 
585, p = .02, LLCI = .00, ULCI = .40. All other main effects and interactions were not 
significant, all ps > 12. 
To better explore the significant three-way interaction between regulatory focus, 
claim type, and previous employment decisions, which subsumes the significant two-way 
effects, I divided the sample based on claim type. For participants only deciding a 
retaliation claim, moderation analyses found that the effect of regulatory focus on 
retaliation verdict was not significant for either participants with no previous experience, 
z = -.36, p = .72, LLCI = -1.68, ULCI = 1.16, or participants with previous experience, z 
= .93, p = .35, LLCI = -.64, ULCI = 1.81. However, when looking at participants who 
had to decide both a discrimination and retaliation claim, there was a regulatory focus 
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effect on retaliation verdict for participants who had no experience, z = 1.92, p = .05, 
LLCI = -.03, ULCI = 2.84, but not for participants who had experience, z = -1.45, p = .14, 
LLCI = -2.06, ULCI = .31. Specifically, as seen in Figure 16, prevention focused 
participants with no previous employment decision experience were more likely to find 
for the plaintiff as compared to promotion focused participants with no previous 
experience. Additionally, for prevention focused individuals, the difference between 
participants with and without previous experience is significant β = 2.79 (SE = 1.42), 
Wald  = 3.86, p = .049, LLCI = 1.01, ULCI = 264.59, suggesting that prevention focused 
participants with a background in employment decisions were less willing to risk finding 
for the defendant than those without previous experience. Since this is for a retaliation 
verdict, it is possible that those with previous experience were more aware of the 
differences between the claims and may even have had experience in knowing how 
employers can misuse illegal factors in employment decisions. Promotion focused jurors 
do not show a difference in experience, β = -1.99,  p = .14. 
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Figure 4.5: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for 
Regulatory Focus Predicting Retaliation Verdict for Discrimination and Retaliation 
Condition. 
 
Predicting retaliation verdict by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic 
regression predicting retaliation verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment decisions 
failed to produce a significant  overall model,  χ2(4) =2.20, p = .70, Nagelkerke R2 = .02 
or any predictor effects,  all ps > .31. A second forced entry binary logistic regression 
adding all the interactions to the main effect model was also not significant,  χ2(11) 
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=12.29, p = .34, Nagelkerke R2 = .13, and there were no significant main effects or 
interactions, all ps > .08.  
Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by instruction, claim type, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and employment decision. An one-way ANOVA examined the role of 
instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions (as a 
covariate) on retaliation verdict certainty yielding only a n effect of instruction, F (1, 148) 
= 4.80, p = .03, partial η2 = .03, but no other main effects or interactions significant, all 
Fs < .1.37 and all ps > .24. The same  ANOVA model adding all the interactions resulted 
in no significant main effects, all Fs < 2.80 and all ps > .10, but there was a significant 
two-way interaction between claim and regulatory focus, F (1, 141) = 9.37, p = .003, 
partial η2 = .06, and a significant three-way interaction between claim, regulatory focus, 
and previous employment decision experience, F (1, 141) = 10.27, p = .002, partial η2 = 
.07. No other interactions were significant, all Fs < 2.71 and all ps > .10 
 After splitting the data on claim type, I performed moderation analyses on the two-
way interaction between regulatory focus and previous employment decision experience 
to find  regulatory focus effects for respondents with no previous experience deciding 
only on the retaliation claim, t (1, 74) = -1.13, p = .26, LLCI = -2.61, ULCI = .72, but not 
for those with previous experience, t (1, 74) = 1.53, p = .13, LLCI = -.35, ULCI = 2.73. 
For participants who had to decide both a discrimination and retaliation claim and had no 
previous experience regulatory focus produced a marginal effect, t (1, 75) = 1.96, p = .05, 
LLCI = -.03, ULCI = 4.23, while the effect was not significant for those with previous 
employment experience,  t (1, 75) = -1.23 , p = .22, LLCI = -2.88, ULCI = .69.  
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As seen in Figure 4.6, the pattern of the moderation is the same as it was for 
retaliation verdict, in that those with no previous employment decision experience are 
more certain in their verdict for the defendant under prevention focus than those in 
promotion focus. For prevention focused participants, the difference between those with 
and without experience is significant, F (2, 70) = 9.23, p  = .003, partial η2 = .12. That is, 
for prevention focused jurors, those who have previous employment decision experience 
are more certain in finding for the plaintiff, while those without previous experience are 
more certain in finding for the defendant, but only when they have to decide two claims, 
as opposed to one. Promotion focused jurors did not significantly differ based on 
previous experience, F (1, 71) = 1.96, p = .17, partial η2 = .03.  
Figure 4.6: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for 
Regulatory Focus Predicting Retaliation Verdict Certainty for Discrimination and 
Retaliation Condition. 
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Predicting retaliation verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. An one-way ANOVA testing the role 
of instruction, claim type, regulatory focus, and previous employment decisions (as a 
covariate) on retaliation verdict certainty failed to produce any  significant effects, all Fs 
< .62 and all ps > .54. A second ANOVA using the same model but adding all the 
interactions, again produced  no significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 2.91 and 
all ps > .09.   
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by instruction, regulatory focus 
manipulation, and employment decision. An ANOVA on discrimination verdict certainty 
with instruction and regulatory focus serving as factors and experience with previous 
employment decisions as a covariate resulted in only a marginally significant effect of 
instruction, F (1, 73) = 3.57, p = .06, partial η2 = .05. No other main effects were 
significant (all Fs < .50 and all ps > .48). A second ANOVA adding the interactions 
between the main effects produced no significant effects, all Fs < .2.70 and all ps > .10.  
Predicting discrimination verdict by instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and 
previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting 
discrimination verdict from instruction, regulatory focus manipulation, and whether 
participants had ever made previous employment decisions produced a significant model 
, χ2(3) = 10.54 p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .17. There was a main effect of instruction, β = 
1.09 (SE = .49), Wald  = 4.93, p = .03, LLCI = 1.14, ULCI = 7.78, but regulatory focus 
and previous employment decisions were not significant, ps > .07. A second forced entry 
binary logistic regression using the same model adding the interactions was significant, , 
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χ2(7) = 14.51, p = .04, Nagelkerke R2 = .23, but no significant main effects or interactions 
resulted, all ps > .21.  
Predicting discrimination verdict by three-level instruction. regulatory focus 
manipulation, and previous employment decisions. A forced entry binary logistic 
regression predicting discrimination verdict from the three-level instruction, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and whether participants had ever made previous employment 
decisions produced an overall significant model,  χ2(4) = 9.84 p = .04, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.12 but without significant  predictor effects, all ps > .07. A second binary logistic 
regression adding all the interactions produced a non-significant model, χ2(11) = 17.83, p 
= .09, Nagelkerke R2 = .19, without any significant  main effects or interactions, all ps > 
.07.  
Predicting discrimination verdict certainty by three-level instruction, regulatory 
focus manipulation, and previous employment decisions. An ANOVA predicting 
discrimination verdict certainty with three-level instruction, regulatory focus, and 
previous employment decisions as a covariate failed to find any significant effects, all Fs 
< 1.88 and all ps > .16. A second one-way ANOVA adding the interactions from the first 
model also failed to produce significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 2.37 and all 
ps > .10. 
Study 2 Discussion 
Study 2 sought to examine the same hypotheses as Study 1 with the addition of 
Hypothesis 1b, which states there will be weaker instruction effects due to the fact that 
the retaliatory event was a denial of promotion as compared to the firing in the first study.  
The hypotheses were partially supported.  
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Results supported Hypothesis 1, participants using but-for instruction reached 
more pro-defendant verdicts than participants using mixed motive instructions, for 
retaliation verdict certainty, discrimination verdict, and discrimination verdict certainty 
but not for retaliation verdict. That is, participants using but-for instruction, as compared 
to mixed motive were more likely to find for the defendant for the discrimination claim 
and were also more certain of a verdict for the defendant for retaliation verdict certainty 
and discrimination verdict certainty.   
Moderation analyses exploring these results showed that type of causality 
instruction moderated the effect of the defendant’s use of the rehiring policy to make 
employment decisions on retaliation verdict. Participants using but-for instructions 
showed no effect of whether they believed the defendant was motivated by the rehiring 
policy, while participants using mixed motive instructions were influenced by the 
rehiring policy motivation. Specifically, if participants strongly believed the defendant 
relied on its rehiring policy (a legitimate reason for its actions) then they were more 
likely to find for the defendant, whereas if they did not believe the defendant used the 
rehiring policy they were more likely to find for the plaintiff. This is in-line with how 
participants should have used the instructions, namely, if they believe the defendant used 
a legitimate reason under but-for instructions, then they should find for the defendant. 
Under mixed motive instructions the law allows participants to find for the plaintiff even 
if there is a legitimate reason that used as well as an illegitimate reason. This same 
moderation shaped participants judgments when they determined only a retaliation claim, 
as compared to those determining both discrimination and retaliation claims. The 
moderation effects showed the same pattern such that rehiring policy did not influence 
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decisions under but-for instructions but did influence decisions under mixed motive 
instructions. Additionally, perceived strength of plaintiff evidence moderated the 
relationship between instruction and retaliation verdict certainty. Participants using mixed 
motive instructions were more certain of their verdicts for the plaintiff if they believed 
the plaintiff had strong evidence, as opposed to weak evidence. There was no difference 
in retaliation verdict certainty for participants using but-for instructions regardless of the 
strength of the plaintiff’s evidence.  
Hypothesis 1a predicted that participants using mixed motive instructions for a 
discrimination claim and but-for instructions for a retaliation claim would more closely 
follow the but-for instructions for both claims. None of the results of the full model 
analyses from Phase 1 or Phase 2 supported this hypothesis. There was only one 
significant effect involving the three-level instruction on discrimination verdict in which 
participants using only but-for instructions rendered verdicts for the defendant 
significantly more than participants using mixed motive instructions. There was, 
however, no difference between the two-instruction condition as compared to either the 
but-for only or mixed motive only instruction conditions.  
 Unfortunately Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, concerning chronic regulatory 
focus and regulatory fit, were untested because the chronic regulatory focus measure, 
again (as in Study 1) could not differentiate participants as either prevention or promotion 
focused.  I take this failure up in greater detail in the general discussion.  
Hypothesis 4, participants using but-for instructions would show the strongest 
effects of the regulatory focus manipulation, failed to gain support as there were no 
interactions between regulatory focus and instruction. However, there were some effects 
 146 
of manipulated regulatory focus that are in line with that theory. There was a main effect 
of regulatory focus on discrimination verdicts such that prevention focused participants 
were more likely to find for the plaintiff than promotion focused jurors. Moderation 
analyses also found that previous employment decision experience moderated the 
relationship of regulatory focus on retaliation verdict for participants who had to decide 
both a discrimination and retaliation claim. For participants who had no previous 
experience making such decisions (including firing or promoting employees), they were 
more likely to find for the defendant when they were prevention focused, while 
participants who were promotion focused were more likely to find for the plaintiff when 
they had no experience. Prevention focused participants additionally showed significant 
effects for between previous employment decision experience so that if they had previous 
experience they were more likely to find for the plaintiff than if they did not have that 
experience. This suggests that prevention focused individuals who understand the 
decision making process are less willing to risk a defendant verdict against retaliation, 
perhaps because they have experienced other employers bringing illegal factors into 
employment decisions. The same pattern of moderation occurred under retaliation verdict 
certainty, such that no previous experience led to more pro-defendant certainty under 
prevention and more pro-plaintiff certainty under mixed motive instructions but only in 
the two-claim condition.  
  Study 3 will expand this research to examine the role that legal standard and 
regulatory focus influence employment decisions of firing and promoting.  
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Chapter 5: Study 3 
Study 3: Regulatory Focus, Causality and Employment Decisions 
The third study moves out of the courtroom and examines the interactive 
influence of type of legal causality and the role of regulatory focus on employer decisions 
to promote or fire an employee.  No research has examined when and why employer 
retaliation occurs. Regulatory focus offers a clear motivational theory of why employers 
choose to retaliate despite being aware that this action is illegal. The correct decision 
outcome in this study is to promote the best employee or to fire the worst one. The 
question of interest is, “What happens when the most qualified employee brings a claim 
of discrimination against the company?” 
Measures and Materials. 
Chronic Regulatory Focus. Participants first completed the same measure of 
regulatory focus as in studies 1 and 2.  Ideal rating M = 2.56, SD =  .69; Ought rating M = 
2.95, SD = .68; Ideal reaction time M = 82.15, SD  =  51.10; Ought reaction time M  = 
84.00, SD  = 52.71 (Appendix A). 
Employment Decision Frame. Participants learned that their company wanted to 
either dismiss or promote someone and that their role was to review the resumes and 
recommend whom to dismiss/promote. The promotion framed decision informed 
participants that it was their job to promote (fire) the best (worst) employee in a way that 
satisfies them because it means they completed their job and achieved the best possible 
outcome for the hospital that employs them.  The prevention framed decision informed 
the participants that it was their job to avoid the dissatisfaction that comes from knowing 
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they improperly completed their job and promoted (fired) the wrong employee leading to 
a subpar outcome for the hospital that employs them (Appendix N). 
Resumes. Participants read one of two sets (control v. discrimination complaint) 
of three resumes and accompanying background information on the candidates. For those 
in the control condition, none of the candidates complained of discrimination, while for 
those in the experimental condition, one of the candidate resumes always contained a 
note explaining that he had recently filed a claim against a supervisor alleging 
discrimination based on national origin. A Latin square design was used to ensure that the  
complainer appeared in each position within the packet an equal number of times. 
Additionally, the complainant displayed stronger work evaluations and appeared to be an 
excellent employee (Appendix O).   
Causal Model manipulation. After reading the resumes, participants received a 
policy guide from the University Medical Center concerning employment decisions.  The 
policy guide explained how the hospital makes promotion decisions and how it makes 
dismissal decisions. With regard to employment decisions, the policy guide conveyed the 
current law prohibiting retaliation. It varied whether or not the current law defined 
causality in retaliation using a but-for model  (prohibiting retaliation only if the 
discrimination complaint is the determinative factor for an adverse action) or mixed 
motive framework (prohibiting retaliation even if the decision maker considers the 
discrimination complaint along with other legitimate reasons in making a decision).  The 
policy page informed the participants that all employment decisions should take into 
consideration the Human Resource Department policies.  The policy guide also discussed 
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affirmative action initiatives, workforce reductions, and promotion decisions (See 
Appendix P). 
Decision Condition and Measure. Participants picked one of the three employees 
they would recommend for promotion or one of the three for dismissal depending upon 
the decision condition. Participants also rated their confidence in their decision on an 9-
point scale ranging from 1 (not at all certain) to 9 (very certain). Additionally, 
participants ranked the three applicants in the order in which they would have 
promoted/dismissed each one. Finally, participants also completed measures assessing 
which factors they took into consideration when making their decision. These included: 
application qualifications (M  = 9.02, SD = 2.45), applicant education (M = 2.76, SD = 
2.76), unfavorable qualities of the applicant (e.g. the complaint v. other applicants 
showing up late) (M = 10.22, SD = 2.15) , and favorable qualities of the applicant (M = 
9.89, SD = 1.99) (Appendix Q).  
Causality Manipulation Check. Two questions assessed whether participants 
understood the EEOC/Title VII guidelines concerning retaliation in the workplace based 
on type of causality. These questions were: 1) “Retaliation occurs only if the 
discrimination complaint was the determinative factor in an adverse decision.”….(true, 
false, note specified) (but for)  and 2) “Retaliation occurs even if the discrimination 
complaint played only a role in the adverse decision along with other legitimate 
factors…” (true, false, not specified). (mixed motive)  (Appendix R).  
Demographics. Demographic questions were the same as those in Study 1 and 
Study 2 (Appendix H). 
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Research Design and Procedure. Study 3 is a 2 (Framing manipulation: 
promotion v.  prevention) x 2 (Resumes: control v. complained of discrimination) x 2 
(Employment decision: promote v. fire) x 2 (Retaliation Causality: but-for v. mixed 
motive) between subjects design with chronic prevention and promotion as continuous 
variables. Participants were 316 community members recruited from Mechanical Turk.  
All measures were programed in Qualtrics. 
In line with studies 1 and 2, the program directed the Mechanical Turk 
participants to the survey and informed them that they needed to complete the study 
within 3 days of accepting the invitation and that they needed to complete the work in 
one sitting.  Participants read and agreed to the informed consent and then completed the 
chronic regulatory focus measure. Next they reviewed the employment decision task with 
the three resumes. After reading the resumes, participants read the employment decision 
guidelines and then rated what factors they took into consideration when deciding who to 
promote and who to let go. Participants then recommended which employee to promote 
(let go).  Next, they completed the manipulation checks and demographic questionnaire. 
Finally, participants read a debriefing statement, a thank you statement for donating their 
time, and received $1 for completing the survey. 
Participants. As with studies 1 and 2, only participants who were 18 or older and 
a U.S. citizen were able to see the survey on Mechanical Turk. Seventeen of the 332 
community member participants showed response times that were 2 or more standard 
deviations above or below the mean response time. I dropped these participants, as well 
as another  who provided no employment decision (the primary dependent variable), and 
one more who had  not completed the regulatory focus measure. Of the  final 316 
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participants,  54.3% were women,  the mean age of the sample was  35.38, and 77.9%  
were employed at least part-time. The ethnic breakdown of the participants was 
representative of the Mturk community with 81% European American, 6.6% African 
American, 4.4% Asian American, 3.5% Hispanic, 1.9% Native American, 1.3% Latino/a, 
1.6% Other, and .3% Middle Eastern. Fifty seven percent of participants had at least a 
college degree, 33.2% had some college, 9.2% had a high school diploma, and .6% had 
less than a high school diploma. Lastly, 52.2% of participants indicated that they had 
been in an employment position in which they made hiring or firing decisions.  
Results 
 The results of Study 3 will appear in 3 phases. Phase 1 includes preliminary 
analyses of the experimental task testing overall differences in decisions about and 
rankings of candidates based on main effects of non-manipulated variables. Phase 2 
displays results of the full model analyses on the dependent variables using the 2 
(Framing manipulation: promotion v.  prevention) x 2 (Resumes: control v. complained 
of discrimination) x 2 (Employment decision: promote v. fire) x 2 (Retaliation causality: 
but-for v. mixed motive) between subjects design. Finally, Phase 3 tests for moderation 
or mediation based on viable moderators and mediators from Phase 1 analyses.  
 Dependent variables. The three dependent variables for study 3 are the decision, 
the certainty of their decision, and how they ranked the target resume for the decision. A 
dichotomous decision variable was created in which dismissal or failure to promote the 
target resume was 0 and not dismissing or promotion of the target resume was 1. This 
factor differentiates between a retaliatory action and a non-retaliatory action. One 
hundred and seventy  participants (53.8%) chose the retaliatory action while 146 (46.2%) 
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of participants chose the non-retaliatory action.  The second dependent variable ranges 
from -8 (very certain in dismissing/not promoting) to 8 (very certain of not 
dismissing/promoting) with a middle value of 0 (uncertain of decision) (M  = .35, SD = 
5.40).  Finally, the third dependent variable, the rank of the target resume, simply looks at 
whether the target resume was ranked most likely for the decision (1; N = 107), second 
most likely (2; N  = 119), or least likely (3; N = 90) in terms of a favorable decision . I 
transformed this variable so that a target rated last for being dismissed and a target rated 
first for being promoted are both scored 1 because they are both the most favorable 
outcome. Similarly a target that rated first for being dismissed and a target last for being 
promoted are both 3 because they are both the least favorable outcome. Middle rankings 
were scored 2.  
 Phase 1: Preliminary Analyses of Decision and Rank of Candidates 
 Manipulation checks. As with studies 1 and 2, an index of accuracy in 
understanding the instructions was created and coded as 1 for correctly answering the 
manipulation checks and 0 for incorrectly answering the manipulation checks. Accuracy 
was slightly lower in this study with only 66.5% of participants correctly answering the 
manipulation check. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting accuracy from 
instruction condition produced a significant model, χ2(1) = 6.49, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.03 with instruction significantly predicting accuracy, β = -.61 (SE = .24), Wald  = 6.39, p  
= .01, LLCI = .34, ULCI = .87. Specifically, participants who received the but-for 
instructions in the policy manual were more accurate in their understanding of the 
instructions than those who received mixed motive instructions (See Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1: Instruction Accuracy by Instruction Condition 
  
Inaccurate 
 
Accurate 
 
Total 
  
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
But-for  
 
 
42 
 
26.8 
 
115 
 
73.2 
 
157 
 
100 
Mixed Motive  
 
64 40.3 95 59.7 159 100 
Total 106 33.5 210 66.5 316 100 
 
A force entry binary logistic regression testing the influence of accuracy on the 
decision dependent variable  was not significant, χ2(1) = 2.07, p = .15, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.01 and accuracy was not a significant predictor of decision, β = .34 (SE = .24), Wald  = 
2.07, p  = .15, LLCI = .88, ULCI = 2.25. A one-way ANOVA showed that accuracy did 
not predict decision certainty, F(1, 314) = 3.21, p = .08, partial η2 = .01. Lastly, a one-
way ANOVA showed that accuracy did not predict participants ranking of the resumes, 
F(1, 314) = .90, p = .34, partial η2 = .003. 
Motivational analyses. A forced entry binary logistic regression assessed which 
motivational factors (application qualifications, application education, favorable qualities 
of applicant, and unfavorable qualities of application) were influential in decision 
making, The model was marginally significant, χ2(4) = 9.37, p = .052, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.04, with only one significant factor, the participants who were not motivated by the 
applicants qualifications, β = -.21 (SE = .08), Wald  = 7.72, p  = .01, LLCI = .70, ULCI = 
.9 were less likely to dismiss or not promote the target resume. The applicant’s education, 
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β = .09, p  = .17, favorable qualities, β = .02, p  = .74, and unfavorable qualities, β = .04, 
p  = .50, did not significantly influence decisions.   
A one-way ANOVA tested the influence of motivating factors on decision 
certainty. Only the applicant’s qualifications predicted certainty, F(1, 270) = 2.13, p = 
.02, partial η2 = .08, in that participants who were more motivated by the applicant’s 
qualifications were more certain in an unfavorable decision towards the target resume 
(either more certain in firing or more certain in not promoting). No other motivating 
factors were significant, all Fs < .82 and all ps > .62. A second one-way ANOVA testing 
applicant rank found that none of the motivating factors significantly predicted rank, all 
Fs < 1.36 and all ps > .20. 
Trait regulatory focus analyses. Trait regulatory focus again failed to produce 
analyzable data due to a failure of the regulatory focus measure to differentiate between 
promotion and prevention focused individuals. Specifically, the reaction times did not 
correlate with the ratings of the traits, even after several transformations to correct for 
deviations for normality. As in the previous studies, individuals who rated themselves 
high in ideal/promotion traits also significantly rated themselves high in ought/prevention 
traits (Pearson r = .32, p = .001). This suggests that the measure was not sensitive enough 
to parse out participants’ trait regulatory focus.  
Phase 2: Full Model Analyses. 
Predicting decision by instruction, regulatory focus, complaint type, and 
decision type. A forced entry binary logistic regression predicting decision to not dismiss 
(promote) the target candidate by instruction ( 0 = but-for, 1 = mixed motive), decision 
type (0 = dismiss, 1 = promote), regulatory focus (0= prevention, 1 = promotion), and 
 155 
complaint (0 = no complaint, 1 = complaint) produced an overall significant model, χ2(4) 
= 43.48, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .17, with only the decision condition significantly 
predicting  the final decision, β = -1.53 (SE = .24), Wald  = 39.54, p  < .001, LLCI = .13, 
ULCI = .35. Participants in the dismissal condition were less likely to make an 
unfavorable decision towards the target resume as compared to participants in the 
promotion condition. Specifically, participants in the dismissal condition were less likely 
to dismiss the target resume, while participants in the promotion condition were more 
likely to not promote the target resume (See Table 5.2). Instruction, β = .18, p  = .45, 
regulatory focus, β = .10, p  = .68, and complaint condition, β = -.02, p  = .93, did not 
significantly influence decisions.   
Table 5.2: Decision Condition by Decision  
  
Dismiss Target/Not 
Promote Target 
 
Not Dismiss 
Target/Promote Target 
 
Total 
  
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
 
Dismissal 
Condition 
 
 
43 
 
27.7 
 
112 
 
72.3 
 
155 
 
100 
Promotion 
Condition 
 
103 64 58 36 161 100 
Total 146 46.2 170 53.8 316 100 
 
A second forced entry binary logistic regression adding all the interactions 
between the four manipulated variables to the first model was not significant, χ2(14) = 
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49.81, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .19, again with only decision condition predicting 
employment decision, β = -2.10 (SE = .72), Wald  = 8.51, p  = .004, LLCI = .03, ULCI = 
.50. No other main effects or interactions were significant, all ps > .07.  
Predicting decision certainty by instruction, decision condition, regulatory 
focus, and complaint condition. An ANOVA predicting decision certainty by 
instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, and complaint condition found that only 
decision condition significantly predicted the employment decision, F(1, 300) = 43.53, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .13. Participants who made a dismissal decision were more certain of 
their favorable decision to not dismiss the target while participants in the promotion 
condition were more certain of their unfavorable decision to not promote the target (See 
Figure 5.1). No other main effects or interactions were significant, all Fs < 2.06 and all ps 
> .15.  
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Figure 5.1: Decision Condition on Decision Certainty
 
Predicting resume rank by instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, 
and complaint condition. An  ANOVA predicting rank of target by instruction, decision 
condition, regulatory focus, and complaint condition found no significant main effects or 
interactions, all Fs < 2.09 and all ps > .15.  
Phase 4: Moderation Analyses 
 Based on Phase 1 results, I tested employee qualifications and previous 
employment decision experience as a potential moderators for decision and decision 
certainty.  
Predicting decision by instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus 
manipulation, complainant condition, and applicant qualification motivation. A forced 
entry binary logistic regression predicting decision from instruction, decision condition, 
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regulatory focus, complaint condition, and the applicant’s qualifications as a motivating 
factor produced a significant model,  χ2(5) = 43.91, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .17.with 
only decision condition as a significant predictor β = -1.46 (SE = .25), Wald  = 33.90, p = 
.001, LLCI = .14, ULCI = .38. Instruction (β = .17, p = .48), regulatory focus (β = .08, p 
= .74), complaint condition (β = -.02, p = .92), and applicant qualification (β = -.05, p = 
.30) were not significant.  A second forced entry binary added the interactions and 
resulted in  a significant  overall model, χ2(26) = 58.18, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .22. 
The main effect of decision dropped out  (β = -1.55, p = .51)  but there was a marginally 
significant effect of instruction, β = -2.97 (SE = .1.59), Wald  = 3.47, p = .06, LLCI = 
.002, ULCI = 1.17. Specifically, participants using but-for instructions were more likely 
to make favorable decisions towards the target applicant as compared to participants 
using mixed motive instructions. No further moderation analyses were necessary.  
Predicting decision certainty by instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus 
manipulation, complainant condition, and applicant qualification motivation. An 
ANOVA predicting decision certainty with instruction, decision condition, regulatory 
focus, complaint condition, and applicant qualifications as a covariate tested the potential 
moderating role of applicant qualifications on decision certainty yielded only a main 
effect of decision condition, F (1, 298) = 36.50, p < .001, partial η2 = .12. Participants  
making a dismissal were more certain in their decision not to dismiss the target applicant 
as compared to those considering a promotion who were more certain in their decision 
not to promote the target applicant. All other main effects and interactions were not 
significant, all Fs <2.23 and all ps > .14.  
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A second ANOVA, that repeated this analysis adding in all the interactions of the 
main effects produced no significant main effects, two-way interactions, or three-way 
interactions, all Fs <2.46 and all ps > .12. There was a significant four-way interaction 
between instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, and complaint condition, F(1, 
283) = 6.21, p = .013, partial η2 = .02, and a significant five-way interaction between 
instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, complaint condition, and applicant 
qualifications, F(1, 283) = 5.01, p = .03, partial η2 = .02.  
To further explore the significant five way interaction, I split the data file  by 
instruction and conducted an ANOVA on decision certainty using decision condition, 
regulatory focus, complaint decision, and applicant qualifications as factors. For 
participants that received mixed motive instructions there were no significant effects, all 
Fs < 3.15 and all ps > .08. Participants using but-for instructions showed a significant 
three-way interaction between regulatory focus, decision condition, and complaint 
condition, F(1, 141) = 6.41, p = .012, partial η2 = .04, and a significant four-way 
interaction between regulatory focus, decision condition, complaint condition, and 
applicant qualification, F(1, 141) = 5.56, p = .02, partial η2 = .04. Only participants who 
received but-for instructions were kept in analyses going forward.  
Next, an ANOVA predicting decision certainty by regulatory focus, complaint 
condition, and applicant qualifications with participants considering a dismissal decision 
resulted in no significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 2.44 and all ps > .12. 
However, for participants making a promotion decision this model produced had a 
significant two-way interaction of regulatory focus and complaint condition, F(1, 73) = 
3.98, p = .05, partial η2 = .05, and a marginally significant three-way interaction between 
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regulatory focus, complaint condition, and applicant qualifications, F(1, 73) = 3.76, p = 
.056, partial η2 = .05. Only participants who received but-for instructions and made 
promotion decisions were kept in the analyses going forward.  
I once again split the remaining data set, this time by regulatory focus and found no 
effects for promotion focused participants, all Fs < .55 and all ps > .46, but for prevention 
focused participants I found a significant main effect of complaint condition, F(1, 37) = 
4.52, p = .04, partial η2 = .11 , and a significant two-way interaction for complaint 
condition by applicant qualifications, F(1, 37) = 4.28, p = .046, partial η2 = .10.  
Next I conducted moderation analyses using Hayes’ process program (2013) with 
participants who received but-for instructions, considered a promotion decision, and who 
were prevention focused.  Following the Johnson-Neyman Technique there was 
moderation was found at low levels of application qualification motivation, t (1, 37) = -
2.11, p = .04, LLCI = -17.04, ULCI = -.33, but not at moderate, t (1, 37) = -.49, p = .62, 
LLCI = -3.83, ULCI = 2.32, or high levels of application qualification motivation, t 
(1,37) = .26, p = .26, LLCI = -1.94, ULCI = 6.84. Figure 5.2 shows that for participants 
in the control condition, applicant qualification did influence decision certainty in that 
those who were less motivated by applicant qualification were more certain in their 
decision to promote the target applicant than those in the complaint condition. It is 
interesting that all participants were certain of not promoting the target applicant in the 
discrimination complaint condition – an action that would be considered retaliation as the 
target applicant did complain about discrimination.  
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Figure 5.2: Applicant Qualification as a Moderator for Complaint Condition on 
Decision Certainty for Participants using But-For Instructions, Making a Promotion 
Decision, and Prevention focused. 
 
Predicting decision by instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus 
manipulation, complainant condition, and previous employment decisions. a forced 
entry binary logistic regression predicting decision by instruction, decision condition, 
regulatory focus, complaint condition, and previous decisions assed potential moderating 
role of having made previous employment decisions about hiring and firing. The model 
was significant, χ2(5) = 44.28, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .17 but produced only a main 
effect of decision condition, β = -1.52 (SE = .24), Wald  = 38.52, p < .001, LLCI = .14, 
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regression that added in all the interactions again produced a significant model, χ2(31) = 
73.02, p = .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .28, but one without any significant main effects or 
interactions, all ps > .22. No additional moderation analyses were necessary.  
Predicting decision certainty by instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus 
manipulation, complainant condition, and previous employment decisions. A one-way 
ANOVA predicting decision certainty by instruction, decision condition, regulatory 
focus, complaint condition, and previous employment decisions as a covariate tested a 
main effects model and resulted in a main effect of decision condition, F(1, 299) =42.35, 
p = .001, partial η2 = .12, but no other main effects or interactions were significant, all Fs 
< 1.99 and all ps > .16.  
A second one-way ANOVA adding all interactions to the first model again produced 
a significant effect of decision condition, F(1, 284) =5.56, p = .02, partial η2 = .02, as 
well as a significant effect of regulatory focus, F(1, 284) =4.71, p = .03, partial η2 = .02. 
With regard to regulatory focus, promotion focused individuals were more certain in their 
favorable decisions towards the target applicant than prevention focused individuals. 
There were also two significant two-way interactions, the first between regulatory focus 
and previous employment decision experience, F(1, 284) =4.69, p = .03, partial η2 = .02,  
and the second between instruction and regulatory focus, F(1, 284) =5.78, p = .02, partial 
η2 = .02. There was also a marginally significant two-way interaction between decision 
condition and regulatory focus, F(1, 284) =3.54, p = .06, partial η2 = .01. Finally, there 
was a significant three way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, and 
previous employment decision experience, F(1, 284) = 3.91, p = .049, partial η2 = .01.  
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 Since instruction type moderated the two-way interaction between regulatory 
focus and previous employment decision experience, I split the data into promotion and 
prevention focused participants and performed moderation analyses to interpret the three-
way interaction. The effect of employment decision experience was not significant for 
prevention focused participants, t (1. 152.) = .21, p = .83, LLCI =-3.06, ULCI = 3.79 but 
it was for promotion focused participants, t (1, 156) = 2.38, p = .02, LLCI = .45, ULCI = 
4.87, but not for those with previous experience, t (1, 156)  = -1.08, p = .28, LLCI = -
3.78, ULCI = 1.11 (See Figure 5.3).   
Figure 5.3: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for 
Instruction on Decision Certainty for Promotion Focused Condition.  
 
Predicting rank of target resume by instruction, decision condition, regulatory 
focus manipulation, complainant condition, and previous employment decisions. First 
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regulatory focus, complaint condition, and previous employment decisions as a covariate 
failed to produce any significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 1.99 and all ps > 
.16.  A second ANOVA, repeating the first model  but adding all the interactions 
produced a regulatory focus main effect, F(1, 284) = 16.02, p = .001, partial η2 = .05, in 
which promotion focused participants ranked the target applicant more favorably (M = 
1.93, SD = .06) than prevention focused participants (M = 1.99, SD = .06). There were no 
other main effects, all Fs < 1.05 and all ps > .16.  Significant two-way interactions 
emerged between decision condition and complaint decision, F(1, 284) = 6.36, p = .01, 
partial η2 = .02,  and between decision condition and regulatory focus, F(1, 284) = 6.02, p 
= .02, partial η2 = .02. In addition two three way interactions with previous employment 
decisions emerged, specifically a decision condition x complaint decision x employment 
decision experience interaction, F(1, 284) = 4.79, p = .03, partial η2 = .02, and an 
interaction between decision condition, regulatory focus, and previous employment 
decision experience, F(1, 284) = 4.56, p = .03, partial η2 = .02.  
Moderation analyses to interpret the three-way interaction between complaint 
condition, decision condition, and previous employment decision experience split the file 
on complaint condition. For participants with no previous employment decision 
experience in the control condition (none of the resumes mentioned a discrimination 
complaint) there was significant effect of decision condition on rank of target applicant , t 
(1, 150) = 2.23, p = .03, LLCI = 05, ULCI = .78, but not for those with previous 
experience, t (1, 150) = -.35, p = .73, LLCI = -.41, ULCI = .29. Participants with no 
previous employment decision experience ranked the target applicant more favorably in 
the promotion decision condition as compared to the dismissal decision condition (See 
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Figure 5.4). There was no moderation for participants in the complaint condition, t (1, 
158) = 1.08, p = .28, LLCI = -.22, ULCI = .76.  
Figure 5.4: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for Decision 
Condition on Applicant Rank for Control Participants. 
 
I next conducted moderation analyses to examine the three-way interaction 
between decision condition, regulatory focus, and previous employment decision 
experience by splitting the sample into those who considered dismissing an employee and 
for those considering promoting an employee. For participants deciding whether to 
dismiss an employee, previous employment decision experience did not moderate the 
relationship between regulatory focus and applicant rank, t (1, 151) = 1.46, p = .14, LLCI 
= -.13, ULCI = .86. Participants making promotion decisions who had previous 
experience did show significant effects for regulatory focus, t (1, 157) = -3.71, p = .001, 
LLCI = -.99, ULCI = -.30, as did those without previous experience, t (1, 157) = 2.42, p = 
.02, LLCI = .07, ULCI = .73. Participants who have no previous experience in 
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employment decisions ranked the target applicant less favorably if they were prevention 
focused as compared to those who were promotion focused (See Figure 5.5). Participants 
with previous employment decision experience showed the opposite pattern, ranking the 
target applicant more favorably if they were in the prevention focused as compared to 
promotion focused condition.  
Figure 5.5: Previous Employment Decision Experience as a Moderator for 
Regulatory Focus on Applicant Rank for Promotion Decision Condition.  
 
Study 3 Discussion 
 Study 3 examined how instructions and regulatory focus would influence 
simulated employment decisions predicated on the different types of instruction 
conditions. Unfortunately, the data failed to support the hypotheses, which anticipated 
main effects and interactions between instruction, regulatory focus, the employment 
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decision (dismiss v. promote) and the presence of a discrimination complaint (control v. 
complaint) on the simulated decisions.  
 Hypothesis 1c posited that participants reacting to but-for instructions would be 
more likely to retaliate than participants responding to mixed motive instructions. There 
were no main effects of instruction on any of the dependent variables.  The four-way 
interaction between instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, and complaint 
moderated the one instruction effect that did emerge. Specifically, for prevention focused 
participants who used but-for instructions while determining a promotion decisions, if 
they were not motivated by applicant qualification they were more certain in making an 
unfavorable decision towards the target applicant if the applicant had complained as 
compared to if they had not complained. This suggests that even though the actual 
decision was not significant, the certainty of the decision bordered on retaliation.  
 Hypothesis 3 stated that promotion focused participants would be more likely to 
retaliate than prevention focused jurors because of the tendency chronically promotion 
focus to facilitate the acceptance of risk in order to achieve a goal. The results did not 
support this hypothesis.  Moderation analyses did show that promotion focused 
participants who had previous employment decision experience were more certain in 
making unfavorable decisions for the target applicant, but this never occurred solely for 
the target applicant who had complained of discrimination. Therefore, no retaliation was 
observed.  
Hypothesis 3a, based on work by Charness and Levine (2010), anticipated finding 
more retaliation when participants made promotion decisions as compared to when they 
made dismissal decisions.  There was a main effect of decision condition on decision 
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making and decision certainty such that participants who made promotion decisions were 
more likely to not promote the target applicant and more certain in that decision as were 
promotion focused participants making a dismissal decision.  This effect is in the right 
direction but it was independent of complaint condition and therefore was not an instance 
of retaliation. It only suggests that people are more willing to make negative decisions in 
promotion decisions.  
Additionally a moderation analyses did find that for participants in the promotion 
focused condition contemplating a promotion decision, ranked the target applicant more 
favorably provided  they had no previous experience with employment decisions. 
However, when participants had previous experience they ranked the target applicant 
more favorably if they were in the prevention focused condition.  
 Finally, Hypothesis 4 stated that regulatory focus would be most influential under 
but-for instructions. This was partially supported by the moderation analyses that found 
that applicant qualifications moderated certainty in promoting the target applicant for 
prevention focused jurors using but-for instructions.  
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
Review of Hypotheses  
 The results of this research, primarily studies 1 and 2, support some but not all of 
the hypothesized legal decisions.   
 Hypothesis 1 through 1c. In line with previous research (Wiener & Farnum, 
2013; Farnum & Wiener, in press; Wiener & Farnum, in press) the first hypothesis was 
that participants would be more likely to find in favor for the defendant under but-for 
instructions as compared to mixed motive instructions. The results partially replicated 
this effect. For discrimination claims, both Study 1 and Study 2 found the instruction 
disparity in that participants using but-for instructions were more likely to find for the 
defendant while participants using mixed motive instructions were more likely to find for 
the plaintiff.  Further, participants were also more certain of their verdict for the 
defendant under but-for instructions and more certain of a plaintiff verdict under mixed 
motive. There were, however, no main effects of instruction for retaliation verdicts or 
retaliation verdict certainty. One explanation is that participants did not fully understand 
the retaliation claim and thus they may have simply relied on their own intuitions instead 
of reacting to the instructions and evidence. The fact that participants in both Study 1 and 
Study 2 believed national origin was the most important motivating factor in determining 
how the hospital reached its employment decision, lends support to the idea that 
participants were uncertain how to evaluate a retaliation claim. Specifically, the law does 
not directly support national origin of the plaintiff as a determining factor for a retaliation 
claim, instead the question of the causal connection of the plaintiff’s discrimination 
complaint to the employment decision is the direct causal event under consideration. In 
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neither study did the participants rate the plaintiff’s complaint as an important factor in 
determining their retaliation verdict. Additionally, in Study 1 and Study 2 accuracy of 
understanding of instructions was significantly lower for the retaliation claims as 
compared to the discrimination claims. Most importantly, the accuracy of instructions 
significantly predicted retaliation verdict in that those who understood the instructions 
were more pro-plaintiff than those who did not. Furthermore, accuracy did not predict 
discrimination verdicts. It is possible that participants’ confusion about what retaliation as 
evidenced in Study 1 and Study 2 may have influenced their understanding of the task in 
Study 3.  
Hypothesis 1a suggested that participants with the charge of applying two types of 
instructions (mixed motive instructions for the discrimination claim and but-for 
instructions for the retaliation claim) would show a “bleeding over” effect of the but-for 
instructions. That is, they would be more pro-defendant for the discrimination claim as 
compared to those participants who used only mixed-motive instructions. I found no 
support for this possibility. The alternative hypothesis was that through comparison, 
participants might be more sensitive to the differences and adhere more strongly to the 
details of the instructions. This was also not supported. Instead, there was support for the 
mixed motive instructions bleeding over into the use of the but-for instructions. 
Specifically, in Study 1 participants applying both types of instructions were more certain 
of a pro-plaintiff verdict as compared to participants using but-for instructions for both 
retaliation and discrimination claims, though they did not differ from participants using 
only mixed motive instructions. This suggests that participants who used both 
instructions relied on the mixed motive instructions for both claims instead of 
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differentiating between the instructions. One explanation of these Study 1 results, is that 
mixed motive approaches, those instantiating multiple sufficient causal schemas (Kelley, 
1967; Wiener & Keller, 2011) are the default mode of casual judgment so that once 
invoked it becomes the dominant mode of decision making.  
Unfortunately this effect was not replicated in Study 2, though that is in line with 
Hypothesis 1b. Specifically, Hypothesis 1b posited that in a case in which the employer 
denied the plaintiff a promotion (Study 2) there would be weaker instruction effects than 
when the employer fired the plaintiff (Study 1). While there were no main effects for 
instruction in Study 2 there were moderation effects involving instruction for retaliation 
verdict and verdict certainty in analyses of Study 2 data. The data partially supported 
Hypothesis 1b.  
Finally, Hypothesis 1c predicted that but-for causality would lead to more 
retaliation than mixed motive causality in simulated employment decisions (Study 3). 
Unfortunately there were no main effects of causality on any of the dependent variables. 
Two moderation analyses lend some support to the hypothesis but only in highly 
qualified situations. First, there was a 5-way interaction between instruction, decision 
condition, regulatory focus, complaint condition, and applicant qualifications as a 
motivating factor. Moderation was found for prevention focused participants using but-
for instructions to determine a promotion. Specifically, if there was no complaint of 
discrimination, then participants using but-for instructions were influenced by applicant 
qualification in that they were more certain in a favorable decision (not dismissing or 
promoting) than if they did not consider applicant qualification. For participants who had 
a discrimination complaint in the resumes, applicant qualification did not moderate the 
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relationship. Interestingly, Figure 19, which displays the moderation, reveals that for the 
discrimination complaint decision all participants were more certain of making an 
unfavorable decision – which would be retaliation. Second, a three-way interaction 
between instruction, regulatory focus, and previous employment decision experience 
found that for promotion focused jurors, those who had no previous experience were 
more certain of a favorable/non-retaliatory decision under mixed motive than but-for 
instructions. Though there were no direct retaliation effects, these two moderation 
analyses suggests that retaliation may be more likely under but-for instructions. 
In hindsight, it is possible that the reason Hypothesis 1c did not pan out was the 
ecological validity of the task, which explicitly reminded mock employers of the law 
immediately before they made a potentially illegal retaliation decision.  It is likely that 
employers are not reminded of the law immediately before making an employment 
decision. Research on race salience suggests that people made aware of race in a trial are 
more likely to actively work hard to not appear racist (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 
Sommers & Ellswroth, 2003; Cohn, Bucolo, Pride, & Sommers, 2009). Participants may 
have been actively working to avoid retaliating against the target when the resume 
contained discrimination complaint. This is particularly interesting given that interactions 
with complaint condition occurred only in the control condition. The control condition 
participants were not concerned with retaliation and were freer to make decisions as they 
saw fit, whereas their counterparts in the complaint condition did not show any of the 
interaction affects.  On the other hand, there were instruction effects for jurors, who knew 
that it was their job to examine the law at hand and to make their decisions accordingly. 
Thus, the mock jurors showed stronger instruction effects.   
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If saliency of the law is leading to less retaliation, it could offer an intervention 
for employment settings. Specifically it could be mandatory to review the law before 
making any employment decisions. If employers are forced to review discrimination and 
retaliation laws prior to making any employment decisions, they may be less likely to 
make illegal employment decisions.  Future research should test this possibility by 
manipulating the salience of the law to participants.  
 Hypotheses 2 and 2a. Unfortunately, due to a failed measure of regulatory focus, 
hypothesis 2, concerning chronic regulatory focus, could not be analyzed.  When looking 
at manipulated regulatory focus, there were some interesting interactions of regulatory 
focus and instruction. Specifically, in Study 1, participants who were in the prevention 
focus condition (as compared to those in the promotion condition) and had no previous 
experience making employment decisions were more certain of finding for the plaintiff. 
However, under prevention focus, if participants had previous experience making 
employment decisions they were actually less certain of finding for the plaintiff for 
retaliation. It is possible that participants with previous experience understand what goes 
in to making employment decisions and therefore viewed finding for the plaintiff a high 
risk that they wanted to avoid.  
In Study 2, this pattern reversed such that previous employment decisions 
moderated the effect of regulatory focus for participants who made both discrimination 
and retaliation claim judgments. That is, when rendering a retaliation verdict after a 
discrimination verdict, participants who were in the prevention focused condition and had 
no previous employment decision were more likely to find for the defendant as compared 
to those who had experience and those in the promotion focused condition. It is possible 
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that after having already made a discrimination verdict decision that prevention focused 
participants’ assessment of the risk dropped.   
Hypothesis 2a concerned how regulatory fit (the match between chronic 
regulatory focus and manipulated regulatory focus) would lead to different results. 
Because of the failure of the chronic regulatory focus manipulation, I was not able to test 
this hypothesis. Nonetheless, under Hypothesis 2a, promotion focused jurors should have 
overvalued the plaintiff’s evidence in coming to a pro-plaintiff decision, while prevention 
focused participants should have undervalued the defendant’s evidence in reaching a pro-
plaintiff decision (in line with Wiener & Farnum, 2013).  In Study 1, plaintiff evidence 
moderated the relationship of instruction on retaliation verdict for promotion focused 
participants. Promotion focused participants, but not prevention focused participants, who 
believed the plaintiff’s evidence was strong were more likely to find for the plaintiff 
under mixed motive as compared to but-for instructions. Study 2 produced a significant 
four-way interaction between instruction, regulatory focus, claim type, and plaintiff 
evidence. Moderation analyses found that for prevention focused jurors deciding only a 
retaliation claim, those who believed the plaintiff had strong evidence were more certain 
of finding for the plaintiff under mixed motive but not but-for instructions. Thus, Study 1 
supported Hypothesis 2a but Study 2 did not.  
Hypothesis 3 through 3b.  Hypotheses 3 through 3b concerned the simulated 
employment decisions in Study 2. Under Hypothesis 3, participants high in prevention 
focus were expected to be less likely to retaliate than participants high in promotion 
focus. Once again I was unable to test the effects of chronic regulatory focus but there 
was a main effect of regulatory focus as manipulated on decision certainty in which 
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promotion focused participants were more certain of a favorable decision toward the 
target candidate than prevention focused participants. Previous employment decision 
experience moderated the relationship between regulatory focus and decision certainty. 
Participants who had no previous employment decision experience were more certain of a 
favorable decision if they were promotion focused than if they were prevention focused. 
Additionally, for promotion focused participants, those with no experience were more 
certain of a favorable decision than those with previous employment decision making 
experience. There was also a three-way interaction between decision condition, 
regulatory focus, and previous employment decision experience. Moderation analyses 
found that in the dismissal decision condition regulatory focus had no impact, but in the 
promotion decision condition it was significant. For participants with no previous 
experience, prevention focused participants ranked the target resume less favorably than 
did promotion focused participants, while those with previous experience ranked the 
resume more favorable under prevention than promotion focus. It is important to note that 
no actual retaliation occurred, as complaint condition did not interact with regulatory 
focus.  
Hypothesis 3a posited that retaliation was more likely to occur when participants 
were making a promotion decision as compared to a dismissal decision.  This was in line 
with Charness and Levine’s (2010) finding that people see acts of commission, such as 
dismissing someone, more as retaliation than the view acts of omission, such as not 
promoting someone.   Consistent with this earlier research, I found a main effect of 
decision condition (dismiss v. promote) for both the overall decision and decision 
certainty. Participants in the promotion decision condition were more likely to make an 
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unfavorable decision and were more certain of their unfavorable decision as compared to 
participants in the dismissal condition.  Even though retaliation did not occur, participants 
were still significantly more willing to deny promotion to the target applicant than they 
were to dismiss the target applicant. That is, they were more willing to commit an act of 
omission than an act of commission, in line with Charness and Levine (2010).  This 
finding is somewhat consistent with research by Gino and Margolis (2011) who found 
that promotion focused individuals are more likely to act unethically than prevention 
focused individuals. It would be fully consistent if the effect had been found for the 
retaliation condition as well. Perhaps if retaliation concerns were less salient there would 
have been an interaction between decision and complaint condition.  
Finally, Hypothesis 3b expected promotion focused participants to overvalue the 
good work qualities of the applicant who did not complain and for prevention focused 
participants to undervalue the negative aspects of the complainant. Unfortunately, neither 
good nor bad work qualities predicted decision, decision certainty, or resume rank. In 
fact, the only motivating factor that did predict effects on the dependent variables was 
applicant qualification. The moderation analysis that examined the five-way interaction 
between instruction, decision condition, regulatory focus, complaint condition, and 
application qualification found that applicant qualification mattered only if the 
participants were prevention focused using but-for instructions and making a promotion 
decision. Specifically, if participants believed that the applicant’s qualifications were 
low, they were more certain of a favorable decision in the control condition but more 
certain of an unfavorable decision in the complaint condition. This suggests that 
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prevention focused participants using but-for instructions were more likely to retaliate 
when believing the applicant’s qualifications were low.  
Implications for Psychology 
 The findings of the current studies show some encouraging findings that may help 
to explain how jurors and employers make discrimination and retaliation decisions. The 
current studies specifically examined the role of regulatory focus on decision making, 
which bares directly on how people make causal judgments. Kelly (1967) argued that 
most people tend to use “multiple sufficient schemata” when making causal decisions. 
This means that people take into considerations a multitude of factors when making a 
decision, not just one factor. Mixed motive causality allows decision makers, both jurors 
and employers, to use multiple sufficient schemata. They may still find for the plaintiff 
even if there are both illegitimate (such as a discrimination complaint) and legitimate 
reasons for the defendant’s actions (such as an employee who is late often or not a team 
player). However, the law under but-for causality instructions, requires a direct causality 
judgment instead of reliance on a sufficient schema. Though there can be both legitimate 
and illegitimate factors at play under but-for instructions, the illegitimate factor must be 
the determinative, or most influential factor; whereas under mixed motive instructions it 
need only play a contributing role. There is some evidence in the current studies that 
limiting the use of multiple schema by applying but-for instructions encourages 
participants to use regulatory focus in their decision making when determining verdict 
decisions in a retaliation case. There is little evidence that regulatory focus is influential 
in employer decisions of retaliation based on legal causality.  
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 When considering just the role of regulatory focus, independent of legal 
instruction, the current studies revealed some interesting decision making findings.  It 
appears that regulatory focus can influence decisions differently depending on a person’s 
previous experience. One of the most consistent findings in the current research was that 
previous employment decision making experience moderated the influence of regulatory 
focus. Participants who had made employment decisions before showed a different 
pattern than those who had never been faced with these decisions. Namely, prevention 
focused participants, as compared to promotion focused participants, were more likely to 
find for the plaintiff, more certain of finding for the plaintiff, and more likely to make a 
favorable employment decision if they had no previous experience of making 
employment decisions.  When they had previous experience, the results were flipped. 
This suggests the possibility that what is considered a “risk” under regulatory focus may 
hinge upon previous experience with the task at hand. Specifically for those with 
previous experience they may believe the greater risk is keeping an employee who is not 
considered best for the company, whereas those with no previous experience might 
consider risk to be illegally retaliating against an employee. If this is assessment of risk is 
correct, then the current research is in line with research on policy decisions and 
regulatory focus. Botzen, de Boer, and Terpstra (2013) found that prevention focused 
individuals were the most influenced by risk-framed communications and were in turn 
more likely to buy flood insurance than promotion focused individuals. Additional 
research to further explore the definition of risk in employment decisions is needed to 
better understand how it shapes decisions under regulatory focus.  
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Regulatory focus is likely not the only social cognitive model at play in jury or 
employer retaliation decisions. For example, previous work relying on stereotype content 
model (Farnum & Wiener, in press; Wiener & Farnum, in press) has shown that global 
stereotypes concerning social groups is influential in verdict decisions under but-for but 
not mixed motive instructions. Prospect theory, in particular the framing of gains and 
losses, may also explain how jurors and employers use causal instructions (Belton, 
Thomson, and Dhami 2014; Boettcher 2004; Mishra and Fiddick, 2012; Wiest, Raymond, 
& Clawson, 2012). Employers who view dismissing an employee who has complained as 
a gain to the working environment may be more willing to retaliate than an employer 
who views this as a risk to the reputation of the company. In addition, the theory of 
planned behavior (Ajzen & Madden, 1985; Ajzen 1991) would be particularly interesting 
in examine the path that leads employers to retaliate against an employee. The theory of 
planned behavior hypothesizes that intentions are the result of attitudes, subjective norms, 
and perception of behavioral control. Studies examining the manipulation of each of 
these areas would be interesting. For example, researchers might manipulate the 
subjective norms of a company as participants make employment decisions. One might 
instantiate the subjective norm  in a cohesive and positive workplace through 
inspirational posters and anti-discrimination signs that make it clear the company is 
interested in a healthy environment. Conversely, and uncaring with authoritative 
environment might instead feature signs about use of equipment and suggesting that the 
company does seek employee feedback on relationship issues. I anticipate that retaliation 
would be more likely under the less positive environment as mediated through 
participant’s ratings of attitudes and perceptions of behavioral control.  
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Implications for Law 
Previous research found that but-for instructions led to more pro-defendant 
verdicts and that mixed motive instructions lead to more pro-plaintiff instructions, 
regardless of case strength (Wiener & Farnum, 2013; Farnum & Wiener, under review; 
Wiener & Farnum, under review). The current research sought to determine if this would 
replicate with retaliation claims in the context of the recent Supreme Court ruling 
required but for causality for Title VII retaliation claims (Nasssar, 2013). The current 
studies supported this in part but found less influence of instructions on retaliation 
verdicts than hypothesized. This could be because retaliation is different than 
discrimination claims, in line with Sherwyn, Heise, and Eigen (2014), who found that 
employees fared better in retaliation claims than discrimination decisions. The current 
studies did not necessarily find this. There is an argument that retaliation is different but 
it appears that it may hinge on the understanding of what retaliation means to jurors. If 
jurors are more educated on the definition of retaliation it might lead them to use and 
react to differences in causality instructions more than they did in the current studies. 
This is also a serious consideration as the Supreme Court, in their Nassar (2013) 
decision, pointed out that jurors should have no issue differentiating discrimination 
evidence from retaliation evidence and should understand how to make their decision. 
Yet, Studies 1 and 2 found that participants relied on the whether or not the defendant 
considered the plaintiff’s national origin, but not whether the defendant considered the 
plaintiff’s discrimination complaint. It appears that jurors may not be as capable of 
differentiating the evidence for a discrimination complaint from a retaliation complaint as 
the Court assumed and that may help explain why jurors found the retaliation complaint 
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more confusing. This may explain why participants who considered both claims and 
using different instructions were more likely to follow the mixed motive instructions. 
Perhaps those instructions that embrace the use of multiple causal schema felt more 
comfortable to use when considering the retaliation, which the participants found difficult 
to understand.   
These results point to the need for more research  to help explain how jurors 
understand and process retaliation claims in the context of different types of causal 
instructions and the influence of different types of causality models on employer decision 
making. There is some empirical evidence that these instructions can impact 
consequences in a case, and also some evidence that jurors are not as capable of 
considering a retaliation claim especially when coupled with a discrimination claim. 
These facts should be central to discussion going forward on how to treat retaliation 
claims as well as whether to continue using different instructions for claims that could be 
brought in the same case. Empirical analysis has an important role to play in determining 
how to consider defining claims for jurors and the role of causal instructions on liability 
judgments.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 The current studies replicated, in part previous research on the influence of causal 
instructions in civil litigation expanding the topic to include Title VII retaliation claims. 
Regulatory focus theory served as the social cognitive model to help explain decision 
making of jurors and employers. Finally, the current studies expanded research on causal 
instructions into the workplace to explore how the law influences employer decision 
making. One strength of the current research was the use of a national sample of jury-
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eligible participants as opposed to a student sample (Bornstein, 1999; Wiener, Krauss, & 
Lieberman, 2011). Another strength was the use of legally accurate instructions.   
Nonetheless, as is the case with all studies, the current research is not without its 
own limitations. First, future research should utilize a more realistic trial paradigm. For 
Studies 1 and 2 this would involve using a reenacted trial including direct and cross-
examinations, more in-depth descriptions of the jury instructions, and jury deliberations. 
The use of the full-trial experience might increase instruction effects by highlighting the 
differences in the instructions. It is also possible instruction effects might disappear 
within the rich context of a reenacted trial.   Furthermore, regulatory focus may be less 
influential in deliberating jurors.  Finally, deliberation could lead to greater differences 
between a plaintiff who was fired and one who was not promoted by encouraging the 
discussion of the plaintiff’s experience of personal harm.  
Furthermore, research on employer decisions should also utilize a more realistic, 
in-lab paradigm that introduces real consequences and motivation to this simulated 
judgment paradigm. A lab setting where the participants feel like they have true control 
over others and where they must engage with the impact of discrimination may lead to 
more retaliation. Also, a more subtle and less salient manipulation of causal legal 
language might lead to more effects of instruction on retaliation. This is important as 
retaliation does exist in the workplace and creating a realistic environment with more 
power to induce retaliation would better allow researchers to understand why employers 
might engage in that behavior. And of course, this project was unable to test the effects of 
chronic regulatory focus and regulatory fit because of the failure of the chronic regulatory 
measure (Shah & Higgins, 1997).  Future research should add additional methods to 
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assess chronic regulatory focus, trait measures of regulatory focus such as the Lockwood 
Regulatory Focus Scale (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002) or the Composite 
Regulatory Focus Scale (Haws, Dholakia, & Bearden, 2010).  
Conclusion 
 The current research provides some evidence of the influence of both causal legal 
instruction as well as regulatory focus on decisions concerning Title VII retaliation. 
Mock jurors fell more in line with previous research (Wiener & Farnum, 2013; Farnum & 
Wiener, in press; Wiener & Farnum, in press) for discrimination claims, in that but-for 
instructions were more likely to lead to more pro-defendant decisions than mixed motive 
instructions, but the same main effects did not emerge for retaliation claims. An 
unexpected but pervasive finding of the research suggests that jurors, despite receiving 
legally correct instructions, appear to not understand what evidence can and cannot be 
used when making a decision concerning retaliation. Unfortunately, the results from the 
employer study (Study 3) did not find any differences in willingness to retaliate based on 
instruction or regulatory focus. This is likely due to salience of the law and should be 
examined in future research. Overall the current studies lend some support to the role of 
regulatory focus and causal instructions, but also presents a number of exciting future 
directions to better understand how people think about and act in retaliation cases. 
Further research will better help to inform future policies and laws concerning retaliation 
in the workplace.  
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Appendix A 
Chronic Regulatory Focus Measure 
Shah, Higgins, & Friedman (1998) 
 
You are going to be asked to list traits or attributes that describe both your ideal and 
ought self. The traits or attributes that you provide must be different for the two selves. 
After each trait or attribute, you will also be asked to rate the extent to which you believe 
you possess this attribute.  
 
Please list traits or attributes of your Ideal Self. Your ideal self is the type of person you 
ideally would like to be, the type of person you hope, wish, or aspire to be.  
1.  
 
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute? 
1 2 3 4 
Slightly   Extremely 
 
2.  
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute? 
1 2 3 4 
Slightly   Extremely 
 
 
3.  
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute? 
1 2 3 4 
Slightly   Extremely 
 
 
4.  
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute? 
1 2 3 4 
Slightly   Extremely 
 
 
5.  
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute? 
1 2 3 4 
Slightly   Extremely 
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Please list traits or attributes of your Ought Self. Your ought self is the type of person 
you believe it is your duty, obligation, or responsibility to be.  
 
1.  
 
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute? 
1 2 3 4 
Slightly   Extremely 
 
2.  
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute? 
1 2 3 4 
Slightly   Extremely 
 
 
3.  
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute? 
1 2 3 4 
Slightly   Extremely 
 
 
4.  
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute? 
1 2 3 4 
Slightly   Extremely 
 
 
5.  
To what extent do you believe you actually possess this attribute? 
1 2 3 4 
Slightly   Extremely 
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Appendix B 
Case Vignette – Fired (Study 1) 
Based on University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (2013) 
 
 The defendant, University Medical Center, is an academic institution that 
specializes in medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists. 
University Hospital affiliates itself with a number of healthcare facilities including 
Meadowood Memorial Hospital.  The agreement between Meadowood Memorial 
Hospital and the University Medical Center permits medical students to gain real world 
experiences by working in the hospital. As part of its obligations under the agreement, 
Meadowood Memorial Hospital offers staff physician positions to the University’s 
faculty members.  
 The plaintiff, Daren Ahmad, a medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent, 
specializes in internal medicine and infectious diseases. In 1995 the University hired 
Ahmad to work jointly on the University’s faculty and as a staff physician as Meadowood 
Memorial Hospital. Dr. Ahmad left both positions in 1998 to seek additional medical 
education and then returned to both positions in 2001. In 2004, the University hired Dr. 
Anna Louis to be the Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine, and as such, became the 
plaintiff’s ultimate (though not direct) superior. When Dr. Louis joined the faculty she 
met with each clinic doctor for 15 to 20 minutes, but spent an hour and a half with Dr. 
Ahmad discussing his resume in great detail.   
Dr. Ahmad believed Dr. Louis, targeted him for more intense supervision due to 
his national origin. He claimed that she scrutinized his productivity more than any of the 
other doctors under her supervision. Although Dr. Kaisar, Dr. Ahmad’s previous 
supervisor, stated that that Dr. Ahmad was a hard worker, Dr. Louis “took a long time to 
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be satisfied with his opinion of Dr. Ahmad.”  Ahmad alleges that Louis made several 
derogatory comments concerning Middle Easterners. In 2005, Dr. Louis opposed hiring 
another physician of Middle Eastern descent and remarked to a fellow colleague that 
“Middle Easterner’s are lazy” and when that physician joined the staff Louis commented 
to the same colleague, they had “hired another one.”  On several occasions, the plaintiff, 
Dr. Ahmad, met with Dr. Jeffrey Fitzgerald, the chair of the University’s Internal 
Medicine and Dr. Louis’ supervisor, to complain about Dr. Louis’ alleged harassment.   
 In 2006, Dr. Louis nominated Dr. Ahmad for a promotion, for which she wrote a 
letter of recommendation about his work that aided him in receiving the promotion.  
Despite this help, Dr. Ahmad continued to believe that Dr. Louis was biased against him 
due to his ethnic heritage. As a result, Dr. Ahmad negotiated his contract to continue 
working at Meadowood Memorial Hospital without remaining as a faculty member at the 
University under Dr. Louis’ supervision. Dr. Ahmad sent a letter along with his 
resignation from his University teaching position to several faculty members, including 
Dr. Fitzgerald, in which he stated that he was resigning due to the harassment he received 
from Dr. Louis. The letter stated that Louis’ harassment stemmed “from racial and 
cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims.”  After reading the letter, Dr. Fitzgerald 
expressed alarm at the accusations, which he believed publicly humiliated Dr. Louis.  Dr. 
Fitzgerald also commented to a colleague that he felt it was “important that Dr. Louis be 
exonerated.” 
 Meadowood Memorial Hospital had offered Dr. Ahmad a position as a staff 
physician as negotiated. However, upon  learning about the offer, Dr. Fitzgerald protested 
to Meadowood, claiming that the offer was inconsistent with the partnership agreement 
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between the University and Meadowood Memorial Hospital. Specifically, Fitzgerald 
argued that all staff physicians at the hospital should also be faculty members at the 
University. Meadowood Memorial Hospital withdrew the contract from Dr. Ahmad, 
effectively firing him from this position. The University Medical Center formally 
discharged Dr. Ahmad. 
 After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the 
United States District Court alleging two discrete violations of Title VII. The first was a 
status-based discrimination claim under §2000e-2(a) alleging that his constructive 
discharge from the University was due to the alleged racially motivated harassment he 
received from Dr. Louis. Dr. Ahmad’s second claim was that Dr. Fitzgerald’s efforts 
directing Meadowood Memorial Hospital fire him was in retaliation for complaining 
about Dr. Louis’ harassment in violation of §2000e-3(a).   
 
Just discrimination 
 After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the 
United States District Court alleging a status-based discrimination claim under §2000e-
2(a). The claim alleges that his constructive discharge from the University was due the 
alleged racially motivated harassment he received from Dr. Louis. 
Just retaliation 
 After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the 
United States District Court alleging that Dr. Fitzgerald’s efforts directing the Hospital 
fire him were in retaliation for complaining about Dr. Louis’ harassment in violation of 
§2000e-3(a) of Title VII.   
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Appendix C 
Motivating Factors 
 
Next, we would like you to answer some questions about why you think Dr. Ahmad 
was fired. 
 
To what extent was each of the following a motivating factor in the University 
Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to the decision to firing of Dr. Ahmad? 
A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some part in University Medical 
Center’s decision.  
 
1. Dr. Ahmad’s national origin. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
2. Meadowood Hospital’s rehiring policy.  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
3. Dr. Ahmad’s adversarial relationship with his supervisors. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
4. Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination complaint 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
5. Dr. Ahmad’s letter to the University Medical Center’s faculty. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
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Appendix D 
Judge’s Instructions (Regulatory focus manipulation) 
 
Promotion Focused 
Judge’s Instructions 
As a juror in this case, it is your job to achieve the satisfaction that comes from knowing 
you completed your job and achieved the best possible outcome. You should base your 
decision on the facts of the case as they apply to the following instructions. Using the 
case facts appropriately to reach an outcome will promote the ideal of fairness in the 
justice system. I hope that you will serve eagerly as an enthusiastic juror to aid the justice 
system in reaching the optimal and just decision for the parties in the case.  
 
 
Prevention Focused 
Judge’s Instructions 
As a juror in this case, it your job to avoid the dissatisfaction that comes from knowing 
you improperly completed your job and contributed to a miscarriage of justice. You 
should base your decision on the facts of the case as they apply to the following 
instructions. Using the case facts appropriately to reach an outcome will prevent the loss 
of the ideal of fairness in the justice system. I hope that you will serve vigilantly as a 
careful juror to aid the justice system in avoiding an incorrect miscarriage of justice for 
the parties in the case. 
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Appendix E 
Jury Instructions 
 
Instructions 
 
But-For Retaliation Instructions 
 
To establish a claim of retaliation, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, must prove each of the 
following three basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence  
 
Element 1: Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, complained about national origin discrimination; and 
Element 2: Defendant, University Medical Center, took an action that a reasonable 
employee would have found materially adverse – namely discharging Dr. Ahmad; and  
Element 3: The Plaintiff making a discrimination complaint was the determinative factor 
for the Defendant’s action to fire him. “Determinative Factor” means that the Defendant 
would not have taken the challenged employment decision but for the Plaintiff’s 
protected activity. 
 
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the statement is 
more likely true than not. 
 
A “Materially Adverse” action is any action by the employer that is likely to discourage a 
reasonable worker in the Plaintiff’s position from exercising his or her rights under Title 
VII.  
 
To establish element #3, Dr. Ahmad must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 1) 
that his discrimination complaint was the determinate cause of University Medical 
Center’s actions that ultimately led to its decision to fire Dr. Ahmad and 2) the University 
Medical Center would not have fired Dr. Ahmad if the administrators had not considered 
his discrimination complaint.  You must find for University Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad 
failed to prove both of these facts by a preponderance of the evidence.  
 
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the three basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that 
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the three basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor 
of the Defendant. 
 
  
 218 
Mixed Motive Retaliation Instructions 
 
To establish a claim of retaliation, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, must prove each of the 
following three basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:  
 
Element 1: Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, complained about national origin discrimination; and  
Element 2: Defendant, University Medical Center, took an action that a reasonable 
employee would have found materially adverse – namely discharging Dr. Ahmad; and  
Element 3: The Plaintiff making a discrimination complaint was a motivating factor for 
the Defendant’s action to fire him.  A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some 
part in the defendant's decision.  
 
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the statement is 
more likely true than not. 
 
A “Materially Adverse” action is any action by the employer that is likely to discourage a 
reasonable worker in the Plaintiff’s position from exercising his or her rights under Title 
VII.  
 
In showing that his discrimination complaint was a motivating factor for University 
Medical Center’ actions (element #3), Dr. Ahmad is not required to prove that his 
discrimination complaint was the sole motivation or even the primary motivation for 
University Medical Center’s actions. Dr. Ahmad need only prove that his discrimination 
complaint played a motivating part in University Medical Center’s actions to fire him 
even though other factors allowable under the law may also have motivated University 
Medical Center.  Your verdict must be in favor of University Medical Center if Dr. 
Ahmad failed to prove that his discrimination complaint was a motivating factor by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
 
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the three basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that 
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the three basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor 
of the Defendant. 
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But-For Discrimination Instructions 
 
To establish a claim of discrimination based on national origin, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, 
must prove each of the following two basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:  
 
Element 1: The Defendant, University Medical Center’s actions ultimately led to the 
firing Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad; and 
Element 2: The Plaintiff’s national origin was the determinative factor for the 
Defendant’s action. “Determinative Factor” means that the Defendant would not have 
taken the challenged employment decision but for the Plaintiff’s protected activity.  
 
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the truth of a 
statement is more likely than not likely. 
 
To establish element #3, Dr. Ahmad must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
1) his national origin was the determinate cause of  University Medical Center’s decision 
to fire Dr. Ahmad and that 2) the University Medical Center would not have fired Dr. 
Ahmad if the University administrators had not considered his national origin. You must 
find for University Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to prove both of these facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
 
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the two basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that 
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the two basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor 
of the Defendant. 
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Mixed Motive Discrimination Jury Instructions 
 
To establish a claim of discrimination based on national origin, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, 
must prove each of the following two basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:  
 
Element 1: The Defendant, University Medical Center’s actions ultimately led to the 
firing Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad; and 
Element 2: The Plaintiff’s national origin was a motivating factor for the Defendant’s 
actions.  A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some part in the defendant's 
decision.  
 
In showing that his national origin was a motivating factor for University Medical 
Center’s action (element #2), Dr. Ahmad is not required to prove that his national origin 
was the sole motivation or even the primary motivation for the University Medical 
Center’s decision to fire Dr. Ahmad. Dr. Ahmad need only prove that his national origin 
played a motivating part in University Medical Center’s action even though other factors 
allowable under the law may also have motivated University Medical Center to fire 
him.  Your verdict must be in favor of University Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to 
prove that his national origin was a motivating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the two basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that 
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the two basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor 
of the Defendant. 
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Appendix F 
Verdict and Evidence Decisions 
Wiener & Farnum (2013) 
 
Verdict 1:     With regard to the claim of discrimination I find in favor of:  
Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad      
Defendant, University Medical Center 
 
How certain are you of the verdict for discrimination?  
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Completely 
certain the 
defendant 
is not liable 
    Uncertain 
whether 
the 
defendant 
is liable 
    Completely 
certain the 
defendant 
is liable 
 
Verdict 2:     With regard to the claim of retaliation I find in favor of:  
Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad      
Defendant, University Medical Center 
 
How certain are you of the verdict for retaliation?  
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Completely 
certain the 
defendant 
is not liable 
    Uncertain 
whether 
the 
defendant 
is liable 
    Completely 
certain the 
defendant 
is liable 
 
 
 
Next, we would like you evaluate the scenario that you just read on several 
additional rating scales.  Select the number that best summarizes your opinion.  
 
1. How convincing was plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad’s evidence that University Medical Center 
violated Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination when Dr. Ahmad was fired? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Convincing 
Somewhat 
Convincing 
Very 
Convincing 
 
 
2. How convincing was defendant University Medical Center’s evidence that it did not 
violate Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination when Dr. Ahmad was fired? 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Convincing 
Somewhat 
Convincing 
Very 
Convincing 
 
 
  
3.  How convincing was plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad’s evidence that University Medical Center 
violated Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation when Dr. Ahmad was fired? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Convincing 
Somewhat 
Convincing 
Very 
Convincing 
4. How convincing was defendant University Medical Center’s evidence that it did not 
violate Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination when Dr. Ahmad was fired? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Convincing 
Somewhat 
Convincing 
Very 
Convincing 
5. For this case, on a scale of 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain), how 
certain must you be of the evidence to find that defendant University Medical Center 
violated Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination when Dr. Ahmad was fired? 
 
a.   0% convinced h.  35% convinced      o. 70% convinced 
b.   5% convinced i.  40%  convinced      p. 75% convinced 
c. 10% convinced j.  45%  convinced      q. 80% convinced 
d. 15% convinced k. 50%  convinced       r. 85% convinced 
e. 20% convinced l.  55%  convinced       s. 90% convinced 
f. 25% convinced m. 60% convinced       t. 95% convinced 
g. 30% convinced n. 65% convinced       u. 100% convinced 
 
6. For this case, on a scale of 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain), how 
certain must you be of the evidence to find that defendant University Medical Center 
violated Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation when Dr. Ahmad was fired? 
 
a.   0% convinced h.  35% convinced      o. 70% convinced 
b.   5% convinced i.  40%  convinced      p. 75% convinced 
c. 10% convinced j.  45%  convinced      q. 80% convinced 
d. 15% convinced k. 50%  convinced       r. 85% convinced 
e. 20% convinced l.  55%  convinced       s. 90% convinced 
f. 25% convinced m. 60% convinced       t. 95% convinced 
g. 30% convinced n. 65% convinced       u. 100% convinced 
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Appendix G 
Manipulation Checks 
 
Discrimination Only 
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier. 
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions. 
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views 
about national origin discrimination. We are interested in your understanding of 
the jury instructions that we supplied to you. 
 
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s national origin was 
the determining factor in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr. 
Ahmad being fired.  
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
  
 
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s 
national origin in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr. Ahmad 
being fired. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
 
3.  Have you heard of this case before you read it today? 
 a. yes 
 b. no 
 
 3b. If yes, were you familiar with the facts of this case? 
  a. yes 
  b. no 
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Retaliation Only 
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier. 
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions. 
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views 
about retaliation. We are interested in your understanding of the jury instructions 
that we supplied to you. 
 
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination 
complaint was the determining factor in University Medical Center’s actions that 
ultimately led to Dr. Ahmad being fired. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
  
 
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s 
discrimination complaint in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr. 
Ahmad being fired. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
 
3.  Have you heard of this case before you read it today? 
 a. yes 
 b. no 
 
 3b. If yes, were you familiar with the facts of this case? 
  a. yes 
  b. no 
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Discrimination and Retaliation  
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier. 
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions. 
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views 
about national origin discrimination or retaliation. We are interested in your 
understanding of the jury instructions that we supplied to you. 
 
DESCRIMINATION CHARGE: 
 
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s national origin was 
the determining factor in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr. 
Ahmad being fired. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
  
 
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s 
national origin in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr. Ahmad 
being fired. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
 
RETALIATION CHARGE: 
 
 
3. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination 
complaint was the determining factor in University Medical Center’s actions that 
ultimately led to Dr. Ahmad being fired. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify  
 
4. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s 
discrimination complaint in University Medical Center’s actions that ultimately led to Dr. 
Ahmad being fired. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
 
5.  Have you heard of this case before you read it today? 
 a. yes 
 b. no 
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Appendix H 
Demographics 
(1) Please provide your age.   ______ 
(2) Please provide your ethnic origin and/or race. (Check one)  
 ___   European American ___   African American 
 ___   Asian American  ___   Latino/a 
 ___   Hispanic   ___   Native American 
 ___   Middle Eastern  ___   Other Please specify 
_________________________ 
(3)  Sex 
       _____ Male ______ Female 
(4) What is your current marital status?             Select one: 
  
           Single                      Married                       Divorced                       Widowed   
  
(5) Which of the following best describes the area in which you are originally from? 
 ____ Urban   ____ Suburban 
 ____ Small town  ____ Rural 
(6) What is your religious preference (if any)? 
  
_____ Protestant                                       _____ Muslim                         _____ Atheist 
  
       _____ Catholic                                          _____  Hindu                          _____ Other 
                  
       _____ Jewish                                            _____ Agnostic 
 
(7) Do you have a current driver’s license?   ____ Yes  ____ No 
(8) Are you currently registered to vote?   ____ Yes  ____ No 
(9) Have you ever served on a jury   ____ Yes  ____ No 
(10) Please provide what best describes your current employment. 
 ____ Employed full-time _____ Unemployed 
 ____ Employed part-time _____ Student 
(11) What is your political affiliation? (check one) 
 ____ Democrat ____ Republican ____ Green Party 
 ____ Independent ____ Libertarian ____ Other 
(12) Please provide your political orientation on social issues. 
 ___ Very conservative 
 ___ Conservative 
 ___ Moderate 
 ___ Liberal 
 ___ Very liberal 
(13) Please provide your political orientation on economic issues. 
 ___ Very conservative 
 ___ Conservative 
 ___ Moderate 
 ___ Liberal 
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 ___ Very liberal 
 
(14) Please provide your highest level of education achieved. 
 ____ Less than high school diploma 
 ____ High school diploma/ G.E.D. 
 ____ Some college 
 ____ College graduate 
 ____ Advanced degree (Master’s degree, doctorate, etc.) 
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Appendix I 
Case Vignette –Not Promoted (Study 2) 
Based on University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (2013) 
 
 
  The defendant, University Medical Center, is an academic institution that 
specializes in medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists. 
University Hospital affiliates itself with a number of healthcare facilities including 
Meadowood Memorial Hospital.  The agreement between Meadowood Memorial 
Hospital and the University Medical Center permits medical students to gain real world 
experiences by working in the hospital. As part of its obligations under the agreement, 
Meadowood Memorial Hospital offers staff physician positions to the University’s 
faculty members.  
 The plaintiff, Daren Ahmad, a medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent, 
specializes in internal medicine and infectious diseases. In 1995 the University hired 
Ahmad to work jointly on the University’s faculty and as a staff physician as Meadowood 
Memorial Hospital. Dr. Ahmad left both positions in 1998 to seek additional medical 
education and then returned to both positions in 2001. In 2004, the University hired Dr. 
Anna Louis to be the Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine, and as such, became the 
plaintiff’s ultimate (though not direct) superior. When Dr. Louis joined the faculty she 
met with each clinic doctor for 15 to 20 minutes, but spent an hour and a half with Dr. 
Ahmad discussing his resume in great detail.   
Dr. Ahmad believed Dr. Louis, targeted him for more intense supervision due to 
his national origin. He claimed that she scrutinized his productivity more than any of the 
other doctors under her supervision. Although Dr. Kaisar, Dr. Ahmad’s previous 
supervisor, stated that that Dr. Ahmad was a hard worker, Dr. Louis “took a long time to 
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be satisfied with his opinion of Dr. Ahmad.”  Ahmad alleges that Louis made several 
derogatory comments concerning Middle Easterners. In 2005, Dr. Louis opposed hiring 
another physician of Middle Eastern descent and remarked to a fellow colleague that 
“Middle Easterner’s are lazy” and when that physician joined the staff Louis commented 
to the same colleague, they had “hired another one.”  On several occasions, the plaintiff, 
Dr. Ahmad, met with Dr. Jeffrey Fitzgerald, the chair of the University’s Internal 
Medicine and Dr. Louis’ supervisor, to complain about Dr. Louis’ alleged harassment.   
 In 2006, Dr. Louis nominated Dr. Ahmad for a promotion, for which she wrote a 
letter of recommendation about his work that aided him in receiving the promotion.  
Despite this help, Dr. Ahmad continued to believe that Dr. Louis was biased against him 
due to his ethnic heritage. As a result, Dr. Ahmad applied for a promotion within 
Meadowood Memorial Hospital as head of Infectious Disease that would remove him as 
a faculty member for the University, and thus no longer be supervised by Dr. Louis. 
Upon favorably interviewing for the position at Meadowood Memorial Hospital, Dr. 
Ahmad sent a letter along with his resignation from his University teaching position to 
several faculty members, including Dr. Fitzgerald, in which he stated that he was 
resigning due to the harassment he received from Dr. Louis. The letter stated that Louis’ 
harassment stemmed “from racial and cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims.”  After 
reading the letter, Dr. Fitzgerald expressed alarm at the accusations, which he believed 
publicly humiliated Dr. Louis.  Dr. Fitzgerald also commented to a colleague that he felt 
it was “important that Dr. Louis be exonerated.” 
 Meadowood Memorial Hospital had, during this time, privately stated their 
intention to offer Dr. Ahmad the promotion. On learning about the potential promotion, 
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Dr. Fitzgerald protested to Meadowood, claiming that the promotion was inconsistent 
with the partnership agreement between the University and Meadowood Memorial 
Hospital. Specifically, Fitzgerald argued that all staff physicians at the hospital should 
also be faculty members at the University. Meadowood Memorial Hospital offered the 
promotion to another applicant and the University Medical Center formally discharged 
Dr. Ahmad. 
 After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the 
United States District Court alleging two discrete violations of Title VII. The first was a 
status-based discrimination claim under §2000e-2(a) alleging that his constructive 
discharge from the University was due to the alleged racially motivated harassment he 
received from Dr. Louis. Dr. Ahmad’s second claim was that Dr. Fitzgerald’s efforts 
directing Meadowood Memorial Hospital to not offer him the promotion was in 
retaliation for complaining about Dr. Louis’ harassment in violation of §2000e-3(a).   
 
Just discrimination 
 After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the 
United States District Court alleging a status-based discrimination claim under §2000e-
2(a). The claim alleges that his constructive discharge from the University was due the 
alleged racially motivated harassment he received from Dr. Louis. 
Just retaliation 
 After exhausting administrative remedies, Dr. Ahmad filed a Title VII suit in the 
United States District Court alleging that Dr. Fitzgerald’s efforts directing the Hospital to 
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not offer him the promotion was in retaliation for complaining about Dr. Louis’ 
harassment in violation of §2000e-3(a) of Title VII.   
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Appendix J 
Jury Instructions 
 
But-For Retaliation Instructions 
 
To establish a claim of retaliation, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, must prove each of the 
following three basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence  
 
Element 1: Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, complained about national origin discrimination; and 
Element 2: Defendant, University Medical Center, took an action that a reasonable 
employee would have found materially adverse – denial of a promotion; and  
Element 3: The Plaintiff making a discrimination complaint was the determinative factor 
for the Defendant’s action – denial of a promotion. “Determinative Factor” means that 
the Defendant would not have taken the challenged employment decision but for the 
Plaintiff’s protected activity. 
 
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the statement is 
more likely true than not. 
 
A “Materially Adverse” action is any action by the employer that is likely to discourage a 
reasonable worker in the Plaintiff’s position from exercising his or her rights under Title 
VII.  
 
To establish element #3, Dr. Ahmad must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 1) 
that his discrimination complaint was the determinate cause of University Medical 
Center’s actions that ultimately led to its decision deny Dr. Ahmad his promotion and 2) 
the University Medical Center would have promoted Dr. Ahmad if the administrators had 
not considered his discrimination complaint.  You must find for University Medical 
Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to prove both of these facts by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  
 
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the three basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that 
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the three basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor 
of the Defendant. 
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Mixed Motive Retaliation Instructions 
 
To establish a claim of retaliation, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, must prove each of the 
following three basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:  
 
 
Element 1: Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, complained about national origin discrimination; and  
Element 2: Defendant, University Medical Center, took an action that a reasonable 
employee would have found materially adverse – namely denying Dr. Ahmad his 
promotion; and  
Element 3: The Plaintiff making a discrimination complaint was a motivating factor for 
the Defendant’s action to deny him his promotion.  A “motivating factor” is a factor that 
played some part in the defendant's decision.  
 
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the statement is 
more likely true than not. 
 
A “Materially Adverse” action is any action by the employer that is likely to discourage a 
reasonable worker in the Plaintiff’s position from exercising his or her rights under Title 
VII.  
 
In showing that his discrimination complaint was a motivating factor for University 
Medical Center’ actions (element #3), Dr. Ahmad is not required to prove that his 
discrimination complaint was the sole motivation or even the primary motivation for 
University Medical Center’s actions. Dr. Ahmad need only prove that his discrimination 
complaint played a motivating part in University Medical Center’s actions to deny him 
his promotion even though other factors allowable under the law may also have 
motivated University Medical Center.  Your verdict must be in favor of University 
Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to prove that his discrimination complaint was a 
motivating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the three basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that 
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the three basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor 
of the Defendant. 
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But-For Discrimination Instructions 
 
To establish a claim of discrimination based on national origin, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, 
must prove each of the following two basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:  
 
 
Element 1: The Defendant, University Medical Center’s actions ultimately led to failing 
to promote Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad; and 
Element 2: The Plaintiff’s national origin was the determinative factor for the 
Defendant’s action not to promote him. “Determinative Factor” means that the Defendant 
would not have taken the challenged employment decision but for the Plaintiff’s 
protected activity.  
 
“Preponderance of the evidence” means that according to the evidence the truth of a 
statement is more likely than not likely. 
 
 
To establish element #3, Dr. Ahmad must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
1) his national origin was the determinate cause of  University Medical Center’s decision 
not to promote Dr. Ahmad and that 2) the University Medical Center would have 
promoted Dr. Ahmad if the University administrators had not considered his national 
origin. You must find for University Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to prove both of 
these facts by a preponderance of the evidence.  
 
 
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the two basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that 
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the two basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor 
of the Defendant. 
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Mixed Motive Discrimination Jury Instructions 
 
To establish a claim of discrimination based on national origin, the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, 
must prove each of the following two basic elements by a preponderance of the evidence:  
 
Element 1: The Defendant, University Medical Center’s actions ultimately led to failing 
to promote Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad; and 
Element 2: The Plaintiff’s national origin was a motivating factor for the Defendant’s 
action not to promote him.  A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some part in the 
defendant's decision.  
 
In showing that his national origin was a motivating factor for University Medical 
Center’s action (element #2), Dr. Ahmad is not required to prove that his national origin 
was the sole motivation or even the primary motivation for the University Medical 
Center’s decision not to promote Dr. Ahmad. Dr. Ahmad need only prove that his 
national origin played a motivating part in University Medical Center’s action even 
though other factors allowable under the law may also have motivated University 
Medical Center to deny him a promotion.  Your verdict must be in favor of University 
Medical Center if Dr. Ahmad failed to prove that his national origin was a motivating 
factor by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
If you find that the Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad, has proven each of the two basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find for the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant, University Medical Center, on this claim. If, on the other hand, you find that 
the Plaintiff has failed to prove any one or more of the two basic elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find against him on this claim and in favor 
of the Defendant. 
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Appendix K 
Manipulation Checks 
 
Discrimination Only 
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier. 
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions. 
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views 
about national origin discrimination. We are interested in your understanding of 
the jury instructions that we supplied to you. 
 
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s national origin was 
the determining factor in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad his 
promotion.  
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
  
 
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s 
national origin in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad his 
promotion. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
 
3.  Have you heard of this case before you read it today? 
 a. yes 
 b. no 
 
 3b. If yes, were you familiar with the facts of this case? 
  a. yes 
  b. no 
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Retaliation Only 
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier. 
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions. 
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views 
about retaliation. We are interested in your understanding of the jury instructions 
that we supplied to you. 
 
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination 
complaint was the determining factor in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. 
Ahmad a promotion. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
  
 
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s 
discrimination complaint in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad a 
promotion. 
. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
 
3.  Have you heard of this case before you read it today? 
 a. yes 
 b. no 
 
 3b. If yes, were you familiar with the facts of this case? 
  a. yes 
  b. no 
  
 238 
Discrimination and Retaliation  
The following questions are about the jury instructions that you read earlier. 
Answer each question to the best of your ability based upon only those instructions. 
These questions are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views 
about national origin discrimination or retaliation. We are interested in your 
understanding of the jury instructions that we supplied to you. 
 
DISCRIMINATION CHARGE:  
 
1. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s national origin was 
the determining factor in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad his 
promotion . 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
  
 
2. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s 
national origin in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad his 
promotion. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
 
RETALIATION CHARGE:  
 
3. University Medical Center violated Title VII only if Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination 
complaint was the determining factor in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. 
Ahmad his promotion.  
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify  
 
4. University Medical Center violated Title VII if they merely considered Dr. Ahmad’s 
discrimination complaint in University Medical Center’s decision to deny Dr. Ahmad his 
promotion. 
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
 
5.  Have you heard of this case before you read it today? 
 a. yes 
 b. no 
 
 5b. If yes, were you familiar with the facts of this case? 
  a. yes 
 239 
  b. no 
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Appendix L 
Motivating Factors 
 
Next, we would like you to answer some questions about why you think Dr. Ahmad 
was not promoted. 
 
To what extent was each of the following a motivating factor in University Medical 
Center’s actions that may have led Meadowood Memorial Hospital to not promote 
Dr. Ahmad? A “motivating factor” is a factor that played some part in University 
Medical Center’s decision.  
 
1. Dr. Ahmad’s national origin. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
2. Hospital’s rehiring policy.  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
3. Dr. Ahmad’s relationship with his supervisors. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
4. Dr. Ahmad’s letter to the University Medical Center’s faculty. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
5. Dr. Ahmad’s discrimination complaint 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
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Appendix M 
Verdict and Evidence Decisions 
Wiener & Farnum (2013) 
 
Verdict 1:     With regard to the claim of discrimination in the denial of promotion I 
find in favor of:  
Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad      
Defendant, University Medical Center 
 
How certain are you of the verdict for discrimination?  
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Completely 
certain the 
defendant 
is not liable 
    Uncertain 
whether 
the 
defendant 
is liable 
    Completely 
certain the 
defendant 
is liable 
 
Verdict 2:     With regard to the claim of retaliation in the denial of promotion I find 
in favor of:  
Plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad      
Defendant, University Medical Center 
 
How certain are you of the verdict for retaliation?  
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Completely 
certain the 
defendant 
is not liable 
    Uncertain 
whether 
the 
defendant 
is liable 
    Completely 
certain the 
defendant 
is liable 
 
 
Next, we would like you evaluate the scenario that you just read on several 
additional rating scales.  Select the number that best summarizes your opinion.  
 
7. How convincing was plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad’s evidence that University Medical Center 
violated Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination when Dr. Ahmad 
was denied promotion? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Convincing 
Somewhat 
Convincing 
Very 
Convincing 
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8. How convincing was defendant University Medical Center’s evidence that it did not 
violate Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination when Dr. Ahmad 
was denied promotion? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Convincing 
Somewhat 
Convincing 
Very 
Convincing 
 
 
  
9.  How convincing was plaintiff, Dr. Ahmad’s evidence that University Medical Center 
violated Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation when Dr. Ahmad was denied 
promotion? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Convincing 
Somewhat 
Convincing 
Very 
Convincing 
 
10. How convincing was defendant University Medical Center’s evidence that it did not 
violate Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation when Dr. Ahmad was denied 
promotion? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not At All 
Convincing 
Somewhat 
Convincing 
Very 
Convincing 
 
11. For this case, on a scale of 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain), how 
certain must you be of the evidence to find that defendant University Medical Center 
violated Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination when Dr. Ahmad 
was denied promotion? 
 
h.   0% convinced h.  35% convinced      o. 70% convinced 
i.   5% convinced i.  40%  convinced      p. 75% convinced 
j. 10% convinced j.  45%  convinced      q. 80% convinced 
k. 15% convinced k. 50%  convinced       r. 85% convinced 
l. 20% convinced l.  55%  convinced       s. 90% convinced 
m. 25% convinced m. 60% convinced       t. 95% convinced 
n. 30% convinced n. 65% convinced       u. 100% convinced 
 
12. For this case, on a scale of 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain), how 
certain must you be of the evidence to find that defendant University Medical Center 
violated Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation when Dr. Ahmad was denied 
promotion? 
 
h.   0% convinced h.  35% convinced      o. 70% convinced 
i.   5% convinced i.  40%  convinced      p. 75% convinced 
j. 10% convinced j.  45%  convinced      q. 80% convinced 
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k. 15% convinced k. 50%  convinced       r. 85% convinced 
l. 20% convinced l.  55%  convinced       s. 90% convinced 
m. 25% convinced m. 60% convinced       t. 95% convinced 
n. 30% convinced n. 65% convinced       u. 100% convinced 
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Appendix N 
Resumes 
 
Applicant 1: Daren Ahmad 
 
Education 
Fellowship Duke University Medical Center, Infectious Disease 
Residency Wayne State University School of Medicine, Internal Medicine 
M.D.   George Washington University School of Medicine 
B.S.  Vanderbilt University, Biology 
 
Current Appointments 
Associate Professor, Department of Medicine (Infectious Disease) 
Staff Physician, University Medical Center, Infectious Disease Division  
 
Research Interests 
• Hollow fiber culture system 
• Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
• Pharmacokinetics/pharmacodynamics of antitubercular therapy 
 
Reference feedback 
§ Required multiple reminders to up-date client database. 
§ Skilled at acquiring and maintaining relationships with patients and students.   
§ He has difficulty making deadlines on projects and grant proposals 
§ He’s creative in his development of patient-oriented research 
§ Often takes long breaks on a daily basis. 
§ Keeps himself informed on current trends in research and funding opportunities.   
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Applicant 2: Amir Nassar 
 
Education 
Fellowship New York University School of Medicine, Infectious Disease 
Residency New York University School of Medicine, Internal Medicine 
M.D.   University of Tennessee College of Medicine 
B.S.  Stanford University, Human Biology 
 
Current Appointments 
Associate Professor, Department of Medicine (Infectious Disease) 
Staff Physician, University Medical Center, Infectious Disease Division 
 
Research Interests 
• Clinical outcomes in musculoskeletal and diabetic foot infections 
• Innovations in graduate medical education 
• Prevention of surgical site infections 
 
 
Reference feedback 
§ Shows he is trustworthy by keeping clients’ personal information confidential.  
§ Was unresponsive to supervisor suggestions on how to improve administrative 
skills. 
§ Researched changes in patient pharmacy plan benefit information to stay current.   
§ Would not respond to student requests for information in a timely manner. 
§ Maintained a professional relationship with medical technicians, resulting in 
faster tests for his patients 
§ Would sometimes complain about student requests for coverage information. 
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Applicant 3: Omar Saab 
 
Education 
Fellowship Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center, Infectious Disease 
Residency Ohio State University College of Medicine, Infectious Disease 
M.D.   Northeast Ohio Medical University 
B.S.  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chemistry 
 
Current Appointments 
Associate Professor, Department of Medicine (Infectious Disease) 
Staff Physician, University Medical Center, Infectious Disease Division  
 
Research Interests 
• HIV and HPV co-infection 
• LGBT Research with a Focus on Transgender Care 
• STDs with a Focus on HPV and Anal Dysplasia 
 
 
Reference feedback 
§ He has a good work ethic, often staying late to complete projects. 
§ Has a tendency to boast of his accomplishments to others when he believes his 
supervisor is not within earshot. 
§ Shows he is creative by designing brand new marketing campaigns. 
§ Requires considerable time locating proposals because he keeps a cluttered 
working environment. 
§ Shows confidence when proposing new research initiatives.   
§ Doesn’t like to work with others on projects. 
 
 
 
Experimental Condition 
Feedback 
• Recently filed a complaint of national origin discrimination against his unit 
supervisor. 
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Appendix O 
Task Description and Regulatory Focus Manipulation 
 
 
Firing  
Promotion Focused 
 
Job Description 
 
You currently work for the University Medical Center as the division supervisor of 
Infectious Diseases. The Medical Center is an academic institution that specializes in 
medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists. All staff 
physicians and unit supervisors under your supervision are faculty members of the 
University and mentor medical students. The Medical Center needs to cut the number of 
staff physicians in your division and has asked that you dismiss one of the physicians. 
You are to review three resumes of current employees and choose which one should be 
let go. It is your job to achieve the satisfaction that comes from knowing you completed 
your job and achieved the best possible outcome for the Medical Center. You should 
serve eagerly as an enthusiastic manager to aid the hospital in reaching the optimal and 
best decision given the doctors that you are reviewing. You should base this decision on 
the resumes you have in front of you. Use the resumes appropriately to reach an outcome 
that will promote the ideal of fairness in the workplace.  
 
 
Prevention Focused 
 
Job Description 
 
You currently work for the University Medical Center as the division supervisor of 
Infectious Diseases. The Medical Center is an academic institution that specializes in 
medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists. All staff 
physicians and unit supervisors under your supervision are faculty members of the 
University and mentor medical students. The Medical Center needs to cut the number of 
staff physicians in your division and has asked that you dismiss one of the physicians. 
You are to review three resumes of current employees and choose which one to let go. It 
is your job to avoid the dissatisfaction that comes from knowing you improperly 
completed your job and contributed to dismissing the wrong person. You should serve 
vigilantly as a careful manager to aid the hospital in avoiding the incorrect decision and a 
miscarriage of justice given the doctors that you are reviewing. You should base this 
decision on the resumes you have in front of you. Use the resumes appropriately to reach 
an outcome that will prevent the loss of the ideal of fairness in the workplace.  
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Promotion Decision 
Promotion focused 
 
Job Description 
 
You currently work for the University Medical Center as the division supervisor of 
Infectious Diseases. The Medical Center is an academic institution that specializes in 
medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists. All staff 
physicians and unit supervisors under your supervision are faculty members of the 
University and mentor medical students. The Medical Center wants to add a second 
supervisor in the research unit and has asked that you promote one of the staff physicians. 
You are to review three resumes of current employees and choose which one should be 
promoted. It is your job to achieve the satisfaction that comes from knowing you 
completed your job and achieved the best possible outcome for the Medical Center. You 
should serve eagerly as an enthusiastic manager to aid the hospital in reaching the 
optimal and best decision given the doctors that you are reviewing. You should base this 
decision on the resumes you have in front of you. Use the resumes appropriately to reach 
an outcome that will promote the ideal of fairness in the workplace.  
 
Prevention Focused 
 
Job Description 
 
You currently work for the University Medical Center as the division supervisor of 
Infectious Diseases. The Medical Center is an academic institution that specializes in 
medical education for medical students, health professionals, and scientists. All staff 
physicians and unit supervisors under your supervision are faculty members of the 
University and mentor medical students. The Medical Center wants to add a second 
supervisor in the research unit and has asked that you promote one of the staff physicians. 
You are to review three resumes of current employees and choose which one to promote. 
It is your job to avoid the dissatisfaction that comes from knowing you improperly 
completed your job and contributed to promoting the wrong person. You should serve 
vigilantly as a careful manager to aid the hospital in avoiding the incorrect decision and a 
miscarriage of justice given the doctors that you are reviewing. You should base this 
decision on the resumes you have in front of you. Use the resumes appropriately to reach 
an outcome that will prevent the loss of the ideal of fairness in the workplace.  
 
 
  
 249 
Appendix P 
HR Policy and Causal Manipulation 
 
Number: HR 2.05 
Policy Title: Employment Decisions 
 
Purpose 
 
Guidance in policy considerations in employment decisions.  
 
Employment Decision Details 
A. Recruitment processes should result in the most diverse and qualified applicant pool 
possible. 
B. Selection practices should emphasize hiring the best-qualified individuals with due 
consideration for persons from underrepresented groups.  
a. Underrepresented groups include racial/ethnic minorities, women, sexual 
orientation, religious groups etc.  
C. The Office of Human Resources must approve any reductions in work force.  
a. Decisions to make reductions in staff who are represented by labor unions 
must not violate collective bargaining agreements.  
b. Managers should approach reduction in workforce situations with sensitivity. 
They must balance organizational needs with human resource considerations 
such as affirmative action objectives, compliance with university policies, 
and applicable collective bargaining agreements.  
D. Managers should give rewards and promotions for significant outstanding 
performance that they advances unit goals that they are tied to specific 
accomplishments. 
a. Managers should take care to communicate and distribute rewards and 
promotions so that employees do not view them as entitlements 
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But-For 
Number: HR 2.05a 
Policy Title: Legal Considerations in Employment Decisions 
 
Purpose 
 
Guidance in policy considerations in employment decisions.  
 
Legal Considerations Details 
A. Management practices should emphasize prevention of discrimination and 
harassment.  
a. Discrimination and harassment is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), American with Disabilities 
Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act.  
b. All of these federal laws prohibit retaliating against someone who files a 
charge of discrimination, participates in a discrimination proceeding, or 
otherwise opposes an unlawful employment practice.  
a. Under federal law, retaliation occurs only if the discrimination complaint is 
the determinative factor for an adverse action. A determinative factor 
means that the adverse action would not have taken place but for the 
employee making a discrimination complaint. It is not illegal for the 
organization to consider the impact of a disgruntled employee’s complaint, 
but it is illegal for the decision maker to base the decision on the fact that an 
employee made a discrimination complaint. If the defendant made an adverse 
decision against an employee because the worker made a discrimination 
complaint against the employer, than that constitutes illegal retaliation.  
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Mixed Motive 
Number: HR 2.05a 
Policy Title: Legal Considerations in Employment Decisions 
 
Purpose 
 
Guidance in policy considerations in employment decisions.  
 
B. Legal Considerations Details 
C. Management practices should emphasize prevention of discrimination and 
harassment.  
a. Discrimination and harassment is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), American with Disabilities 
Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act.  
b. All of these federal laws prohibit retaliating against someone who files a 
charge of discrimination, participates in a discrimination proceeding, or 
otherwise opposes an unlawful employment practice.  
c. Under federal law, retaliation occurs if a decision maker considers an 
employee’s discrimination complaint when making an adverse decision 
against the employee even if the decision making also considers legitimate 
reasons along with the discrimination complaint. That means the 
discrimination complaint may not be a motivating factor in the adverse 
decision. A motivating factor is a factor that played some role in the decision. 
If the defendant relied on the information that an employee made a 
discrimination complaint to take an adverse action against the employee, than 
that constitutes illegal retaliation.  
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Appendix Q 
Decision Measure 
Please answer the following questions. 
 
1. Which of the three applicants that you have reviewed would you promote (let 
go)? 
a. Daren Ahmad 
b. Amir Nassar 
c. Omar Saab 
 
2. How confident are you in your promotion decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at all 
confident 
   Somewhat 
confident  
   Very 
confident 
 
3. Please rank the applicants in the order in which you would promote (let them go) 
with 1 being most likely to promote (let go) and 3 being least likely to promote 
(let go). 
 
4. To what extent did you consider application qualification in your decision? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
5. To what extent did you consider applicant education in your decision? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
6. To what extent did you consider the favorable qualities of the applicants in your 
decision? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not 
at 
All 
 Very 
Little 
   Somewhat   Quite 
a bit 
 Extremely 
 
7. To what extent did you consider the unfavorable qualities of the applicants in 
your decision? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Not  Very    Somewhat   Quite  Extremely 
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at 
All 
Little a bit 
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Appendix R 
Manipulation Checks 
 
The following questions are about the policy that you read earlier. Answer each 
question to the best of your ability based upon only the policy guide. These questions 
are NOT opinion questions. We are not interested in your views about retaliation. 
We are interested in your correct understanding of the policy. 
 
1. Retaliation occurs only if the discrimination complaint was the determinative factor in 
an adverse decision. That is, but for the making of the discrimination complaint the 
adverse action would not have occurred.  
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
  
 
2. Retaliation occurs even if the discrimination complaint played only a role in the 
adverse decision along with other legitimate factors.  That is the discrimination complaint 
was a motivating factor.  
 a. True 
 b. False 
 c. The instruction did not specify 
 
